Introduction
On January 7, 2024, Jean-Marie Le Pen, founder of the French far-right party the National Front (FN), and a highly controversial political figure, passed away at the age of 96. A former soldier who served in the Indochina and Algerian wars, he was also a Poujadist deputy for the Seine from 1956 to 1962 and ran for the presidency five times. Le Pen was pivotal in reviving and shaping the French far-right after World War II. His death offers an opportunity to reflect on a significant political phenomenon of recent decades: the rise of institutionalized far-right politics in France, embodied in the growth of the former National Front, now rebranded as the National Rally (RN).
Rise of the National Front
After May 1968, the French nationalist far-right faced significant challenges in gaining momentum. In the 1970s, as the Gaullist party was shifting toward the centre (under the Chaban-Delmas government) and the left was uniting around the Common Program, a faction of Ordre Nouveau chose the institutional path by deciding to conform to the political system. From this shift emerged a necessity: to create a National Front. It was in this context that the National Front (FN) was founded in 1972, with Jean-Marie Le Pen as its leader.
The 1980s marked a turning point for the FN, which experienced its first significant electoral success. A major turning point came in the spring of 1982 with his first televised appearance on the 8 p.m. news on TF1, at the insistence of then-President François Mitterrand. This event marked the beginning of a growing media exposure for the far-right. The greatest success for the FN leader, and one of the biggest political earthquakes in French history, occurred on April 21, 2002, when J.M. Le Pen surprisingly qualified for the second round of the presidential election. Against all expectations, J.M. Le Pen received 16.86% of the vote in the first round, just ahead of Socialist candidate Lionel Jospin (16.18%).
In the 2007 presidential election, which would be his last, J.M. Le Pen saw his score drop to 10.4%. One consequence of this decline was the highly right-wing campaign of the
UMP (Union for the Popular Movement) candidate, Nicolas Sarkozy, who adopted themes of immigration and security, issues that had long been the FN’s political trademark. In January 2011, the “patriarch” handed over leadership of the FN to his daughter, Marine Le Pen, who was then a Member of the European Parliament.
From the National Front to the National Rally: Growing Electoral Successes
The political rise of Marine Le Pen marked a break from the political strategy previously followed by her father. She embarked on a strategy of institutionalizing and making the party more respectable, which ultimately led to the exclusion of her father from the FN on May 4, 2015. The image of Jean-Marie Le Pen and his openly racist, antisemitic, and homophobic remarks became a burden for the party’s new leadership.
In 1987, when asked by journalists, J.M. Le Pen stated during a debate on historical revisionism:
“I’m not saying the gas chambers didn’t exist. I haven’t seen them myself; I haven’t studied the question. But I believe it’s a detail in the history of World War II.”
In August 1996, he commented on “the inequality of races” saying:
“I believe in it, of course. History shows it. They don’t have the same capacity nor the same level of historical evolution.”
More recently, in January 2005, he declared regarding the German Occupation during World War Two:
“ In France, Germany’s occupation was not particularly inhumane.”
J.M. Le Pen’s remarks have led to over thirty judicial convictions.
It is in a break with the unrestrained racism and antisemitism that Marine Le Pen built a new, more polished political communication strategy, at least on the surface. For example, she made sure to target “Islamic fundamentalism” rather than “Islam” in her statements. The symbolic break with the FN was definitively confirmed in 2018 when the party changed its name to National Rally (RN). In public opinion, this strategy paid off, as evidenced by the fact that in 2015, 78 out of 100 people considered the party to be far right, compared to 66 in 2023. Similarly, in 2015, 60 out of 100 people viewed the party as xenophobic, compared to 52 in 2023. This trend has also been confirmed in recent elections, with the RN reaching the second round in the 2017 presidential election (33.90%) and in 2022 (41.45%).
Moreover, the RN’s qualification for the second round of the presidential election is no longer the political earthquake it was in 2002, as the far-right party greatly improved its score in the latest presidential elections. This electoral breakthrough was reinforced by a second one, the entry of a group of 89 RN deputies into the National Assembly following the June 2022 legislative elections. But the progress didn’t stop there, as after the surprise dissolution by President Emmanuel Macron last June, the RN became the largest political group in the National Assembly with the unprecedented entry of 125 deputies.
The normalization strategy started by Marine Le Pen took a new step in November 2024, with the election of young European MP Jordan Bardella as president of the RN. This decision followed Marine Le Pen’s choice not to run for a new term, preferring to fully devote herself to her role as president of the RN group in the National Assembly.
How to Explain Such a Breakthrough?
Several factors can explain such progress. One key factor dates back to April 6, 2016, with the creation of a new political movement, La République En Marche (now Renew), founded by Emmanuel Macron. This movement sought to overcome the traditional left-right divide by appealing to centrist forces, while also bringing together moderates from both sides. The remarkable success of this political project, highlighted by Emmanuel Macron’s election to the presidency twice, in 2017 and 2022, led to a weakening of the traditional political parties (the Socialist Party and The Republicans). It also intensified the polarization of French political life, dividing it into three distinct blocs: the radical left (dominated by its radical wing: La France Insoumise), the centre (Renew and centrist parties), and the far right (National Rally and, since 2021, Reconquête).
