Complex Dynamics of the Extended Israel-Hamas Conflict
Hamas’ attack from Gaza on October 7 and the subsequent chain of events have created new problems in many areas. Initially, these events exposed weaknesses within Israel’s security elite, leading to a loss of prestige. In response, the Israeli government made unpredictable decisions and launched a war in Gaza, attempting to regain control of the situation. The scope of this war was pushed to the limits—both geographically and in terms of the laws of war. The crossing of these boundaries, coupled with the fact that Israel was not confronting a conventional military force, extended the initially expected three-month war to nearly a year.
During this time, both discreet and open negotiations between Israel and Hamas regarding ceasefires and hostage exchanges continued despite the ongoing conflict. In this context, the U.S. and neighboring states stepped in to try to defuse the crisis. However, factors such as public pressure in Israel, the prolonged nature of the war, ongoing isolationist policies, the issue of dual citizen hostages, the globalization of the crisis, and internal and external pressures on Hamas to continue fighting contributed to complicating the situation further.
In the Israel-Hamas conflict, several questions have arisen about the exchange negotiations that have distracted from the broader diplomatic landscape by focusing on the war itself. These questions include: How many negotiations took place during the war? What were the advantages and disadvantages presented by the changing geopolitical situation? Why did these negotiations suddenly fail when they seemed close to resolution? What should Israel do next?
Hostage and Ceasefire Deal Negotiations After October 7
Although Israel launched a war in the Gaza region immediately after the October 7 attacks, it continued to engage in both prisoner exchange and ceasefire negotiations in parallel. Following the onset of the conflict, approximately 251 Israelis were taken hostage by Hamas. It is believed that 97 of these hostages are still alive, while 33 are thought to have been killed. Reports suggest that around 230 of these individuals are Israeli, and the remaining ones are foreign nationals. Over the course of nearly a year, numerous negotiations and rescue operations have been carried out over the course of approximately one year regarding hostages and the ceasefire.
The first ceasefire negotiation after October 7th took place on November 22nd. With this deal, a 4-day ceasefire proposal was accepted at the request of both sides. The terms of the ceasefire were as follows: Hamas requested the release of 150 Palestinian women and children prisoners held in Israeli jails in exchange for freeing 50 Israeli women and children. The Israeli side also proposed releasing 10 additional prisoners each day. This deal lasted 7 days, exceeding the expected 4-day period. In total, 105 civilians, including 81 Israeli citizens, 23 Thai, and 1 Filipino, were released by Hamas.
The second ceasefire negotiations began on December 2nd. These talks were actually intended to extend the first ceasefire for a longer period. However, the negotiations failed. The main reason for this was that the Israelis wanted to secure the release of more female hostages, but Hamas rejected the offer, claiming that these women were not civilians but soldiers. The far-right coalition in Israel also pressured Netanyahu to suspend the talks, arguing that extending the deal increases the likelihood of a permanent ceasefire. As a result, the Israeli delegation left Qatar and the talks were halted.
After the suspension of the ceasefire negotiations and the increasing public pressure on Netanyahu, Israel resorted to military means to rescue the hostages. Although detailed information about this operation, which took place in the first week of December, was not publicly shared, claims emerged that the operation was unsuccessful and that the hostages intended to be rescued had been killed. were later confirmed by IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari.
Immediately after this incident, the UN Security Council proposed a ceasefire resolution for Gaza, citing Article 99 of the UN Charter. However, the resolution could not be adopted due to a veto by the United States. In the resolution, Russia and the United Kingdom abstained from voting.
The main reason for the resolution’s failure was the commencement of secret (third) ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas following the unsuccessful operation. These talks were mediated by Egypt, the United States, and Qatar, and extended into January 2024, taking place in Paris. During these talks, a three-phase ceasefire proposal was presented for the first time: (1) The first phase proposed a permanent halt to the conflict, the release of some Israeli hostages, and the delivery of humanitarian aid to blockaded areas. (2) In the second phase, Israel would receive additional female soldier hostages in exchange for more humanitarian aid. (3) The third phase proposed the return of deceased Israeli prisoners to Israel in exchange for the release of Palestinian prisoners. However, due to internal pressure, the Israeli side did not agree to the ceasefire. The main reason for this was the potential political defeat that a permanent ceasefire agreement could bring.
