Introduction
In a statement released by Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, it was emphasized that Iran places special importance on its relations with neighbouring countries. In this context, the relationship between Turkmenistan, which shares both land and maritime borders with Iran, has drawn attention. Against Russia’s involvement in the Ukraine war, Central Asian countries are increasingly inclined to play a more active role in regional issues. Meanwhile, Iran has repeatedly expressed its desire to strengthen its activities in this regard. In such a context, the increase in mutual official visits by politicians and discussions on cooperation prospects in various fields highlight the significance of the relationship between the two countries.
Berdimuhamedov’s Visit to Tehran and Its Outcomes
On August 28, 2024, Turkmenistan’s national leader, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, officially visited Iran. The main agenda revolved around issues such as gas, energy, and transportation.
The primary topic of discussion in the joint talks between Iran and Turkmenistan was the expansion of cooperation in the energy, transit, and electricity sectors. This included joint efforts in the gas and petrochemical fields, the provision of technical and engineering services, the targeting of transit for 20 million tons of goods, the facilitation of visa issuance between the two countries, and the development of cooperation in ports, shipping, corridors, and land and railway transport sectors. Additionally, an agreement was reached regarding the development of mutual relations in the natural gas sector between the National Iranian Gas Company and TurkmenGaz. The future plans of both countries also encompass the development and deepening of customs cooperation from 1403 to 1405, for which a joint action plan document has been signed [1]. Simultaneously, the Turkmen delegation met with Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, with Pezeshkian also present. During the meeting, Khamenei noted that while cooperation between the two countries has developed in recent years, there are still opportunities for even higher collaboration. The importance of joint projects, including the North-South Highway project and the development of the Turkmenistan gas pipeline, was emphasized by both leaders. During the visit, a total of four cooperation documents covering various fields were signed between the two leaders. One of these documents is a cooperation program between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkmenistan, covering the years 1403 to 1405.
Accompanying the visit, writings in the Iranian press particularly highlighted the significance of Turkmenistan and Iran to each other. In this regard, it was mainly emphasized that for Turkmenistan, Iran serves as a country that provides access to the Persian Gulf and, from there, to Europe, as well as a route for transit of its gas to Türkiye. Conversely, Iran’s importance to Turkmenistan is underscored as being vital for connections to Central Asia and China.
Bilateral Cooperation and Prospects
The relations and collaborations between the two countries covering various fields began to accelerate during the previous Iranian administration. While Iranian media often associate this with the 13th government’s “first neighbours” diplomacy, it can be concluded that global events have also spurred this cooperation.
Since the previous Iranian government, Iran has started to play a significant role in Turkmenistan’s infrastructure development. In recent years, numerous industrial projects have been constructed or are currently being built in Turkmenistan with Iran’s assistance. For instance, the water purification plant located in the city of Mary continues to provide drinking water to residents. Other projects include wheat storage warehouses in Mary province, joint efforts for the construction of the Friendship Dam, the building of a connecting road between Bajgiran and Ashgabat, a 79-kilometer segment of the road between Ashgabat and Turkmenbashi, and the construction of a road from Nabita Mountain to Turkmenbashi covering approximately 100 kilometers, as well as a 47-kilometer section of the Archman-Bami road.
Additionally, proposals and discussions regarding cooperation in various fields along the Turkmenistan-Iran border, including seaports and land borders, frequently come to the forefront. Representatives from both countries are currently engaged in discussions to establish a joint free economic zone.[2]
Currently, the Dowlātābād–Sarakhs and Korpəçə–Kordkuy pipelines are operational between the two countries. Furthermore, there is another agreement involving Azerbaijan in the gas sector. Under a three-party gas exchange agreement signed in November 2021, which came into effect the following year, Tehran imports gas from Turkmenistan and delivers the same volume of gas to Azerbaijan in another region.[3] Based on these gas agreements, Turkmenistan diversifies its gas sales and transit routes while Iran relatively facilitates gas deliveries to its remote northern regions, where gas supply is challenging, thereby enhancing its reputation as a trading partner in the Caspian region.
Another significant agreement based on gas exchange between Iran and Turkmenistan was signed in July 2024. According to this agreement, Iran will supply Iraq with 10 bcm of natural gas annually in exchange for gas received from Turkmenistan. Interestingly, in addition, Iranian companies will construct a new 125-kilometre gas pipeline and three gas pressure-boosting stations in Turkmenistan. This project aims to increase Iran’s annual gas supply to 40 bcm, thereby enhancing the potential for gas transit and swaps between the two countries.
Berdimakhmedov’s strategy of using Iran as a transit country has led to an increase in land transport of goods. There has been a 30% rise in railway trade in the border region of Sarakhs between the two countries. Of the approximately 600,000 tons of foreign trade goods brought to the Sarakhs border via the Bandar Abbas-Sarakhs railway line, 526,000 tons consist of transit loads from Turkmenistan to the Persian Gulf. These goods are being transported to global waters via the Sarakhs-Bandar Abbas railway line. This railway line was constructed in 2009, marking a period when the foundations of modern trade cooperation between Iran and Turkmenistan were firmly established.
Iran provides an opportunity for Central Asian countries to gain easier access to global markets through the Persian Gulf. This issue, frequently raised during meetings with representatives from the opposing side, is gradually gaining interest from Central Asian states. Both parties appear determined to continue the bilateral cooperation that began during the administrations of Hashemi Rafsanjani and Saparmurat Niyazov and has recently been gaining momentum. Turkmenistan, which lacks direct sea access and primarily exports its gas through Russia and China, aims to diversify its buyers and transit routes for imports and exports through this collaboration. Meanwhile, Iran seems to be striving to realize its goal of becoming a gas hub, a target it has frequently articulated in recent times.
