Introduction
“Taiwan is no bigger than a handful of mud; there is nothing to gain by possessing it.” This phrase, reportedly spoken by Emperor Kangxi in 1683, seems almost unbelievable considering that this idea has been disproved for decades. Since 1949, the separation between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) has led to a complex conflict, with Beijing advocating for national reunification while Taiwan increasingly asserts its distinct identity. On top of the cross-strait tensions, the involvement of other actors has added a regional and international dimension to the conflict, raising the stakes surrounding the island.
Japanese Colonial Past: A Structuring Antagonism
1949 marked a turning point with the retreat of Chinese nationalists to Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) proclamation. In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping proposed peaceful reunification under the “one country, two systems” model, originally designed for Hong Kong and Macau and later extended to Taiwan. Beijing then launched a memorial offensive, glorifying the cooperation between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) against the Japanese oppressor, as seen in the 1985 conference in Beijing. This strategy aimed to construct a narrative of national unity.
However, this policy met with resistance in Taiwan. As early as 1988, President Lee Teng-hui distanced himself from Beijing’s rhetoric, asserting Taiwan’s sovereign independence in 1995. Under Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008), this opposition strengthened with the 2006 reform of school textbooks, emphasising Taiwan’s socio-economic development over the harshness of Japanese colonial rule.
Evolution of Political Parties and Positions in Taiwan
Taiwan’s political history has been marked by a significant ideological transformation. Under the Kuomintang (KMT), the island was seen as an experimental laboratory for a “New China” following the Civil War defeat by the communists. Starting in 1987, with the abolition of martial law, the KMT began a process of democratization that weakened the notion of a unified China, creating an ideological divide with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Despite this shift, the KMT never fully abandoned its vision of “One China.”
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), founded in the 1990s, initially advocated for independence before abandoning the idea of creating a Republic of Taiwan in 1999. Today, the DPP advocates for the status quo while affirming a more distinct Taiwanese identity. The 2024 elections revealed a divergence between the KMT, which favors closer economic ties with the PRC, and the DPP, which supports economic diversification.
The recent emergence of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) reflects a rejection of both traditional parties and a call to move beyond the traditional divide over China.
According to the annual study from Chengchi University, in 2024, 64.3% of respondents identified exclusively as Taiwanese, 30.4% as both Taiwanese and Chinese, and only 2.2% as exclusively Chinese. For comparison, in 1992, 46.4% identified as Taiwanese, and 25.5% identified as Chinese.
Taiwan: Between Sovereign Nation and Academic Diplomacy
Beijing’s main argument is based on the claim that since October 1, 1949, Taiwan has been the twenty-third province of China. One key point in this argument is the fact that the Republic of China (ROC) has not held a seat at the United Nations since 1971. However, the absence of a seat at the UN has never been an absolute criterion for determining the existence of a sovereign state. For example, Switzerland only joined the UN in 2002.
According to the criteria established by the 1933 Montevideo Conference, the conditions for being recognized as a sovereign state include having a government, a defined territory, a population, and the capacity to enter into international relations. For Taiwan, the last criterion is the most contentious. Currently, only twelve countries officially recognize the ROC: Guatemala, Belize, Paraguay, Haiti, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Vatican, Eswatini, Palau, the Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu.
One might wonder if this limited recognition is sufficient to argue that Taiwan is not sovereign, especially since the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was not considered a sovereign state until the 1970s. What is certain is that this limited recognition represents a significant diplomatic obstacle for Taiwan, which cannot engage in official diplomacy.
To bypass this limitation, Taiwan developed academic diplomacy in the 1970s, which became crucial in the context of its gradual loss of international influence. These communication channels are particularly interesting to Beijing due to the strong permeability between the academic and political worlds in Taiwan. The local saying, xue er you ze shi (“one who excels in studies will hold a high public office”), illustrates this dynamic.
In the 2000s, Chinese academics preferred exchanges with their counterparts in the Kuomintang (KMT). However, since the 2010s, a growing number of Chinese academics have participated in discussions in “green” think tanks affiliated with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). This shift reflects the “charm offensive” launched by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since 2008, following the KMT’s return to power. Communication is more polished, and dialogue is preferred over threats. However, the goal remains the same: reunification. Nevertheless, these meetings raise questions about several asymmetries in the exchange of information between the two parties.
The first asymmetry concerns control and supervision. Chinese academics are required to adhere to the regime’s ideology, conveying a uniform discourse dictated by the central government. On the other hand, Taiwanese academics enjoy significant freedom and can freely express their disagreement with the current government.
The second asymmetry lies in funding. The Chinese government invests heavily in these academic exchanges. This investment concretely translates into organizing conferences in China with luxurious hospitality for the academics (luxury hotels, banquets, and tourist excursions). This raises the question of “reciprocity in hospitality,” as it is difficult for Taiwanese academic institutions to uphold this custom.
Finally, the third asymmetry, and perhaps the most significant, concerns strategic planning. China follows a clear strategy: to work toward the reunification of the “Chinese nation.”
Regarding Taiwan, the objectives are diverse and complex; there is no unified national policy. This is due to the difference in regimes between the two parties.