The pause in the ceasefire negotiations forced Israel to resort to military means once again. The second hostage rescue operation carried out on February 12th, was successful. While 61-year-old Fernando Marman and 70-year-old Louis Har were rescued in this operation, 74 Palestinians were killed.
The process proceeded similarly to the previous one. The issue was again brought to the UN Security Council, and on February 20th, the United States vetoed the resolution for the third time. The reason given was that implementing the resolution would harm the background ceasefire negotiations. Although there were hopes for a ceasefire during Ramadan in March, this also did not result in a positive outcome.
On March 26th, the United States abstained for the first time without vetoing the UN Security Council’s ceasefire proposal. Later, the US argued that this UNSC decision was non-binding. It is likely that the US backed down due to the intense election period and the stance of the Muslim community during Ramadan.
On April 13th, immediately after the end of Ramadan, ceasefire and hostage negotiations (the fourth round) between Israel and Hamas continued with Egypt as the mediator. Israel proposed the release of 40 hostages without presenting a new offer, while Hamas indicated it was only ready to release 33 people and proposed that all hostages would be freed in exchange for an end to the war. Due to Hamas abandoning the agreement as a result of the negotiations, success was not achieved.
The next (fifth) proposal was made on May 7th. This proposal was essentially a revised version of the initially outlined three-phase plan. The key points were: (1) Israeli hostages, both civilian and military, would be released in exchange for an unspecified number of Palestinian prisoners; (2) The end of the blockade and the permission for reconstruction in the areas blockaded by Israel since 2007; (3) The removal of all obstacles to humanitarian aid being delivered to Gaza.
Although Israel had the opportunity to rescue female soldiers under this agreement, it withdrew from the deal by objecting to the lifting of the blockade in Gaza. However, Hamas had agreed to the conditions from the beginning. Two days later, not only did Israel refuse the proposal due to the belief that a permanent ceasefire would mean defeat, but it also launched a large-scale operation in Rafah.
Since the Rafah operations were not progressing as expected and due to international criticism regarding the lack of safe exit routes for the approximately 2 million people in the area, Israel felt the urgent need to make a tactical manoeuvre to change the course of the war. This step involved Israel taking control of the Philadelphi (Salahaddin) Corridor, which runs along the Gaza-Egypt border, on May 29. Although Netanyahu had warned Egypt about the closure of this corridor since December, the tactical move was only executed at the end of May.
Two days after the closure of the corridor, on May 31, President Biden finally proposed a three-phase agreement once again, tailored to the new geopolitical conditions. According to this plan: (1) Israel would allow 600 trucks of humanitarian aid to enter Gaza each day; (2) Both sides would release all hostages and end hostilities; (3) Gaza would be rebuilt, and the remains of the deceased would be returned to their families. Each phase of the plan was to last 42 days, with the aim of halting the conflict. Looking back today, it seems increasingly plausible that Israel hastily took control of the Philadelphi Corridor because it knew this plan would be announced on May 31. Another possibility is that the US waited for this step to renew the peace offer and use it in the election marathon.
Opposing this proposal, Israel launched a military operation in the Nuseirat camp on June 8 and managed to rescue 4 more hostages. The hostages were Noa Argamani (26), Almog Meir Jan (22), Andrey Kozlov (27), and Shlomi Ziv (41).
On June 10, the United States presented a new proposal at the UN Security Council meeting. This proposal included a ceasefire and a hostage exchange. Although an immediate ceasefire was proposed without any conditions, the proposal was accepted with 14 votes in favour and 1 (Russia) abstention. Russia’s permanent representative to the UN claimed that the decision was not clear enough and that they did not fully understand what Israel was committing to, citing many unanswered questions. The Israeli side reported from the first day that they accepted Biden’s proposal and offered the same to Hamas. Hamas also stated that they did not oppose this proposal. However, Yahya Sinwar, the then-military leader, announced that he was against a new ceasefire despite all the pressure from the US, Qatar, and Egypt. The likely reason for this was the demand for the release of all hostages.
During the negotiations in Egypt and Qatar throughout July, Hamas accused Israel of prolonging the talks. Israel did not agree to the ceasefire proposed by the United States because it had only recently gained the upper hand in Gaza. Realizing that the delay was unlikely to be beneficial, Israel chose different methods to undermine the process.