Delivery of Turkmen Gas to Türkiye: The Iranian Perspective
Recent articles in the Iranian media have discussed Turkmenistan’s compelled yet willing collaboration with Iran. In a context where Tehran recognizes that Russia can no longer sell its gas to Europe, it is evident that Turkmenistan has no feasible options for selling its gas, a fact acknowledged in Ashgabat. Consequently, Tehran aims to leverage this situation to pursue its goal of becoming a gas hub, considering Turkmenistan has virtually no alternative but to cooperate. Therefore, it is beneficial to analyze the issue of transporting Turkmen gas to Türkiye and subsequently to Europe within this context in 2024.
Based on two preliminary agreements signed on March 1, Turkmenistan plans to supply its natural gas to Türkiye and Europe. Three options have been proposed for this realization: delivery to Türkiye via a swap agreement with Iran, transportation through Iran and Azerbaijan, and delivery through a gas pipeline crossing the Caspian Sea. The likelihood of the third option being implemented in the coming years is quite low. So, what are the prospects for the other options?
It appears that Iran’s capabilities in transporting Turkmen gas to Europe, a subject of discussion for many years, are gradually increasing. Similar to its decision to engage in swap operations for gas sales with Iraq, Turkmenistan is likely to prefer similar operations for delivering its gas to Türkiye. The agreement signed in July between Turkmenistan and Iran to develop infrastructure can facilitate the smooth transfer of natural gas to Iran’s northeastern regions as initially planned. This agreement could be seen as a successful step towards Iran’s frequently stated goal of becoming a gas hub, especially given that the country faces challenges in providing gas to its citizens and that bringing gas from the south is complicated and costly. Additionally, the two countries have reached an agreement to develop infrastructure for larger volumes of gas transfer beyond just swap operations. In his speech at the “Transit and Transport Corridors: Development and Interaction 2023” conference held in Ashgabat in May 2023, Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov stated that “the corridor to be constructed from east to west will connect Turkmenistan with Iran, Iraq, and Türkiye.”[4] In December 2023, representatives from Türkiye and Turkmenistan reiterated their interest in transporting Turkmen gas to Türkiye during a meeting held to discuss this issue.
Based on these points, it can be inferred that Turkmenistan, alongside Iran, intends to resolve this matter between Ashgabat, Tehran, and Ankara while excluding Azerbaijan (and thus Georgia) from this project.
The agreement for gas sales to Iraq in July can also be assessed in this context; however, for the same option to be executed for sales to Türkiye and through it to Europe, the consent of other parties is necessary. It appears that while Türkiye does not fundamentally oppose the inclusion of Iran, based on the agreement signed with Azerbaijan in May, it may wish to incorporate Azerbaijan into the discussion. The agreement signed between Türkiye and Azerbaijan on May 14, 2024, included the delivery of Central Asian gas to Türkiye. By including its official ally Azerbaijan in this agreement, Türkiye seems to be attempting to strengthen its position against Iran. The political tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan in the years following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War—where Ankara openly supported Azerbaijan—may compel Türkiye to consider all possibilities. However, Azerbaijan’s inclusion in this operation also implies Georgia’s inclusion, which complicates the matter further. At the same time, Iran is naturally unwilling to share its geographic advantages in swap operations with anyone.
It is likely that secret negotiations are taking place between Ashgabat and Tehran regarding this matter. On September 18, the head of the National Iranian Gas Company mentioned in an interview that an agreement had been reached with Turkmenistan for new gas negotiations, although he did not specify the exact nature of the agreement. Perhaps these discussions involve the delivery of Turkmen gas to Türkiye through Iran and subsequently to Europe.
Conclusion
As seen, the multifaceted cooperation between Turkmenistan and Iran is developing at an increasing pace. This partnership benefits both sides economically and aligns with the strategic goals of Tehran and Ashgabat. Tehran aims to utilize this cooperation to enhance its position as a transit and gas hub, while Turkmenistan seeks to diversify its gas buyers and establish itself as a gateway to Central Asia.
Looking ahead, it is reasonable to expect that this collaboration will continue and directly influence the transportation of Turkmen gas to Türkiye and subsequently to Europe. However, a key uncertainty remains regarding Türkiye’s response to the proposals from Turkmenistan and Iran, as well as its determination to include Azerbaijan (and thereby Georgia) in this project.
[1] Iranian officials have expressed complaints several times about the difficulties Turkmenistan faces in granting visas to Iranian businessmen. It appears that this cooperation agreement aims to address this issue.
[2] Some of the news reported in the Iranian media in recent months are as follows:
- Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA Farsi) noted on September 14, 2024, that The Razavi Khorasan Science and Technology Park is in the process of signing a memorandum of understanding with the Turkmenistan Academy of Sciences.
- Bâshgâh-e Khabarnegarân-e Javân reported on May 11, 2024, that An examination of the economic cooperation sector between South Khorasan and Turkmenistan has been conducted.
- Bâshgâh-e Khabarnegarân-e Javân reported on February 15, 2024, that The development of maritime connections between the ports of Iran and Turkmenistan is underway.
- Bâshgâh-e Khabarnegarân-e Javân reported on May 15, 2024, that The increase in interactions between Iran and Turkmenistan is indicative of both parties’ strong commitment to strengthening their relations
[3] The gas transmission agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan was suspended in 2024 due to disagreements over pricing. However, if a new agreement is reached, the gas transmission will resume. This situation highlights the complexities of regional energy partnerships and the importance of negotiation in ensuring ongoing collaboration.
[4] Previously, the President of Turkmenistan had made a similar proposal. In July 2022, during a conference, he also suggested two international transit routes for the members of the Economic Cooperation Organization: The Corridors of “Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Iran” and “Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Türkiye.”