From Heroes to Governance: Russia’s New War Elite
Over the months of 2024, the Kremlin’s attitude towards war participants has significantly changed. Before the presidential elections, Vladimir Putin, during his speech to the Federal Assembly on 29th February 2024, stated that the “new, true elite” of modern Russia are individuals who serve their country, meaning war participants. According to him, these people were expected to become a hegemonic class by assuming governmental positions in the near future with the help of the “Time of Heroes” initiative. Similar statements were made in 2023, although war returnees were only identified as new elites without the regime’s further desire to see them in top-tier positions. On the one hand, the Kremlin did not abandon the idea of war as a prospective social ladder by continuing to increase payments for signing contracts with the Ministry of Defence. On the other hand, Russian officials are beginning to worry about the poor ability of war participants to adapt to civilian life. This article will analyse the concerns that have arisen in Moscow by providing a comparative criminal statistic that covers the period before and after the beginning of the invasion.
Reasons for concern
The prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among war participants ranges The prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among war participants ranges from 1% to 35%, depending on 27 different risk factors. The US National Centre for PTSD estimates that 29% of soldiers examined during the Iraq War experienced PTSD at some point in their lives. However, precise data on the presence of PTSD among combatants in Ukraine are insufficient. These are limited to individual psychiatrists’ estimates (25-29% of participants) due to the Kremlin’s efforts to place discussion of the destructive consequences of conflict under a taboo. Relying on statements from Ukrainian officials that up to 500,000 Russian troops are deployed in Ukraine, it is possible that between 125,000 and 150,000 individuals may be experiencing stress disorders. The example of the Chechen wars can be partly applied to the contemporary situation, as warfare primarily occurs in devastated cities and towns in Ukraine, leading to more battle-related stress disorders. Moreover, due to the extensive use of drones and the scale of combat, the frequency of disorder occurrence might also be higher than in Chechnya. According to Professor Novikov V.S., only 28% of screened troops in Chechnya (1,312 respondents in total) could be defined as healthy, while 72% exhibited symptoms of psychological disorders, including PTSD. In 26% of cases, soldiers showed signs of highly unstable psychotic behaviour, including increased aggression, anxiety, and deterioration of morality. Another study conducted by Alexander Kucher revealed that nearly 35,000 soldiers and their family members received psychological support from 1996 to 1997, while up to 100,000 combatants were involved from the Russian side at the peak of the two Chechen wars.
Comparing the war in Ukraine with previous conflicts such as Afghanistan, Putin’s administration is troubled by the fact that the scale of warfare in Ukraine is greater. However, the consequences of the Chechen and Afghan wars in the late 1980s and early 2000s were still present in society even after the war participants returned to civilian life. Behind the scenes, Moscow refers to these individuals as “Afghanis,” a term denoting returnees from the Afghan war in the late 1980s who struggled to adjust to new economic, political, and personal health conditions (including mental disorders). This adjustment difficulty contributed to the rise of organised crime groups and an overall increase in crime rates in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
During the first and second conflicts in Chechnya (1994-1995 and 1999-2001, respectively), there was a peak in the number of murders, with the highest value in 2001 (33,600). The incidence of intentional infliction of grave injury also peaked in 1994 (67,700) and again after the Second Chechen War in 2002 (58,500 cases). Specific and precise data on crimes committed by war returnees from Afghanistan and Chechnya are scarce and are reflected in the overall crime rates. After the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, there was a noticeable increase in crime rates (1,867,223 crimes in 1988; 2,461,692 in 1989; and 2,786,605 in 1990). Nonetheless, the Chechen and Afghan wars coincided with periods of dramatic socio-economic transformations, such as Perestroika and the so-called “Dashing 90s.”
Chechen experience in the Kremlin’s narrative was not used because of its inner political controversy and the fact that conflicts and disputes in the Caucasus region are still actual for RF. The Afghan reference may also indicate that the regime does not fully comprehend the problem they are facing, i.e. increased criminality connected with the lack of personnel in police structures, poor mental care and war-related issues inside the country. Afghan war in comparison with the conflict in Ukraine was less bloody and terrifying in sense of intensity, human losses and extent of destruction. However, the issue of the so-called “Afghan” or “Chechen” syndrome (synonym for PTSD) that the state is supposed to take responsibility for is silenced and pinned on socio-economic troubles rather than on the Russian aggression itself.