The near-constant equivalence between the radical left and the far right by the presidential bloc has contributed to the normalization of the National Rally. This was concretely illustrated during the July 2024 legislative elections, particularly through the absence of voting instructions from many members of the presidential bloc in the event of a second-round duel between a candidate from the New Popular Front (left-wing coalition) and a candidate from the RN. Despite this context, and against all expectations, the New Popular Front coalition defied the polls by coming out on top, with the election of 192 deputies.
As with all centrist experiments in power throughout French history, these are generally not destined to last. The decline of Emmanuel Macron’s party, which went from 306 deputies in 2017 to only 93 today, illustrates this trend. The question remains whether the end of this centrist experiment will be accompanied by a retreat of institutionalized far-right forces, making way for the return of the major traditional political families.
Another factor explaining the RN’s growing electoral success lies in the emergence of another political movement: La France Insoumise (LFI). Founded in 2016 by Jean-Luc Mélenchon, LFI was built in opposition to the Socialist Party, seen as a social-liberal party too far removed from leftist ideals. LFI positioned itself as a radical left-wing party, becoming the leading leftist force in the National Assembly in 2022. However, LFI’s strategy of “disorder” and “scandal” in the National Assembly (brandishing placards, displaying a Palestinian flag in the chamber, singing protest songs) starkly contrasts with the RN’s normalization strategy, which aims to present its elected officials as respectable. Additionally, some positions taken by the leader of La France Insoumise have sparked intense controversy. For example, his refusal to label Hamas as a terrorist organization following the attacks of October 7, or his immediate and rhetorically charged use of the term “genocide” to describe Israel’s actions, have fueled accusations of antisemitism against LFI. J.L. Mélenchon’s often provocative behaviour also alienates a significant portion of the French public. During the 2018 judicial raid on LFI’s headquarters, J.L. Mélenchon and several elected officials disrupted the procedure by force, even breaking down a door. In the process, he shoved a public prosecutor and famously declared, “I am the Republic.” These transgressive attitudes, combined with his open admiration for controversial Latin American leaders such as Hugo Chavez, Nicolás Maduro, and Fidel Castro, raise numerous questions.
Thus, in September 2023, J.L. Mélenchon was the most unpopular political figure in public opinion, with a rejection rate of 62%, far exceeding Marine Le Pen, whose rejection rate stood at 43%. To understand the rise of Marine Le Pen and the National Rally, it is also essential to consider the emergence of a new political figure: Éric Zemmour. In 2021, he founded his party, Reconquête, advocating an extreme-right political line similar to that of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Front (FN) before its normalization process began in the 2010s. This dynamic reintroduced more overtly extreme ideas into public debate, expanding what is known as the “Overton window “- a concept that refers to the range of ideas deemed acceptable in political discourse. Consequently, this phenomenon indirectly accelerated the RN’s respectability strategy.
Finally, in the context of economic, political, social, and environmental crises, the National Rally finds fertile ground to promote its nationalist and populist ideas, seeking to broaden its electoral base. More broadly, the prominence of the party led by Jordan Bardella aligns with a European trend marked by the rise of the far right across the continent. France, like other European countries, is experiencing a challenge to the fundamental principles of liberal democracy and a growing tendency toward identity-based withdrawal. These dynamics create a favourable environment for the spread of ideas championed by the RN, fueled by the social and political anxieties permeating society.
The National Rally: Still a Far-Right Party?
This remarkable institutionalization raises the question of the political classification of the National Rally: is it still a far-right party? The answer is yes. However, a simple affirmative response would not suffice. It is, therefore, necessary to specify which type of far-right the RN represents. According to Benjamin Biard, five types of far-right movements can be identified in Western Europe:
- Neo-Nazi Far Right, which promotes racialism, biological racism, and uses
- National-Populist Far Right, which appeals to the people and the idea of defending them against perceived
- Eurosceptic Far Right, which pursues sovereignist
- Traditionalist and Integrist Far Right, which is hostile to liberal democracy and its principles due to their perceived incompatibility with “Christian “
- “Gramscian” Far Right, which conducts a cultural struggle to impose its vocabulary and ideas.
All these forms of far-right ideology are present to varying degrees, within the RN’s electorate. The characteristics of neo-Nazi and Eurosceptic far-right ideologies are indeed less visible in the party’s communication than they were a few years ago. However, the RN fully embodies national-populist far-right ideology, rejecting traditional political parties and elites. The party positions itself as a “party of the popular right,” capturing a portion of the former communist electorate, and achieves its best results in the margins of France, such as in rural and provincial areas.
While the RN has adapted its rhetoric, it maintains a solid ideological foundation, centered around several recurring antagonisms: the people against the elites, the French against foreigners, and France against Europe. These oppositions, which fuel nationalist and populist discourse, are classic characteristics of the far-right.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the evolution of the RN and its political discourse reflects a complex transformation that raises questions about its classification as a far-right party. While the RN has undeniably initiated a strategy of normalization since the 2010s, under the leadership of Marine Le Pen and later Jordan Bardella, it remains a major force of the far-right in France, particularly in its national-populist form. Far from being a simple mutation, this normalization has allowed the RN to expand its electorate, anchor itself in the social and geographical margins of the country, and present itself as the defender of the people. The factors behind this rise in power are numerous: an economic, social, political, and environmental crisis conducive to the spread of populist rhetoric, the destabilization of traditional parties, and the dominance of security and immigration issues in public debate. However, despite its institutionalization, the RN has not abandoned its ideological foundations, particularly its sovereigntist and nationalist vision, which are hallmarks of the far-right.