These asymmetries thus skew the dialogue between the PRC and the ROC, openly exposing Taiwan’s internal political divisions within the academic (and political) spheres to Beijing.
From Seduction to Coercion… and the American Transition
Since 2013, with the rise of Xi Jinping to power, the strategy of seduction has gradually been replaced by a policy of “gray zones” combined with increased militarization. This policy relies on actions that disrupt the status quo without directly provoking military reactions. For example, Chinese military aircraft regularly enter Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) without authorization and without identification.
The election of Tsai Ing-wen (DPP) in 2016 exacerbated tensions, intensifying the pressure exerted by Beijing. According to Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Xi Jinping promotes an “incandescent nationalism” fueled by state propaganda and a quantitative and qualitative buildup of the People’s Liberation Army, reflecting China’s ambitions. Upon assuming power, Xi Jinping set the deadline of 2049, the centenary of the PRC, to reintegrate Taiwan into the embrace of the “motherland.”
Since 2001, Henry Kissinger emphasized the necessity for the United States to maintain a presence in Asia to prevent the formation of a hostile Asian bloc. This vision led the Obama administration to adopt the “Pivot to Asia,” redefining U.S. strategy to focus more on the region, to the detriment of the Middle East. However, this approach follows a tradition of American presence in Asia dating back to the Cold War, exemplified by agreements such as the 1960 U.S.- Japan Security Treaty. Washington implemented a “containment” strategy aimed at limiting the influence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the region. This strategy relied on partnerships with allied countries such as the Philippines, Thailand, Japan, and South Korea to prevent China from accessing the Pacific.
Despite a clear strategic redeployment, the United States maintains a degree of ambiguity regarding potential military intervention in the event of an attack on Taiwan. This ambiguity is maintained by the United States’ sole official recognition of the PRC since 1972. More recently, this ambiguity has been visible when President Joe Biden repeatedly stated that, in the event of an attack on Taiwan, Washington would send troops to defend the island, only for the White House to later clarify his statements through press releases to avoid angering Beijing.
War in the Indo-Pacific: Fantasy or Fate?
Finally, although tensions between China, Taiwan, and the United States are not new, recent years can be seen as a period of “escalation in the strait, with the peak being Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan on August 3, 2022. This triggered China’s anger, which launched a series of “targeted military actions” as well as a series of unprecedented air and naval maneuvers since the 1990s.
However, is a military attack possible in the coming years?
Rationality would suggest that this scenario in the short to medium term seems unlikely. Indeed, any Chinese invasion would result in a war, at least economically. Currently, China cannot afford a trade war with its Western partners, given the structural crisis (a consequence of the one-child policy and the rapid aging of the population) affecting the Chinese domestic economy. The economy is being kept afloat by its trade surplus, meaning that the PRC has no interest in triggering a new world war.
Furthermore, from a military standpoint, despite China’s superiority over Taiwan in this domain, an amphibious military intervention would face challenges. The eastern part of the island is naturally protected by high mountains reaching three thousand meters in altitude. The landing could only occur from the west, and even then, there are only a few beaches suitable for landing. Additionally, for seventy years, the Taiwanese have been preparing for a communist military intervention, and the island is riddled with mines, tunnels, and bunkers, which would result in guerrilla operations while waiting for military reinforcements. Moreover, it would only take one week for the US 7th Fleet, which operates between Okinawa and Guam, to intervene. In the event of an attack from Beijing, an American military intervention seems highly likely, especially since Japan reaffirmed in 2022 that it would intervene militarily if Taiwan were attacked. Moreover, Taiwan can count on support (to be seen to what extent) from the United States, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, as well as the European Union and the United Kingdom.
As for the PRC, it officially counts North Korea as an ally. However, Russia’s actual support is not a certainty. Furthermore, an alliance with India seems complicated at first glance. All of these elements mean that, rationally, the PRC has little interest in attacking Taiwan militarily. However, the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in February 2022 showed that rationality is not an absolute truth.
According to several specialists, the most likely scenario would be a blockade and encirclement of Taiwan. The island’s dependency on liquefied gas could result in the complete paralysis of its activity within a week. Again, in a globalized and interconnected world, many questions arise, including that of semiconductors.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we can say that Taiwan is a geographic dwarf but a political giant; it is, in a way, the new “heartland” of the world. For the Chinese Communist Party, Taiwan is not only a strategic issue but also an ideological one. Indeed, there exists the notion that the civil war against the Chinese nationalists was never truly concluded and that it has continued since 1949 against Taiwan.
One of the key elements to watch in the coming years will be the position of the Trump administration: will it align with the Obama, Trump 1, and Biden administrations, or will it disengage from Taiwan, as John Bolton suggested in his memoir, The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir?
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Emmanuel Lincot. Taiwan : Histoire et Enjeux. Conférence donnée le 16 novembre 2023, dans le cadre de l’Université du Temps Libre de Tarbes et de Bigorre
Mathieu Duchatel, Isabelle Feng, Jacques Gravereau, Baptiste Falloz, Taïwan : une élection sous l’œil de Pékin, 2024.
Sébastien Colin, Juliette Genevaz, Pierre-Antoine Donnet, Mathilde Pelletier, Joris Zylberman, Taiwan face à la menace chinoise, 2022.