This year marks rapid geopolitical shifts in the Middle East, with Lebanon, Iran and other Iran proxy states at the centre of these developments. This shift has somewhat diminished Iran’s influence through its proxies, such as Hezbollah, disrupted Tehran’s strategic corridor through Syria, and strengthened Lebanese endeavours toward reclaiming state sovereignty from within. Meanwhile, the uncertain nature of the U.S.-Iran talks has cast a large question mark over the future of Iran’s regional posture and, consequently, the stability of the Levant region.
The most recent developments led to a major escalation in June 2025, when Israel launched an airstrike on Iranian nuclear facilities and assassinated the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, several other senior commanders, nuclear researchers and the head of the nuclear program.
This article attempts to analyse the shifting Lebanese-Iranian relationship against a significant series of events, laying out the strategic implications for the region as well as the policy questions faced by the U.S. and its allies.
Hezbollah’s Decline and Lebanon’s Political Transformation
Last year, 2024, represented a significant turning point for the Middle East and Lebanon regarding its relations with Iran. Hezbollah was long considered Iran’s most promising proxy, but following the onslaught of events within the conflict between them and Israel, Hezbollah was brutally defeated and is now at a significant point of weakness, both politically and militarily.
The 2024 Conflict, Nasrallah’s Death and Hezbollah’s Defeat
Beginning in September with a series of airstrikes which included missile strikes penetrating deep into Lebanese territory, which eliminated Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, led to a period of condemnation from Western states and support for Israel, jeopardising Hezbollah’s legitimacy in the region. The loss of Nasrallah, at the heart and brains of the organisation after thirty years, demoralised the organisation in terms of command and esteem.
The military campaign that got underway in September was proportionate to the increase in tensions, and subsequent rocket attacks were implied to be linked to Hezbollah by the Israeli government channels and communications, while resulting in many justification calls from the Israeli side regarding intensifying their operations on the Lebanese front.
Iran’s own economic problems, compounded by sanctions and domestic unrest, have also added stress to its ability to fund and support proxy organisations abroad. Hezbollah has similarly suffered from financial distress, including the loss of cash from drug trafficking and reduced funding from Iran, and has struggled operationally as a result. These financial strains have also necessitated a tactical retreat and have hindered Iran’s power politics through non-state actors in Lebanon.
The June 2025 Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities and its limited response so far highlight Tehran’s diminished ability to project strength and deterrence across the region, putting in the spotlight Hezbollah’s current paralysis and the fragmentation of Iran’s proxy strategy.
Political Shift in Lebanon
The political vacuum after the conflict, along with Nasrallah’s death, opened a chance for transformation in Lebanon’s political environment. Lebanon’s parliament chose General Joseph Aoun as the nation’s 14th president on January 9, 2025, following more than two years of presidential vacancy. During the second round of voting, Aoun received 99 votes from lawmakers who reached a broad consensus.
The election of Aoun marked the beginning of state authority recovery while working to diminish Hezbollah’s political power. The international community, including the United States together with Saudi Arabia, endorsed Aoun’s presidency because they believed his leadership would promote political stability and reform.
The strength through proxies strategy of the Iranian regime has faced a strong setback. Hezbollah, one of the strongest Iranian arms in the Middle East, saw huge military defeats and a switch in public stance on their presence and role, as well as several political abandonments within the national environment. The election of President Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam both are staunch supporters of state sovereignty and oppose Hezbollah’s militarisation, and this marks a significant departure from previous administrations in their support and alignment with Hezbollah. This sway has paved the way for reducing the Iranian influence over Lebanese affairs.
The Fall of Assad’s Regime and Its Regional Implications
The demise of Bashar al-Assad in Syria in December 2024 had significant ramifications in the Middle East, and specifically for Iranian strategy towards Hezbollah.
