Introduction: How Vladimir Putin’s Regime Remains Stable Amidst Growing Challenges
Two and a half years after the beginning of the invasion, the regime of Vladimir Putin has been in a position that is known in chess as “Zugzwang”. This term reflects the situation when a player is forced to make a move which worsens his/her situation in the game. Applying the chess rules to the political life of Russia since 24th February, it is clear that the Kremlin’s circumstances have “evolved” from the perception that war would be quick and victorious to the condition when the Ukrainian army has been developing its success in Kursk Oblast and Putin’s administration is obliged to either find a solution or mute the problem.
Addressing the fact that Russian politics is generally centred around the power of the political capital of the governor inside the Kremlin, Vladimir Putin after several failures during the ongoing war (including the successful operation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) in the Kursk region), remains in relatively stable position. Whether it is luck, a tightly formed system based on corruption and nepotism or Putin’s background that helps him maintain power without noticeable inclinations from elites, the army, or the public to take away. This article will analyse the reasons for the current political regime in Russia by providing economic, sociological, and individual explanations.
Zugzwang explanation
The Zugzwang character of Russian politics can be presented with the help of graphics where the actions of the Kremlin (from the 24th of February) are analysed and possible outcomes are presented. The left column depicts the possible outcome if Russia had achieved its primary objectives in 2022 while the center column shows the events in chronological order and their potential consequences. The right column reflects the aftermath if the war is stopped by Russia itself. Critical for the regime events and probable aftermaths are highlighted by the red colour.
Excluding the unrealistic consequences of improbable actions that the Kremlin could have taken and may still take, the regime is limited in options on how to solve external and internal difficulties they have been facing since 2022.
After the failure of the first phase of war, Private Military Companies (PMC) were connected allowing their leaders to gain political, economic, and military capital which led to the federal authorities being severely criticised and discredited for their losses, corruption, and “treason”. Considering that Evgeniy Prigozhin and Igor Strelkov (Girkin) were the Kremlin’s fosterlings, still they were representing their interests with the possible intention of taking part in the political life of Russia creating a liability for the regime which neither tolerates the unarranged and uncoordinated participation in public politics. In that case, when Girkin’s presence in the media was eliminated by imprisoning him, Prigozhin’s issue was solved with a possible political killing that launched another problem: the regime is seen as revengeful and bloody. Without the PMC Wagner that was officially responsible for the hiring of Russian prisoners, brutal executions, and atrocious way of conducting the war, the attention began to be focused on the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and its downsides. Improving their own and the MoD’s reputation, the cleanings were sent off inside of the department making the high-rank officials nervous causing the distrust and anxiety that provoked the mistakes on the frontline. By removing one problem, the Kremlin launches a chain reaction that results in more problems occurring creating a vicious cycle. In the case of the Kursk region, Russia had to either withdraw the troops from the Donetsk oblast of Ukraine or declare a second wave of mobilization, adhering to the lesser of two evils principle. It is quite probable that Russian authorities have not yet reached the point when according to this principle, two critical alternatives for the regime will be put on weight charts.
Economic and elitist explanation
Shortly after the Russian economy faced substantial difficulties with import and investment meaning that several productions were to be stopped or even shut down threatening the tax payments, interconnected businesses, and the wealth of the workforce. Adapting the new strategy of so-called “military Keynesianism” that supposes that increasing the allocating financial sources for the military causes the demand to grow. Considering that some technologies and parts might be dual-use, the products are both used for civilian and war-related sectors interconnecting for example the invasion, the Ministry of Defense, and its sub-suppliers and suppliers. It also represents the fact, that some companies and their owners are profiting from the war or better said from contemporary circumstances even if their businesses assemble the civilian products. This macroeconomic politics allows the enterprises and oligarchs to concentrate on fulfilling the interests of the Central Bank of Russia keeping the economy and their business relatively stable, low unemployment, and revenue conditions appealing for the employees. This is despite the fact that the war’s consequences are echoed in buying power, inflation and poverty rates of the Russian population. Partially blue-collar and some grey-collar workers benefited from the invasion as well and their salaries have significantly risen and de-jure some of them who are employed in defence, banking, or IT sector have a reservation that allows them not to be mobilized.
Following this strategy, the regime lowers the probability of elites and a partial proportion of Russian citizens not openly becoming antagonistic towards the war and political representation. The overall drop in oligarchs’ wealth and implemented limitations are the enrichment of specific individuals (Vagit Alekperov – former president of “Lukoil” from $20.5 to $28.6 billion; Leonid Mikhelson – Novatek from $5.8 to $27.4) and possible threat of a criminal proceeding. „Lukoil” supplies fuel for the MoD, the National Guard of Russia, and structures that are affiliated with defence companies. Novatek is responsible not only for gas production for civic usage but also for transporting natural gas and chemical products for the businesses connected with MoD and defence enterprises that create submarines, air-dropped bombs FAB-500, and solid rocket fuels.
The technique of carrot and stick that Vladimir Putin applies toward the top-tier officials and oligarchs was visible the day before the invasion when members of the Security Council were justifying the recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as “LDNR”. Glossing over its beneficiaries, the regime shows that high-rank representatives and oligarchs do not have options but collaborate with Vladimir Putin (moreover they are perceived as corrupted individuals and cronies). In that case, elites are afraid to become oppositional to Putin as they have no guarantees or personal persuasion that they will be pardoned in the future.
Sociological explanation
In 2014, the number of political prisoners in Russia rose from 40 to 600 according to the “Memorial”. Human rights media project „OVD-Info” estimates there are nearly 3,424 political prisoners in Russia. This difference is explained by the blurriness of laws which can be interpreted differently, especially those in which “OVD-Info” is supposed such as Article 280.3 (Discrediting the armed forces, government agencies, or mercenaries), Article 207.3 (Dissemination of deliberately false information about the armed forces, government agencies, or mercenaries), “extremist” Article 280. Starting from 2012 non-systemic oppositional activity might be a reason for the individual to be chased and prosecuted. Cases of human rights campaigner Oleg Orlov who criticized the war in Ukraine and after the re-trial was sentenced to 2,5 years, or pensioner Anastasiya Gordienko who was threatened by penal prosecution for her commentaries in social network condemning war in Ukraine and Vladimir Putin and later was delivered with a 1,5 year suspended sentence.
Other cases are characterized by harsher penalties, especially if the person was a part of political representation such as the local deputy of Krasnoselsky District in Moscow Alexei Gorinov who was sentenced to 7 years for criticizing the war during the session. Taking the risk of being incarcerated does not leave vast space for the people to address against the invasion both for public and non-public individuals. The publicity that was aiding to avoid the unjust and fabricated cases (Ivan Golunov’s incident) is misused by the regime which by implementing long sentences sends a clear message to the opposition inside the civic sphere of Russia.
Conclusion
Supporting the assumption that the current political establishment is not critical for its sustainability is partially legitimate, as the longevity of the system depends on several factors such as economic and sociological. As long as the masses at most have the physical freedom, able to keep their standard of living at relatively appropriate levels, and the war is both not directly felt by the vast majority of the population and a source of income for some citizens, the power of Vladimir Putin will be relatively stable. However, the question is how long will the regime be able to withstand the economic and social consequences of the war that have an impact on the wealth and security of the Kremlin’s elites is open (especially when the leading economists claim that the Russian economy is “overheated”).