Assessing the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s Role: Can SCO Emerge as a Viable Alternative to Western Platforms?
Amidst the backdrop of major global conflicts, countries within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) region, including China and Russia, have been striving to establish a platform that can serve as an alternative to Western institutions. The recent enlargement of the SCO, with India and Pakistan joining in 2017 and Iran in 2023, has bolstered the organisation’s prominence as such a platform. The 2021 Dushanbe Summit in Tajikistan saw an expansion of the cooperation sphere within the organisation to include security, raising questions about whether this platform can indeed become a viable alternative.
The culmination of the latest Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the SCO in 2024 was the adoption of the Astana Declaration. This declaration emphasised key areas such as economic development cooperation, connectivity, and the promotion of regional peace. It also highlighted the importance of improving the situation in Afghanistan and supporting the security cooperation measures adopted by the SCO Heads of State Council Resolution of 17 September 2021. Additionally, the declaration addressed cooperation in sustainability and environmental protection, institutional development, and cultural and humanitarian cooperation.
On 4 July 2024, the first-ever “SCO Plus” summit was held alongside the annual Meeting of the Council of the Heads of State of the SCO. The summit, themed “Strengthening Multilateral Dialogue – Striving for Sustainable Peace and Development,” featured an expanded platform that included Dialogue Partners, Observers, and the United Nations (UN). Although not all Dialogue Partners attended, the summit addressed crucial issues related to security, peace, development projects, and connectivity. The 2024 SCO summit has sparked discussions on whether the SCO can emerge as a successful alternative to Western platforms and if the SCO Plus format enhances this potential. Answering this requires a number of considerations.
Security Dynamics within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Achievements and Limitations
The measures in the field of security have advanced significantly with the adoption of the SCO Heads of State Council Resolution in 2021. The Dushanbe Declaration, marking the 20th anniversary of the SCO, elaborated on the nature of these measures. One of the significant achievements of the Dushanbe Summit was the increased regional institutionalisation within Central Asia. This included plans to establish the SCO Counter-Terrorism Centre in Dushanbe (Tajikistan), the SCO Universal Centre to Counter Challenges and Threats to Security within the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in Tashkent (Uzbekistan), the SCO Information Security Centre in Kazakhstan, and the SCO Centre against International Organised Crime in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan).
Perhaps one of the most important establishments under the SCO is RATS. The agreement to establish this structure was reached in 2002 during the Council of Heads of State meeting of the SCO Member States in Saint Petersburg, Russia. RATS has become a supporting pillar and coordinating centre for the SCO in combating terrorism, separatism, and extremism at both regional and global levels. Achievements of this establishment include the organisation of annual Joint Anti-Terrorist Exercises since 2006, cooperation agreements with UN agencies, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) institutions, and others. Additionally, there is a vision to involve SCO Dialogue Partner countries in such forms of cooperation.
The Dushanbe Declaration also outlined the priorities of the SCO for regional security. These priorities include combating terrorism, separatism, extremism, illicit trafficking in drugs, weapons, ammunition, and explosives, and addressing cross-border organised crime. They also cover international information security, strengthening border security, joint efforts to combat illegal migration and human trafficking, money laundering, economic crimes, and corruption.
Defence cooperation under the SCO primarily extends to personnel training and capacity building of armed forces. This aims to strengthen confidence-building measures, maintain peace and regional stability, counter security challenges and threats, and create favourable conditions for the sustainable development of the SCO. However, unlike NATO, the SCO does not have an equivalent to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which obliges members to use force if another member is attacked. Thus, membership in the SCO does not impose such obligations.
The security component of the Astana Declaration primarily referred to the previous Dushanbe Declaration. Defence security was also mentioned, highlighting the importance of mutual training exercises. Despite its extensive security measures, the SCO’s defence cooperation remains focused on capacity building and confidence measures, lacking the collective defence commitments seen in military alliances like NATO. Given its nature, the SCO is not a military alliance like NATO but an intergovernmental international organisation. Thus, its military cooperation is limited in scope.
