Agriculture’s Role in EU-Ukraine Relations
The agricultural sector plays a crucial role in Ukraine’s economy. In 2022, the farming sector accounted for 8.22% of Ukraine’s GDP (Statista Research Department, 2023). The stable income from the export of agricultural goods gained significant relevance in 2022, when the Russian invasion disrupted the classical model of the economy and trade routes. This situation caused additional challenges in the relationship between the EU and Ukraine. In June 2022, Kyiv received official EU candidate status (European Council conclusions, 2022). Undoubtedly, this decision sparked a new wave of discussions about Ukraine’s eligibility to join the European Union.
It is also crucial to mention the stance of EU farmers towards the integration of the Ukrainian farming sector into the common market of the European Union. In particular, the position of Central and Eastern European (CEE) farmers and governments should be taken into account. Several waves of protests by EU farmers against the imports of Ukrainian agricultural goods revealed the importance of agriculture in the affairs between Ukraine and Brussels.
The integration of the Ukrainian farming sector into the EU is exemplified by Ukrainian farmers gaining entry to European markets in 2022. Although temporary access for Ukrainian goods to EU agricultural markets has already led to tensions between Ukraine and the EU, with Ukraine accusing the EU of protectionism and unfair trade practices, both parties grapple with their interests while considering Ukraine’s integration.
The agricultural question in EU-Ukraine relations is a complex and highly debated matter, carrying significant risks for both parties involved. It also connects to larger issues concerning trade policy, broader economic growth, and international collaboration. Such conditions raise questions about the nature of the issue and what solutions can be introduced to address the agricultural problem in the relations between Kyiv and Brussels.
Trade Tensions and Protests
In 2022, in response to the Russian invasion, the European Union allowed Ukraine to export goods to the EU without any duties and quotas (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 2022). As a consequence, the value of Ukrainian agricultural exports to the EU in 2022 rose to 12.9 billion US dollars, 5.24 billion more than the previous year (Statista, 2023). This drastic change provoked mass protests in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) EU member states. The markets of these countries were flooded with Ukrainian agricultural goods, causing farmers from CEE states to lose a portion of their expected income.
According to Dabrowski (2023), farmers from Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary were highly disapproving and protested the appearance of Ukrainian agricultural goods on the European market. Because CEE countries border Ukraine, a notable share of Ukrainian grains and other products were exported to these states. Such a reaction is not surprising, as from 2022 to 2023, Ukrainian agricultural exports to the European Union amounted to €10.2 billion, with the share of five Central European countries totalling €4.03 billion (Centre for Eastern Studies, 2023).
Another EU member state that took a strong stance against Ukrainian grain exports is France. Even though the country is located far from Ukrainian borders, the traditional protectionist stronghold in the French farming sector led Paris to express deep concerns about agricultural products coming from Ukraine. For instance, France joined Poland in an effort to limit the exports of Ukrainian cereals into the EU market. Both Paris and Warsaw insisted on the importance of preventing the destabilization of EU agricultural markets and further upsetting already angry farmers (Reuters, 2024). As can be seen, the problem of Ukrainian cereals is not limited to proximity to Ukrainian borders but also involves the traditional protectionist structure of the national agricultural sector.
EU’s Policy Dilemma Over Ukrainian Imports
Given all of the aforementioned factors, the European Union found itself in a very unpleasant situation, as the Commission, Council, and Parliament were formally obliged to represent the trade interests of their member states while Kyiv was in dire need of support during the war. Different tactics were used to address the agricultural issues in Kyiv and Brussels’ relations. Currently, these problems are regulated by measures adopted in March 2024. The Council of the EU extended the period of free trade between the EU and Ukraine until 2025. However, safeguard measures were introduced, and under the new regulation, some categories of products were labeled as “sensitive,” including eggs, poultry, sugar, oats, maize, groats, and honey. These goods will be subject to tariffs if their flows surpass the average volumes of the previous three years.
This measure can be considered only short-term. The trade relations between the EU and Ukraine will likely be determined by another procedure after 2025. Given that Ukraine and the European Union are working on the integration of Kyiv into the Union, agriculture will play a very problematic role in the negotiations. Traditionally, the farming sector of the EU is a subject of enormous discussion, and the accession of Ukraine to the EU will drastically affect the current state of production and agricultural trade within the European Union.
The large farming sector of Ukraine risks becoming one of the main obstacles on the path to Ukraine’s integration into the EU. As can be seen, right now, even the short-term accession of Ukraine into the EU single market illustrates how real accession could unfold. The massive opposition of European farmers to cheaper Ukrainian grains and other products has provoked a significant wave of protest in the EU member states.
Far-right Resurgence Amid Agricultural Disputes
Moreover, the clash over Ukrainian agricultural imports and subsequent farmers’ protests became a fertile ground for far-right parties in Europe to develop their policies. For instance, two of the three leaders of Polish farmers’ protests against imports of Ukrainian grain were affiliated with the pro-Russian far-right party “Confederation” (Anadolu Ajansı, 2024). The internal pressure in EU member states caused by the exports of Ukrainian cereals provided a significant opportunity for opposition far-right, Eurosceptic parties to advocate for protectionist agricultural policies.