The Chechen experience in the Kremlin’s narrative was not used due to its internal political controversy and the fact that conflicts and disputes in the Caucasus region remain relevant for the Russian Federation. The reference to the Afghan war may also suggest that the regime does not fully comprehend the problem it is facing, namely increased criminality linked to a lack of personnel in police structures, inadequate mental health care, and war-related issues within the country. The Afghan war, in comparison with the conflict in Ukraine, was less bloody and terrifying in terms of intensity, human losses, and the extent of destruction. However, the issue of the so-called “Afghan” or “Chechen” syndrome (a synonym for PTSD), which the state is supposed to address, is being suppressed and attributed to socio-economic troubles rather than to the Russian aggression itself.
Crime rates are changing
The overall picture of the criminogenic situation since the beginning of the invasion has barely changed, even though in 2021 there were 62,000 more court cases and a 2% drop in the number of convicts. Nevertheless, by 2023, the total number of convicted military personnel had nearly doubled.
It is important to mention the existence of prisoners who participated in the war and were later pardoned. Their psychological condition is considered to be more severely affected, and the likelihood of stress disorders occurring might be even higher. There could be more individuals experiencing such disorders.
Taking into consideration distinct criminal charges such as murder, sexual crimes, illicit trading of weapons and explosives, and DUI (driving under the influence) offences, statistics show a rise in the number of sentenced soldiers in 2022-2023. Some calculations were based on data from the Supreme Court of Russia, although some statistical analyses published by independent media did not include crimes committed in occupied regions of Ukraine. If such crimes were included, they were handled by military courts in the Rostov region. Former mercenaries from the Wagner group, prior to the coup attempt, were not de jure soldiers, and crimes committed by them were not adjudicated by military courts, which muddied the data. Additionally, the specific nature of war makes it more difficult to investigate atrocities, leading to cases where registered felonies were committed by soldiers under non-combat conditions.
There was an increase in the number of convicted military personnel for murder in 2023, including civilians, with an overall rise of 7% in the first half of the year. For sex crimes, there was an overall increase of 8.2% (including civilians). Sex crimes under the Russian Criminal Code are divided into rape and violent acts with a sexual element. In the first half of 2023, 67% of the victims of sexual crimes committed by servicemen were minors.
More soldiers were convicted for illicit trading of weapons and explosives in 2023. Considering crimes connected with psychotic disorders, the previous year saw 382 soldiers sentenced for drug-related violations (245 in 2021 and 254 in 2022), 615 for DUI and traffic rule violations (256 in 2022 and 296 in 2021), and 133 for intentional infliction of grave injury (compared to 58 in 2021 and 50 in 2022).
There was a clear political will from the Kremlin not to pursue soldiers who committed war crimes and atrocities outside combat. Portraying them as criminals does not support the state’s propagandistic and heroic narrative, especially during wartime. This may explain why, in 2022, after 10 months of war and during de jure ongoing mobilisation, the number of murders and cases of intentional infliction of grave injury was lower than in 2021. The significant increase in 2023 was a consequence of the intensive policy of enlisting as many volunteers as possible and contract manipulations, where signatories (including mobilised men) are required to serve until the end of the conflict, worsening their psychological condition. Mobilised soldiers, being mostly unprofessional military personnel, are more vulnerable to psychotic disorders due to the mandatory nature of mobilisation, prolonged presence in the combat zone, and the impossibility of legally leaving the war. Since September 2022, there has been no substitution of troops, leading to protests by their wives. These factors have impacted the criminogenic situation, as reflected in the crime statistics of 2023.
Conclusion: Long-Term Criminogenic Impacts of the War
It is reasonable to presume that the criminogenic situation in Russia will be further worsening because of the war and its aftermath. The dichotomy of the regime towards the invasion participants indicates that top-tier officials either do not understand the scale of the problem or prefer to stand aside from the issue due to glorifying the conflict and the Russian army message that is distributed by state propaganda. The governmental plan to implement the former soldiers into the “system” and create a specific agenda for them is not an initiative that would beforehand help the returnees to adapt to a peaceful life. The number of initiative attendants is approximately one hundred individuals whether there are more than 500,000 war participants. If the cease-fire agreement is reached, the war will be ended or Vladimir Putin’s regime will be thrown off, Russia will not evade the internal consequences of the invasion in Ukraine due to the scale of warfare, number of troops, poor mental care and partial social exclusion of returnees.