Introduction
In the Western Balkans, the democratic state of affairs has been deteriorating over the past decade and it was exacerbated by the economic crisis of 2008, as well as numerous crises within the European Union (EU), which diverted the Union’s attention away from the enlargement process. Autocratic leaders in the Western Balkans have established their rule using informal power structures, state capture orchestrated by ruling parties, the dispensation of patronage, and control over media outlets. Some nations grapple with complex and detrimental institutional arrangements, as observed in the case of Bosnia, which incentivizes destructive behaviour among ruling elites. Conversely, others face severe inter-party polarization, as exemplified by Albania.
The extent to which incumbents disregard democratic institutions and norms varies significantly among these nations. For instance, Macedonia witnessed the dominant party, VMRO-DPMNE, from 2006 to 2016, engaging in blatant electoral manipulation and extensive patronage, whereas Albania has experienced frequent and relatively feasible alternation of power.
The Bertelsmann Transformation Index, a prominent benchmark for assessing democracy, categorizes these countries as either having defective or strongly defective democracies. Kosovo, the lowest-ranked Western Balkan country, ranks similar to Paraguay or Georgia, while Montenegro stands as the best-ranked country, albeit still below Brazil in terms of democratic performance.
The upshot of these developments is the emergence of a regional “stabilitocracy” characterized by frail democracies led by individuals with autocratic inclinations. These leaders maintain their grip on power through informal patronage networks and purport to offer pro-Western stability within the region. Notable, the European Union, along with several of its member states, has shown tolerance toward this prevailing state of affairs.
EU’s Support to Stabilitocracy States in the Balkans
Considering the above-mentioned negative human rights situation in the Balkans, the question arises: Why does EU support autocratic countries in the region? Some have criticized the EU for its perceived support of authoritarian regimes in globally. While it is challenging to make sweeping generalizations about the EU’s stance on authoritarian regimes, several factors explain why the EU may engage with such governments in certain situations.
One of the key reasons the EU may engage with authoritarian regimes is pragmatism. The EU often prioritizes stability and security in its neighbouring regions to protect its interests. In some cases, it engages authoritarian governments if it believes that doing so can help prevent conflict, address security threats, or promote economic stability. The EU has maintained relations with Serbia, even during periods of political uncertainty and authoritarian tendencies. Serbia’s role in regional stability and the normalization of relations with Kosovo is a key consideration for the EU, leading to pragmatic engagement.
Moreover, the EU has a history of engaging in human rights dialogues with authoritarian governments. While this engagement can be criticized as legitimizing these regimes, it may provide an opportunity to press for human rights improvements. Such dialogues are typically conducted in parallel with diplomatic efforts aimed at encouraging democratic reforms. For example, while not strictly authoritarian, North Macedonia has faced human rights challenges. The EU has been involved in dialogues aimed at addressing these issues while supporting the country’s accession to the EU. This effort has helped North Macedonia improve human rights, as also confirmed by the European Commission itself.
Furthermore, conflict resolution is a critical aspect of the European Union’s foreign policy, and it often involves engaging with authoritarian governments when necessary to address conflicts and promote peace and stability, as in the Balkans. The Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, while challenging recently and sometimes contentious, has made progress in normalizing relations between the two parties. Despite criticism for its authoritarian tendencies, the EU’s approach to engaging with Serbia’s government has been driven by the overarching goal of conflict resolution and regional stability.
However, the EU’s approach to promoting democratic reforms in the Western Balkans has faced several shortcomings.
First, instead of addressing the deep-seated issues of corruption and clientelism and fostering genuine political and societal transformation, the EU’s approach in the Western Balkans has primarily involved providing financial and technical assistance to governments to adopt EU regulations on paper. This has resulted in surface-level norm adoption without altering the region’s political realities.
Secondly, the EU’s expectations regarding the rule of law are often unclear. While the Copenhagen Criteria require democratic institutions and respect for the rule of law, translating these principles into specific benchmarks is challenging. This lack of clarity hampers the enforcement of conditions, particularly those concerning the rule of law and media freedom.
Thirdly, the EU’s country reports tend to focus on the formal adoption of EU regulations rather than their actual implementation and enforcement. These reports often fail to capture democratic setbacks, offering vague assessments that mislead both EU and Western Balkan citizens.
Fourth, the EU is hesitant to publicly condemn Western Balkan leaders who fail to make progress in rule of law reforms. It rarely uses instruments like the ‘imbalance clause’ to suspend negotiations in other chapters, preferring instead to provide financial support, inadvertently supporting authoritarian tendencies.
Finally, the EU’s enlargement process lacks clear timetables for carrying out reforms and aligning the Western Balkans with the EU’s regulations. This absence of interim deadlines weakens the EU’s ability to pressure governments to implement necessary reforms or hold them accountable.
Future of the Balkans
This section explores several potential scenarios for the future of the Balkans.