It is also worth mentioning that the struggle over Ukrainian agricultural goods in the EU and subsequent farmers’ protests, often led by far-right activists, were coupled with opposition to the “Green Policies” of the EU (Arboleas, M. S., & Simon, M., 2024, May 30). Thus, based on the highly successful results of the far-right parties during the EU Parliament elections, it can be said that the protests against the import of farming products from Ukraine fit extremely well into the agenda of the far-right parties’ policies aimed at gaining support in rural areas.
Integrating Ukraine into the EU Amidst Agricultural Challenges
Currently, the European Union is not able to absorb the Ukrainian agricultural sector due to its size and cheaper prices. Consequently, the integration of Kyiv into the EU can be heavily opposed by EU member states with a significant share of agricultural production in their economies. This issue of agricultural production and exports will inevitably hinder Ukraine’s EU accession.
On the other hand, some scholars may argue that the agricultural issue in the relations between Kyiv and Brussels is less serious than it appears. For instance, strong political and economic strategies could be developed to stimulate new reforms and mechanisms to integrate the Ukrainian farming sector with fewer negative effects. One such measure could be the reformation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU. If Ukraine and the European Union prepare their farming sectors for integration, the agricultural issue in their relations might be resolved.
From my perspective, the truth lies somewhere in between. Undoubtedly, the current EU agricultural system cannot integrate the Ukrainian farming sector without significant reforms in both Ukraine and the EU. However, the CAP is a longstanding EU policy, and reforms in this area are a very sensitive topic for farmers and governments. Similarly, significant financial and administrative reforms in Ukraine are challenging to achieve without notable market destabilization, especially in both wartime and post-war contexts.
In this regard, the future of agricultural issues in EU-Ukraine relations remains very unclear, as significant challenges exist for both sides. What can be said without any doubt is that this topic will become a subject of many manipulations in both Ukraine and the EU. A solution to the issue may be found, but the interests of farmers will be a strong argument for both sides during the accession negotiations.
The Complex Path Forward for EU-Ukraine Agricultural Relations
The full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war has fully revealed the high relevance of agriculture in the affairs of Kyiv and the EU. The strong opposition to Ukrainian grain exports from France and the CEE member states provides insight into what the real accession of Ukraine to the EU may look like. Additionally, the vague EU solutions to this problem demonstrate how complicated the co-existence of the EU and Ukrainian farming sectors can be. The measures taken by the European Union are only temporary. If Brussels continues to support Ukraine’s plans for Euro integration, new agricultural policies and reforms will need to be implemented.
Although reforms seem to be a valid option, their implementation will require strategic long-term policies, strong political will, and vision, which are currently lacking in both Ukraine and the EU. Thus, the future of Ukrainian and EU economic and trade relations will be determined by the ability of both parties to change and reform.
Sources
Arboleas, M. S., & Simon, M. (2024, May 30). Wave of farmer discontent not over as far-right sets the stage for EU elections. www.euractiv.com. https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/wave-of-farmer-discontent-not-over-as-far-right-sets-the-stage-for-eu-elections/
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine – European Union has officially abolished tariffs on Ukrainian goods. (2022, June 4). https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/yevropejskij-soyuz-oficijno-skasuvav-mita-na ukrayinskitovari
European Council conclusions, (2022, June 24). https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/06/24/europeancouncil-conclusions-23-24-june-2022/
France, Poland push for greater Ukraine food import curbs. (2024, March 26). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/france-leads-push-greater-ukraine-import-curbs-farmers-protest-2024-03-26/
Liboreiro, J. (2024, March 27). EU countries seal the hard-line deal on Ukrainian grain, raising the possibility of tariffs. Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/03/27/eu-countries-seal-hard-line-deal-on-ukrainian-grain-raising-possibility-of-tariffs
Marek Dabrowski, (2023, September 20). European Union Grain Imports from Ukraine: The Right Decision and a cynical rebellion. Bruegel. https://www.bruegel.org/first-glance/european-union-grain-imports-ukraine-rightdecision-and-cynical-rebellion
Neighbourly feuds. The problem with Ukrainian grain on the Central European markets. (2023, October 26). Centre for Eastern Studies. Retrieved January 3, 2024, from https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2023-10-26/neighbourly-feuds-problem-ukrainian-grain-central-european
Poland’s farmers’ leaders linked with far-right, pro-Russian party. (2024, February 21). Anadolu Ajansı. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/poland-s-farmers-leaders-linked-with-far-right-pro-russian-party/3143889
Statista Research Department, & 2, A. (2023, August 2). Ukraine: Agricultural exports to the EU 2022. Statista. https://www.statista.com/statistics/876118/ukraine-agricultural-exports-to-the-eu
Statista Research Department, (2023, November 6). Agricultural Sector’s share of GDP Ukraine 2022. Statista. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1326724/ukraine-agriculture-share gdp/