On July 31, Hamas Political Leader Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Iran immediately after the new president’s inauguration ceremony. Following this event, Hamas halted the negotiations. For example, on August 15, when Israel sent a delegation to Doha for negotiations, Hamas abandoned the talks.
On August 19, in Doha, Blinken met with Netanyahu. Although various outstanding issues were discussed during the talks, this was a new hostage deal. According to the agreement, the maximum number of out of 110 hostages would be freed. Hamas, which did not participate in the talks, cited new developments in favour of Israel as the reason for their absence. These developments included: (1) Israel’s reluctance to withdraw from Gaza and its refusal to agree to a ceasefire; (2) Issues issues related to control over the Philadelphi and Netzarim Corridors.
On August 29, the IDF announced that it had found the bodies of 6 hostages in one of the tunnels. Two possibilities emerged following this incident. The first possibility is that Hamas had killed these hostages. After Haniyeh’s death, the new political leader Yahya Sinwar, who could not secure assurances from Israel for his safety, may have tried to compensate for this by using the hostages as a protective barrier around himself. Sinwar might have wanted to create a bargaining space through the hostages. The second possibility is that the 6 hostages died in the tunnel as a result of it being bombed by the IDF 6 months earlier. Regardless of which possibility is correct, this situation led to half a million people in Israel taking to the streets to demand a ceasefire and the release of the hostages.
Despite all these protests, Netanyahu and President Herzog urged people to remain calm. Netanyahu reiterated once again that they would not withdraw from the Philadelphi and Netzarim Corridors.
Source: Anadolu Agency
Immediately after these events, the United States pressured Israel to address the vaccination needs of Gazan children and managed to secure a humanitarian ceasefire. It is estimated that 200,000 children would receive their first dose, and 600,000 would receive their second dose of the vaccine within 4 weeks. Biden and his team took this opportunity to announce that an agreement had been reached on 90% of the new negotiations. The remaining open issues in the final ceasefire negotiations, such as the release of all hostages, the cessation of the war and hostilities, and the reconstruction of Gaza, could be included in this 90% agreement. The 10% of the agreement that was not reached involves the issue of the corridors.
The Issue of Dual Citizen Hostages and the U.S. Stance
Immediately after the October 7 attack, approximately 251 people were taken hostage by Hamas. They were divided into three groups: the first group consisted of Israeli citizens only, the second group consisted of foreigners only, and the last group included those with both Israeli and other citizenships. The Israeli government believes that 138 of these hostages hold foreign passports. Among them, 15 are Argentine, 12 are German, 12 are American, 6 are French, and 6 are Russian, with many of them likely having dual citizenship. Additionally, it is estimated that there are about 220 foreigners from 25 different countries, including 54 from Thailand and Nepal, 2 from Tanzania, 2 from the Philippines, 1 from China, and 1 from Sri Lanka.
Among the hostages with dual citizenship, 7 are American. One of these individuals, Gaddi Haggai (73), was killed during Israel’s unsuccessful February hostage rescue operation. The remaining 6 individuals were the focus of intense diplomatic efforts by the US to secure their release. For example, Blinken visited the Middle East 9 times after October 7.
Among the 6 people whose bodies were found by the IDF on August 29, 3 were supposed to be handed over to Israel in the last hostage exchange. These 6 individuals were Hersh Goldberg-Polin, Eden Yerushalmi, Carmel Gat, Alexander Lobanov, Almog Sarusi, and Master Sgt. Ori Danino. The first three were to be released as part of the humanitarian ceasefire. Since Hersh Goldberg-Polin was also an American citizen, objections began to rise within the American community. Aside from these, there are still 7 individuals with dual citizenship, one of which is American, currently held by Hamas. These individuals are: Edan Alexander, Itay Chen Z”L, Sagui Dekel-Chen, Gadi Haggai Z”L (deceased but his body is a hostage), Judith Weinstein Haggai Z”L, Omer Neutra, and Keith Siegel.
After it was confirmed that there were American hostages held by Hamas, the US initially gave Israel a period of time. However, after the negative outcome of the February operations, the US first insisted on the release of all hostages in April and in all subsequent negotiations. Israel managed to tolerate the death of only 1 American citizen for a long time. However, the killing of the 2nd American citizen and the intense competition of the election marathon led the US to pressure Israel. Netanyahu’s decision to pause the war cabinet for 4 weeks for vaccination may also reflect the extent of US pressure.