The Overthrow of Assad
On December 8, 2024, armed groups of the disorganised and conflicted Syrian opposition forces led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), supported by Turkey, successfully captured Damascus, and thus ended the rule of Assad. The offensive began with the capture of Aleppo on November 30, and within ten days, the Syrian opposition had taken Assad’s capital, Damascus. The departure of Assad meant that over five decades of Baath Party rule had ended in Syria, and Iran’s financial and military corridor to its proxy Hezbollah in Lebanon had been disrupted. The loss of an important ally to Iran forced Tehran to revisit its regional strategy and diminished its ability to either project influence or power via its broad-reaching proxy networks.
Emergence of a New Syrian Leadership
The appointment of Ahmed al-Sharaa, a former leader of HTS, in the wake of Assad’s exit, implies that what we know as Syria’s nation-state may be under new leadership. Al-Sharaa has stuck his neck out diplomatically to the West to obtain sanctions relief and ultimately some sort of international assistance with the rebuilding after the devastation of war. Al-Sharaa’s leadership has pledged “broad-based governance” and has committed to recognising Syria’s political plurality in addition to taking measures to distance their administration from the extremist group HTS.
Al-Sharaa’s administration also initiated “indirect contacts” with Israel, which suggests a possible and transformative shift to Syria’s foreign policy role in the Middle East. Changes like these can completely displace established alliances and diminish Iran’s influence in Syria, as well as in Lebanon.
Now, with Hezbollah weakened as a military fighting force and Assad’s regime destabilised, a significant shift is occurring with implications for Iran’s proxy network in the Middle East. The disruption of proxies similarly allows for changes in political bargaining leverage dynamics in Lebanon and Syria. We are in a critical period where it will become known in years to come how these dynamics will change the region.
The 2025 U.S.–Iran Nuclear Talks in Oman: Strategic Stakes and Diplomatic Crossroads
In 2025, the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East is not only changing dramatically but has also made the U.S.–Iran nuclear negotiations in Oman a focal point. This negotiation process is of critical importance for the future of Iran’s nuclear program, but perhaps more importantly, it is significant for regional stability, considering the situation in Lebanon and Syria.
Background: From JCPOA to Renewed Negotiations
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed in July 2015 after a series of negotiations in Vienna and aimed to limit the potential of Iranian nuclear capabilities for sanctions relief. In any case, the U.S. withdrawal under President Donald Trump in May 2018 ultimately led tensions to rise once again. Now, as of 2025, with Iran enriching uranium to a purity of 60 per cent (well beneath the 90 per cent purity threshold for weapons-grade uranium, but well above the JCPOA limit of 3.67 per cent), it has become apparent that any negotiations will need to recommence.
The Fourth Round in Oman: Key Players and Positions
The U.S. and Iran’s fourth round of negotiations ended in Muscat, Oman, on May 11, 2025. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi of Iran was the diplomat representing that country; he is a seasoned diplomat and veteran of the Iran-Iraq War. The U.S.political delegation was led by Steve Witkoff, a lawyer, real estate investor and personal friend of former President Trump, with no diplomatic experience.
Parties characterised the discussions as “difficult but useful,” noting that they still had important challenges ahead. The central topic of the discussions was uranium enrichment. Iran steadfastly held that its enrichment was for civilian purposes and that it was non-negotiable. On the other hand, the U.S. position was also non-negotiable: cessation of enrichment and removal of all infrastructure associated with enrichment.
Iran’s Three-Stage Proposal
As the negotiations progressed, Iran put forward a three-stage scheme for a comprehensive agreement:
Phase 1 – Temporary Reduction: Iran would lower its uranium enrichment levels to 3.67%; in exchange, the U.S. would allow Iran access to frozen financial assets and grant Iran the right to export oil.
Phase 2 – Permanent Measures: Iran would stop high-level enrichment, restore inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and implement the Additional Protocol allowing for surprise inspections at undeclared sites, contingent on the U.S. removing further sanctions.
Phase 3 – Final Agreement: The U.S. Congress would approve the nuclear agreement, resulting in the lifting of primary and secondary sanctions. For its part, Iran would relocate its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium to a third country.
