Introduction
More than two and a half years have passed since Russia invaded Ukraine. The scale of the war is immense and difficult to fully comprehend. On January 1, 2024, approximately 26% of Ukrainian territories were under Russian occupation (Ukrinform, February 5, 2024). Furthermore, the Wall Street Journal, citing its sources, reported that the total number of dead and injured soldiers from both sides might be as high as one million. Beyond the human toll, the war has had a catastrophic impact on Ukraine’s demography and economy. According to the UN Refugee Agency, by the end of 2023, 3.7 million Ukrainians were internally displaced, and 6.3 million were refugees abroad. Birth rates remain alarmingly low, and the prolonged conflict is expected to exacerbate this demographic crisis.
The economic impact is equally dire. The Ukrainian government estimates that the war has inflicted nearly $500 billion in economic damage. This poses a severe challenge because financial strength is a critical factor in sustaining military efforts. Additionally, the disparity between the economies of Ukraine and Russia makes a long-term war unsustainable for Kyiv. As a result, new strategies are urgently required. While various peace proposals have been suggested, President Zelenskyy’s Victory Plan is the most ambitious and controversial. This article examines the key points of the Victory Plan and evaluates its feasibility in bringing the war to an end.
Main Points of the Victory Plan
To analyse the Victory Plan, it is essential to outline its main components. According to Waterhouse, the Ukrainian president highlighted five key points in parliament. The first is the invitation for Ukraine to join the NATO military alliance. The second involves strengthening Ukraine’s defence against Russian forces, including obtaining permission from allies to use their long-range weapons on Russian territory and continuing military operations there to prevent the creation of “buffer zones” in Ukraine. The third point proposes deploying a non-nuclear strategic deterrent package on Ukrainian soil to contain Russia. The fourth focuses on joint protection by the US and the EU of Ukraine’s critical natural resources, as well as the shared utilisation of their economic potential. Lastly, the fifth point pertains to the post-war period and suggests replacing some US troops stationed across Europe with Ukrainian soldiers.
While these policy suggestions reflect a strategic vision, only the first two have the potential to significantly influence the war’s outcome in Ukraine’s favour. The remaining points primarily target post-war measures intended to deter further aggression from the Russian Federation. Crucially, the success of any potential peace treaty depends heavily on the political and economic support of Ukraine’s Western allies.
Ukraine’s Accession to NATO
Kyiv’s accession to NATO, a central and highly contentious element of the Victory Plan, is seen by President Zelenskyy as the only viable path to peace. However, this goal faces substantial resistance from Western allies. According to Julianne Smith, the US ambassador to NATO, the alliance is not prepared to offer Ukraine membership or an invitation at this time. Similarly, Berlin and Washington have expressed concerns about the potential for direct confrontation with Moscow. Slovakia and Hungary, known for their more cautious stances, are even less supportive.
Ukraine’s NATO membership remains a red line for many Western capitals, as it is viewed as a move that would inevitably escalate tensions with Russia. Consequently, achieving this objective under current geopolitical conditions appears unrealistic. Nonetheless, Zelenskyy continues to advocate strongly for NATO membership as a key to ensuring Ukraine’s security and long-term peace.
Permission for Long-Range Strikes
The second proposal in the Victory Plan—obtaining permission to strike Russian territories with Western long-range missiles—is equally controversial. Western allies remain hesitant to provide such support, citing fears of escalating the conflict further. For example, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has repeatedly emphasised that Germany will not supply Ukraine with Taurus long-range missiles, even if other NATO states permit their use on Russian territory.
This limitation poses significant challenges for Ukraine’s military strategy, as the inability to use long-range weapons restricts its capacity to target Russian reserves and critical infrastructure effectively. Without such capabilities, Ukraine’s ability to conduct successful counter-offensives is considerably weakened.
Strategic Deterrence and Post-War Military Collaboration
The third policy point—deploying a non-nuclear deterrent package on Ukrainian soil—is closely tied to Ukraine’s NATO ambitions. Without NATO membership, this measure is unlikely to materialise, as it could be perceived as a direct provocation by Russia, escalating tensions between Moscow and Western powers.
The fifth point, involving the replacement of some US troops in Europe with Ukrainian soldiers, is primarily a post-war initiative. While it may strengthen long-term military cooperation between Ukraine and NATO, it holds little relevance to ending the current conflict.
Limitations of the Victory Plan
The primary weakness of the Victory Plan lies in its detachment from current geopolitical realities. Many of its proposals, such as NATO membership and the authorization of long-range strikes on Russian territory, are seen as too radical by Ukraine’s Western allies. These measures risk escalating the conflict and drawing NATO states into direct confrontation with Russia—a scenario most Western capitals are keen to avoid.
Moreover, time is not on Ukraine’s side. Prolonged conflict will further weaken its economy and demographic resilience. Meanwhile, Moscow’s allies, such as North Korea and Iran, continue to supply military equipment and, in some cases, even deploy personnel. On the other hand, Western support for Ukraine is not guaranteed to remain at its current levels, particularly as the United States faces an election year. The outcome of the US elections could significantly influence the feasibility of the Victory Plan, as Washington’s support is critical for its implementation.
Conclusion
President Zelenskyy’s Victory Plan presents an ambitious framework for ending the Russian-Ukrainian war and securing Ukraine’s future. However, its key proposals lack alignment with the current political climate among Ukraine’s Western allies. The plan’s reliance on NATO membership and long-range missile capabilities risks alienating crucial partners and escalating tensions with Moscow. Consequently, the Victory Plan, in its current form, appears more suited to outlining Ukraine’s strategic priorities than offering a realistic pathway to peace. Significant revisions are needed to adapt the plan to the geopolitical realities of today, ensuring that it aligns with the capacities and willingness of Ukraine’s allies to support its goals.