The Issue of Netanyahu’s Isolation Domestically and Internationally
Netanyahu’s isolation policy is ongoing within two frameworks. The first is (1) internal isolation, characterized by periodic protests from the public against various decisions. The second is (2) external isolation, imposed by both new global actors and the international community.
Protests against Netanyahu within the country are also divided into two groups: (1) those related to judicial reform; (2) those related to the ceasefire and hostages. The protests related to judicial reform actually date back to before October 7. However, even after October 7, for example, on March 31, 2024, people took to the streets of Tel Aviv with these slogans to express their objections. However, protests related to the ceasefire and hostages, with over 10,000 people gathered, occurred on the following dates: November 5, 2023; March 31, 2024; April 28, 2024; May 8, 2024; and August 31, 2024. Looking at the dates of these protests, it can be seen that almost all of them occurred shortly after setbacks in the peace negotiations. Although the increasingly strong anti-war protests do not bode well for Netanyahu’s government, the fact that protests over judicial reform have stopped and been replaced by protests related to hostages actually extends the government’s time in power. Therefore, for Netanyahu’s administration, continuing the war is the less bad option compared to the two unfavourable choices.
External isolation of Netanyahu’s administration largely comes from the international community. Just as there are internal protests, there are also periodic protests against Netanyahu from people of various nationalities abroad. The greatest pressure against Netanyahu could come from decisions made by the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice. However, recently this external pressure has been undermined in ways that even Netanyahu could not have imagined. Putin’s not being detained during his Mongolia visit raised questions about the enforceability of the court’s rulings. This has also created a new case for Netanyahu.
Although the Israeli government appeared close to overcoming external isolation, it faced a new problem. This time, the United Kingdom announced that it had suspended 30 of its arms agreements with Israel. The UK’s move, which provides the largest support to Israel outside the US, signifies a commitment to observing the rules of International Humanitarian Law. Alternatively, could the UK’s action signal that it will not assist Israel if the war expands?
Conclusion
After the October 7 attacks, while Israel tried to resolve the issue through military means, the US, in parallel, continued to pursue diplomacy at all costs. One reason for this was the rule that all wars ultimately end at the negotiation table, while another reason was to prevent Israel’s ultimate isolation. At times, Israel took steps with the US and, at times, steps taken despite the US. Among these steps, the issue of controlling the corridors currently appears to be Israel’s only strategic success.
The reasons why Hamas and Israel do not want to stop the war are different from each other. Hamas, using a hybrid warfare technique, is attempting to exhaust the Israeli state as it is prepared for prolonged conflicts. Israel, on the other hand, is unwilling to end a war it has not fully won on the ground with a diplomatic defeat, as it would tarnish its reputation as one of the world’s most respected armies. For this reason, as the war nears a potential end, Israel continues a policy of expanding the battlefield to reignite the conflict.
Although the US, as a superpower, provides unconditional support to Israel, it also has a value system that it leads globally. For these reasons, the US’s pressures on Israel regarding hostages and ceasefire issues will likely continue to increase in the future. To counter this pressure, Israel may take unexpected decisions similar to the Haniyeh assassination. However, such actions would likely have little impact on US decisions.
At this point, since the situation is seen as the best of a bad situation for Netanyahu, continuing the war, maintaining control of the corridors, gradually shifting the war to the West Bank, and ensuring the freedom of the remaining 101 hostages are the most reasonable options. In contrast, for Hamas, reasonable options include the release of all Palestinian prisoners, lifting the blockade on Gaza, and its reconstruction. However, for Yahya Sinwar, who ties his personal security to the hostages, securing the release of all hostages carries the risk of assassination attempts. Therefore, in the future, either the US and Israel will provide guarantees to Sinwar to secure the hostages, or the hostage exchange issue will take a long time. The current impasse benefits both Israel and Hamas. The US, being the only party seeking a real resolution process, will show us over time how the progress in the conflict correlates with the level of pressure it exerts on the warring parties. Although the US has always supported Israel both militarily and politically, this support continues only as long as it does not harm its vital interests. Since the Israel-Hamas conflict has started to pose problems for the US in global competition and domestic politics, the US is keen to deplete the trump cards held by both sides to bring the conflict to an end as soon as possible.