Talking about the “Balkan Integration Acceleration” scenario, to counter external sabotage by powers such as China or Russia, the EU initiates expedited accession of the vulnerable Western Balkans. The region’s stagnant development over the past three decades necessitates political action to address social discontent, brain drain, and demographic challenges. The main variables at play are the desire for EU membership and the need for significant economic reforms to break the cycle of economic stagnation. The “Balkan Integration Acceleration” scenario underscores the need for change in the region, as the current political elites, characterized by “stabilitocracy,” risk undermining stability and fuelling discontent. The scenario envisions a shift towards economic growth, increased government accountability, consolidation of democracy, and political stability as direct implications of EU membership.
In the “Balkan Economic Integration for Political Harmony” scenario, robust economic cooperation among Western Balkan countries fosters reconciliation, democratic progress, and prosperity in the region. The scenario assumes that sustained economic growth, driven by common market integration and collaboration within the Balkans and with the EU, will overcome political tensions. This economic approach reorients political thinking towards the future, resolves issues related to human rights and the rule of law, and mitigates divisive nationalist sentiments. This outcome will benefit not only Western Balkan countries but also neighbouring states, reinforcing stability and predictability. The region’s comparative advantages, including lower costs and enhanced market access, make it an attractive destination for investment and near-shoring.
Regarding the “Balkan Europeanisation Uncertainty” scenario, both the Western Balkans and the EU experience a democratic decline, leading to reduced EU engagement in aiding democratization in the region. The strained relations between Brussels and Central European leaders, particularly Hungary and Poland, contribute to EU disunity. Consequently, the enlargement policy becomes more stringent, making it nearly impossible for some Western Balkan states to meet the strict rule of law and human rights requirements, resulting in countries like Serbia and North Macedonia withdrawing from the accession process. The “Balkan Europeanisation Uncertainty” scenario is plausible given current trends, including declining trust in civil society, government attempts to control civil society, reduced media freedom, the Russo-Ukrainian war, and the recent Israel-Hamas fight.
Finally, speaking of the “Balkan Stagnation and Instability” scenario, the most probable and pessimistic outlook for the Western Balkans is a continued unsatisfactory status quo marked by unfinished democratization, prolonged stabilitocracy, and growing citizen dissatisfaction. This scenario envisions potential political regression, prolonged regional disintegration, and diminishing prospects for EU membership. It is underpinned by various undesirable factors, both internal and international, including autocratic political leaders, lack of government oversight, political populism, rule of law deficiencies, election fraud, corruption, nepotism, and clientelism. This scenario also highlights the risk of persistent pessimism, citizen frustration, and potential political crises in the Western Balkans, exacerbated by the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and ongoing energy and security crises. It suggests that mass protests and political radicalization could become a reality. Furthermore, it posits that the European integration process may stall at the midway point of the Berlin Process, with economic cooperation but no formal EU membership.
Discussion
The “Balkan Europeanisation Uncertainty” scenario is particularly compelling due to its specificity, as it presents both short-term and long-term challenges that set it apart from the other scenarios.
In the short term, it reflects the current trends of declining trust in civil society, restricted media freedom, and ongoing political struggles within the EU, particularly with countries like Hungary and Poland. These immediate issues contribute to a sense of uncertainty and potential setbacks in the Western Balkans. The reduced EU engagement in aiding democratization in the region further exacerbates this uncertainty, strengthening the plausibility of this scenario.
In the long term, this scenario paints a picture of prolonged uncertainty in the Western Balkans regarding EU accession. The stringent EU enlargement policy and the potential withdrawal of certain Western Balkan states from the accession process introduce significant long-term uncertainty. Persistent pessimism, citizen frustration, and the potential for political crises loom on the horizon. This long-term perspective emphasizes the fragility of the European integration process, which could stall in the middle of the Berlin Process, leaving the region in a state of limbo.
Moreover, the “Balkan Economic Integration for Political Harmony” scenario appears optimistic yet incomplete.
While the “Balkan Economic Integration for Political Harmony” scenario does present some compelling ideas, there are potential concerns that might make it a less attractive option. This scenario primarily focuses on economic cooperation among Western Balkan countries as the key driver of political harmony and democratization. While economic development is essential, it may oversimplify the complex political, historical, and social dynamics in the region. Political issues, such as ethnic tensions and historical conflicts, are deeply rooted and cannot be resolved solely through economic integration. The scenario assumes that economic growth will overcome political tensions and that there will be a seamless transition towards democracy and stability. However, it doesn’t adequately address the potential political obstacles that could hinder the realization of this vision. Political elites in the Western Balkans may not be willing to relinquish power or resolve longstanding disputes merely because of economic cooperation.
Additionally, this scenario seems overly optimistic and lacks contingency planning for potential roadblocks or disruptions, such as external interference or shifts in global economic dynamics. It assumes a linear progression toward political harmony, which may not align with the realities on the ground.
Conclusion
To sum up, the case for the “Balkan Europeanisation Uncertainty” scenario lies in its realistic portrayal of ongoing challenges and the potential consequences for the Western Balkans. It underscores the critical need for EU engagement and highlights the risks of a protracted and uncertain path toward EU membership, which could hinder political stability and democratization in the region. The scenario’s plausibility and attention to both short-term and long-term uncertainties make it a compelling choice for analysis and consideration.