Peace Efforts in Ukraine and SCO Dynamics
One of the most crucial points addressed during the SCO Plus Summit was peace within the SCO region, which includes two major ongoing conflicts: the war in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas war. These issues are significant not only for the members directly involved, such as Russia and Iran but also for China, which seeks to enhance its global reputation as a promoter of peace.
The newly created SCO Plus format may serve as a platform for promoting an alternative view of peace, reflecting the interests of regional countries. In his speech at the SCO Plus meeting, Chinese President Xi Jinping presented the “Five Principles of Coexistence” developed seventy years ago. These principles include “mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty,” “non-aggression,” “non-interference in each other’s internal affairs,” “equality and mutual benefit,” and “peaceful coexistence.”
Although not all parties at the summit addressed the topic of peace, it was discussed by some member states of the SCO. Notably, the Russian and Belarusian Presidents focused on the war in Ukraine, while the Acting President of Iran spoke about the Israel-Hamas conflict.
Currently, the major concern for Russia, the strongest military power and the third-largest economy in the SCO, is the war in Ukraine and the potential for a settlement that considers Russian demands. While the Astana Declaration mentions peace in the context of Palestine (Middle East) and Afghanistan, it does not explicitly address the situation in Ukraine. However, it extensively highlights the importance of peace throughout the text.
The timing of the Conference on Peace in Ukraine in Geneva, Switzerland, and the SCO Plus Summit offers an opportunity to assess if SCO affiliation influences a country’s stance on the Ukraine conflict. Neither Russia nor China attended the Geneva summit. Official sources in Geneva indicated that Russia was invited, but Russia did not reciprocate. China’s absence was also notable, given its significant support for and importance to the Russian economy.
Figure 1 displays the countries that attended the 2024 SCO Plus Summit and those that participated in the Geneva Summit on Peace in Ukraine. Both India and Qatar were represented at the same level—India by the Foreign Minister and Qatar by the Emir—at both events. However, Türkiye had President Erdoğan at the SCO Plus Summit and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan at the Geneva Summit. Türkiye and Qatar supported the Joint Communiqué on a Peace Framework resulting from the Geneva Summit, whereas India did not.
Figure 2 highlights Observers and Dialogue Partners of the SCO that did not attend the SCO Plus Summit but participated in the Geneva Summit. Armenia, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia attended the Geneva summit at the ministerial level, while the United Arab Emirates (UAE) sent an envoy. Armenia and Bahrain did not support the Joint Communiqué, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE did. This variation in representation and support among attending countries underscores differing levels of engagement within the SCO.
To better understand the influence of different types of SCO affiliation on countries’ choices, Figures 3 and 4 have been prepared. Figure 3 shows that only 13 out of 28 countries affiliated in any form with the SCO (less than half) attended only the SCO Plus Summit. When combined with those who attended both the Geneva Summit and the SCO Plus Summit, the number rises to 16. This indicates that around 57% of SCO-affiliated countries either attended only the SCO Plus Summit or both events. Conversely, about 43% of countries (12 in total) attended either only the Geneva Summit or neither event, suggesting a lack of strong cohesiveness among SCO-affiliated countries. However, this broad analysis may be misleading given the varying levels of commitment according to a country’s status in the organisation.
Figure 4 provides a more detailed look into the situation within the SCO. Among observer and dialogue partner countries, half participated in neither the SCO Plus Summit nor the Geneva Summit, and 75% participated only in the Geneva Summit or neither event.
In contrast, among SCO member states, there is a notable cohesiveness. Nine out of ten members attended only the SCO Plus Summit, while the remaining member, India, attended both. These graphs indicate that Belarus was considered a member of the organisation, following its accession during the 2024 Summit.