While U.S. envoy Witkoff reportedly expressed positive sentiments about Iran’s proposals, doubts remained regarding Iran’s motives and the feasibility of their proposal.
To understand the current status of and stakes in these nuclear talks, we need to take a look at how U.S. policy toward Iran has changed, developed, or devolved over the last decade and the implications of the changes in policy for the viability of talks today—especially the dramatic implications of an inherently precarious, inconsistent—and at times entirely contradictory, U.S. policy led by successive administrations.
U.S. Policy Toward Iran Since 2015: A Critical Examination of Strategic Inconsistencies
The United States’ position towards Iran has changed dramatically in the last decade; each administration has followed its way to engage with Iran. Not only does this affect US-Iranian relations, but it also impacts the regional landscape and erodes the leverage of US foreign policy.
The Obama Administration: Engagement through Diplomacy
The signature success of the Obama administration’s Iran policy was negotiating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. The goal of the agreement was to limit Iran’s nuclear ambitions in return for relief from economic sanctions. While thus a major diplomatic achievement, critics of the agreement contended that it did not address Iran’s ballistic missile program or Iran’s regional activities.
The Trump Administration: Maximum Pressure
In 2018, President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the JCPOA because it was not addressing these concerns and Iran’s destabilising activities more generally. The administration imposed a “maximum pressure” campaign to restore sanctions on Iran and isolate oil and capital revenue streams. The purpose of this pressure was to compel Iran to negotiate a broader agreement with the United States; however, the result was increasing tensions between Iran and the U.S. and escalating events within the region.
The Biden Administration: Attempted Re-engagement
President Joe Biden indicated a willingness to return to the JCPOA, but he was limited by Iranian compliance with the original agreement. Follow-up negotiations were commenced to once again enter into the original agreement, but progress was stymied by mutual suspicions and internal political restrictions in the two capitals. The Iran policy came under fire for its apparent loss of agency and indecision, and absence of a clear course of action.
The Return of the Trump Administration: Renewed Hardline Stance
With President Trump’s return to the presidency in 2025, America is back on its strong stance against Iran. The government has imposed maximal pressure and has been adopting a strong position in the nuclear talks, calling for the destruction of Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities entirely. This policy has brought a stalemate to the negotiations and increased the likelihood of military confrontation, which we then saw happen in the Israeli airstrikes and the ongoing escalation between Israel and Iran.
Consequences of Policy Inconsistency
The changing Iran policy of the United States has hurt its credibility and strained ties to allies and partners. The lack of a firm and strategic policy has allowed Iran to capitalise on divisions and advance regional interests with more cards to play. Moreover, the seesaw between engagement and confrontation has raised Middle East instability and uncertainty.
The perceived U.S. approval of the Israeli strike on Iran also affected American neutrality in negotiations and strained diplomatic trust with Iran.
Recommendations for a Coherent Strategy
To restore confidence and successfully deal with Iran’s issues, the United States needs to pursue a consistent and comprehensive policy with diplomatic engagement and unequivocal red lines. This has to be a firm alliance with allies, addressing every aspect of Iran’s activities, and prioritising long-term regional stability over short-term political gain.
The changing dynamic between Lebanon and Iran, as well as the changing geopolitical stance of the United States, emphasises the need for readjusting strategy. Efforts must be made to preserve the complexity of Middle Eastern geopolitics and support an autonomous Lebanon free from foreign intervention.
These policy inconsistencies—and the revival of a hardline policy with the reconstituted Trump administration—laid the groundwork for the explosive escalation to follow. The Israeli June 2025 airstrike on Iranian nuclear installations was not an isolated event, but the result of years of conflicting approaches, failed negotiations, and collapsing regional confidence.
June 2025 Escalation
These shifting dynamics resulted in a high-stakes breaking point: the June 2025 Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. This escalation ties together all the previously mentioned developments; Iran’s retreat, Hezbollah’s weakness, Syria’s shift, into a logical trigger point for this latest crisis.
