Right Turn in Russian Politics

Introduction

Far-right movements have been keeping a special place in Russian politics since the second half of the 1990s, when the First Chechen War was on its outbreak and the consequences of privatization and liberal economic reforms were perceived as devastating for the majority of the  Russian population. The Russian state, which was indirectly involved in scapegoating that was reflected in the culture and everyday racism towards the so-called “person of a non-Slavic appearance” created a space for the far right to “blossom” at the end of the 1990s and the 2000s. Since the annexation of Crimea, the far right, which was mostly represented by formal organizations, informal groups and violent street “muscles” has disappeared from the big politics and the streets of Russia as well.

Nowadays, in the context of the war in Ukraine and the attack on Crocus City Hall, far-rights ideas connected with xenophobia, chauvinism and radical nationalism are again actual for the Kremlin that attempts to build a specific national wartime ideology. In this article, a brief history of the far-right movement in Russia will be presented, along with the analysis of reasons for the right turn accompanied by examples of the manifestation of these ideas in Moscow’s internal and external politics.

The Arousal and Bloom

Before the presidency of Vladimir Putin, far-right movements were mostly deranged and marginalized meaning that a political foundation and governmental unofficial support these movements gained after the beginning of the 21^st century. The concept of “managed nationalism” that appeared in the Kremlin’s political thought had to both control the militant radical nationalists and neo-Nazis and fight the pro-democratic and left activists whose popularity was on the rise after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004.

It is necessary to add that far-right movements in Russia can be divided into violent (militant) or non-violent groups, where some of these associations were relatively legal in the Russian judicial field and others were marginalized.  To address the complicity of these groups the most notorious ones can be categorized in a table, including their name, period of activity, main ideas inside the right spectrum and type of activity.

It is visible that the Russian state during the first decade of the 2000s was interested in non-violent far-right movements that could be used as proxy actors against the possible political opponents of the Kremlin. Until 2014 non-violent organized groups were perceived as “safe” and prone to cooperation with authorities. They were not seen as a threat to a current narrative that was established around the idea of peaceful existence with the new Chechen government after the Second Chechen War, and controlled structured organizations which could be potentially used for further political collaboration such as the Slavic Union and DPNI.

The movement “Nashi”, created and funded by the Russian government, was based on the assumption that pro-democratic forces are also a street-level threat that can be fought with the help of supervised far-right branches across the state. During the 2000s, DPNI was also financed by the Kremlin and approached by the “Nashi” mostly because of their relatively stable management, the existence of a political program and further openness to the partnership with Chechen authorities which by certain far-right leaders of smaller groups was seen as a betrayal.

However, the groups that were out of the legal field and whose activity was far from being outlined as preferable for the Russian state during this period prosecuted and later destroyed such as BTO or BORN that were responsible for the killings of non-Slavic persons including an 8-year old Hursheda Sultonova in 2004 (BTO), individuals that were addressing the problem of everyday discrimination and racism towards the Caucasian, Asian and African people in Russia, left-wing activists, antifascists (the assassination of Anastasiya Baburova and Stanislav Markelov) Jews, Roms and members of law enforcement agencies.

Picture 1-Members of BTO

After 2012-2014, far-right movements have been quickly disappearing from Russia’s streets and political space, mostly because of their engagement in protest activity in 2011-2013 (Bolotnaya protests) and the anti-Ukrainian narrative used in the external politics of Moscow. After the fall of Viktor Janukovich, Kremlin began falsely accusing the new government of Ukraine of following the far-right path in domestic affairs at a time when identical ideology was widely presented in Russian politics.

It’s necessary to add that some leaders of far-right movements did not support the annexation of Crimea and further Russian engagement in the East of Ukraine thus those who rejected the idea of cooperation with the authorities were forced to leave Russia or detained. The right turn in Russian society that was presented in the 2000s the Kremlin tried to use as a tool in the possible rivalry with its political opponents by legalizing and politicizing the movements that were also seen as a threat in a situation when Moscow was dealing with the aftermath of so-called “Chechen syndrome”.

Today, the right turn is a directed policy taking its roots from the inside of the state but not the distinctive parts of society that Russian authorities both attempted to oversee and manipulate.

Russian Right Turn Today

After the beginning of the war in the East of Ukraine in 2014 and during the ongoing invasion Kremlin has not fully given up the idea of infiltrating the Russian troops with assisting Neo-Nazi paramilitary units such as the “Russian Imperial Legion” or the  Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group “Rusich” (also known as ДШРГ «Русич»). This group openly proclaims its national-socialistic views, has connections with the former PMC Wagner and Chechen troops, and has been engaged in the war in Ukraine since 2014. Nevertheless, the example of Rusich and its leader Alexey Milchakov’s recent affiliation with Chechen Special Forces Commander Apti Alaudinov depicts the reality where the Russian far-right movement plays the “episodic” role and does not represent the independent power.

It is also the case that shows that the contemporary radical right scene is fully managed from the upper level and exploited by the state in a sense which Kremlin has been trying to establish since the 2000s meaning the atrocious, brutal, weighty but manageable force that is used according to Moscow interests. The same pattern was visible when the regime was involved in building and reinforcing the role of PMC Wagner in the Russo-Ukrainian war though the primary motivation of mercenaries was financial gains.

The “civil” far-right such as for example de facto Islamophobic and anti-immigrant “The Russian Community” (Русская община) organization which was created in 2020 is relatively staying aside from the big politics and provides material help for the Russian troops. The organization along with the police and local authorities is also responsible for the raids on street food markets but refuses to call itself nationalists claiming that they are “Russian patriots”. New nationalists co-exist with law enforcement forces by following the xenophobic Kremlin rhetoric that strengthened after the attack on Crocus City Hall in 2024.

A number of discriminatory and restrictive measures have been applied after the terrorist assault in March, followed by the defamation and deportation campaign. In a situation when the working market and demographic circumstances are demanding more males to be presented in the country, Moscow tightens immigration politics. The problem of illegal migration serves as a tool for distracting the general public from the war in Ukraine but does not address the socio-economic problems that appear in the Russian regions where there is a traditionally massive percentage of labour migrants employed in the private sector who were recently banned from working in taxi services and catering industry.

Conclusion

In this case, the right turn politics first used proxy agents during the war in Ukraine to mobilize the societal resources for the conflict. Based on previous historical experience, it is visible that moderate political wings are not suitable for the current Kremlin needs because of their indifference and fear connected with the continuing political repressions. From the ideological point of view, right radicals are more suitable than left that are mostly known for their anarchistic beliefs which is not an appropriate detail for Putinism founded on state-centred, conservative ideas with the fleur of leftist nostalgic ideology.

Secondly, the right turn in Russia is a calculated and specific type of politics realized by the Kremlin during wartime which allows the state to both mobilize pro-war, radical parts of society that have a partial resentment towards the right wing and switch the anti-war or status quo public attention from the conflict in Ukraine. Finally, the right turn is no longer a marginalized street-level activity but a state-controlled force that in future may play its part in the potential fight for power in Moscow as a part of revenge for the partially illegal state and the necessity to cooperate with the Kremlin.