Enhancing Connectivity and Stability in the SCO Region
Although connectivity was not the primary focus of the SCO Plus Summit, leaders from countries along the Middle Corridor emphasised its importance. Notably, the need for further development of transportation infrastructure was highlighted in the speeches of President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan, and President Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan. These countries, given their geographic locations and characteristics, can be described as the “keystone” states of the Silk Road region.
Azerbaijan, being the largest country by area, population, and economy in the South Caucasus, holds a strategic position between Iran to the south and Russia to the north, with the Caspian Sea to the east, making it a crucial player in Eurasian connectivity. Similarly, Kazakhstan, with the largest economy and land area, and Uzbekistan, with the largest population in Central Asia, continue to gain importance with the revival of the Caspian trade route.
A potential trilateral cooperation format among these three countries could provide a platform for setting agendas and controlling trade through Central Asia and the Caucasus. Thus, developing connectivity infrastructure along the Middle Corridor and the International North-South Transport Corridor is crucial for addressing the interests of these nations. Furthermore, SCO development projects need to focus on advancing transportation infrastructure to enhance connectivity and economic growth in the region.
The Situation in Afghanistan
The previously mentioned components—security cooperation, support for connectivity projects, and peace preservation—are also relevant to Afghanistan. The Astana Declaration, resulting from the SCO Heads of State Meeting in 2024, explicitly reaffirms the member states’ commitment to establishing Afghanistan as an independent, neutral, and peaceful state free from terrorism, conflict, and narcotic drugs. The member states expressed their readiness to support international efforts to facilitate peace and development in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan’s geographic location is critical for the security, stability, and connectivity of SCO member states. It provides access from Central Asia to India and Pakistan and from Iran to China. Therefore, with the development of transportation infrastructure, Afghanistan could play a pivotal role in providing essential access between SCO member states. Additionally, Afghanistan is home to significant Uzbek and Tajik minorities, making it important for the SCO to share knowledge in institutional development and creation in the country. By promoting inclusivity, the SCO can help prevent destabilisation and an increase in terrorism in the surrounding regions.
Moreover, with the retreat of NATO troops from Afghanistan in 2021 and the subsequent takeover by the Taliban, the SCO needs to play a strong role in stabilising the country. This effort would establish a solid foundation as an alternative platform to the West. SCO development projects should focus on creating inclusive and sustainable institutions and transportation infrastructure to enhance connectivity and economic growth in the region.
Conclusion
In 2021, during the Dushanbe Summit, the SCO expanded its responsibilities to include security and defence spheres. However, the 2024 Summit in Almaty did not bring significant changes. Although SCO cooperation encompasses various aspects of security, such as cybersecurity, counterterrorism, and peacekeeping, defence cooperation remains limited to mutual training among member states. Given the nature of the organisation, the SCO is not a military alliance and cannot be considered an alternative to NATO.
Regarding the cohesiveness of SCO-affiliated countries, the organisation lacks full cohesion, as evidenced by attendance at both the SCO Plus Summit and the Conference on Peace in Ukraine in Geneva. The SCO Plus Summit showed stronger cohesiveness among member states, with nine out of ten attending, while India was the only member attending both events. This indicates that while core SCO members present a unified front, the broader SCO Plus format, which includes Dialogue Partners and Observers, does not. Despite this, the SCO Plus can still serve as a valuable platform for advancing the agenda of the core SCO member states.
There are significant opportunities and challenges for the SCO to establish itself as a viable platform. One opportunity lies in the development of transportation infrastructure along the Silk Road region, involving key states like Azerbaijan in the Caucasus and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in Central Asia. Successful infrastructure development in these countries could enhance trade along the Middle Corridor and solidify their role in setting the trade agenda in the Silk Road region.
Developing sustainable and inclusive institutions and transportation systems in Afghanistan presents both a challenge and an opportunity, given its strategic location between SCO member countries. This effort also holds prestige, as it aims to establish and sustain peace in a country from which NATO troops withdrew in 2021. Additionally, stabilising Afghanistan is crucial for preventing the spread of extremism in the region.