Israel conducted an airstrike on Iranian nuclear infrastructure in June 2025 while US-Iran consultations were occurring in Oman, spiking the tension in the region. Israeli officials cited intelligence that indicated Iran had started undeclared uranium enrichment beyond the JCPOA. Israel believed that the resurrection of an agreement would result in only symbolic restraint, allowing Israel to act unilaterally even while negotiating with Iran. In many senses, this is a profound expression of cynicism regarding multilateral diplomacy, and a preordained readiness for preemptive military action to constrain Iranian nuclear capabilities.
At the same time, President Trump, who has returned to the Oval Office, stated half-jokingly that he wondered whether Iran still had a working weapons program, while supporting the Israeli hit. His remarks demonstrated Iran’s continuing strategic ambiguity and divergent perceptions of its capabilities. The Trump administration also maintained a maximum demand position, seeking a complete disarmament of enrichment infrastructure, which Iran had rejected.
The immediate result was the suspension of nuclear talks, with Iranian officials blaming the USA for meddling and withdrawing from the talks in Oman. While Washington condemned the Israeli strike, Axios reports of backchannel intelligence cooperation suggest at least an implicit understanding, if not a measure of consent. This situation has undermined not only confidence with Iran, but also with Muslims and European partners looking for a diplomatic resolution.
Such events are ringing throughout the region. In Lebanon, Hezbollah is at a crossroads. The group’s military wing remains under pressure from its defeat in 2024 and is attempting to remain relevant amid a shifting domestic and regional landscape. The incapacity of Iran to assist proxies, adding to Hezbollah’s lack of a political mandate, limits gratuitous capacity to respond meaningfully to Israeli action. The group confirmed that they will not be joining the fight from the Lebanese front, and any attack on Lebanon is under the responsibility of the new government. This comes after pressure from the Lebanese political structure and the Lebanese army to maintain neutrality. The end result is an unstable but more dynamic regional equilibrium, where military action may delay risks, but further diminish political routes to resolution.
Israel’s recent strikes on Iranian nuclear assets were intended to counter what they consider an escalating threat of Iran achieving weapons-grade enrichment under the pretext of negotiations. The country has very seriously questioned the current U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations, and acted on intelligence of secret enrichment operations and inferred that military action was necessary to prevent a strategic surprise. The intent is, of course, not only to eliminate Iran’s physical capabilities but also to convey a deterrent to Iran that Israel is prepared to act unilaterally when it perceives that international diplomacy is supporting rather than constraining Iran’s nuclear aspirations.
Following the strategic ambiguity, even the incentive for the strikes is still being debated within the U.S. administration. While President Trump provided a suggestion of a higher aspiration, posting on his Truth Social platform, “if the Iranian regime is unable to Make Iran Great Again, why wouldn’t there be a regime change??”, senior officials were swift to deny any suggestion of regime change. Trump himself then backed away from his claim on regime change in Iran. During press briefings, they emphasised that the aim of the operation was to temper nuclear escalation, not to topple the Iranian government. This divergence has fostered confusion among foreign observers and called into question the consistency of U.S. policy in the region.
This dual signalling has come at a severe diplomatic cost. Iran has accused the United States of acting in bad faith during the Oman nuclear talks, while European allies have been exasperated by Washington’s transition from the negotiating table to violence. As diplomacy was lost with retaliatory threats, the long-term effectiveness of the strikes is in doubt, not only to halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions, but to achieve strategic clarity or regional stability. But with talks at a deadlock, and threats in the air, the ultimate success of the attacks remains uncertain, not only to stop Iran’s nuclear program, but to gain strategic clarity or regional stability.
Despite the administration’s triumphalist rhetoric, US intelligence assessments are more subtle. One of the earliest Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) reports leaked revealed that the disabling of Iran’s nuclear facilities may be less severe than initially assumed, and that it might add several months to the time required for Tehran’s program. Some of the main enrichment materials and equipment were likely sent in advance or survived in reinforced underground bunkers. Iran reacted by withdrawing cooperation with the IAEA and retaliating against US targets in the Gulf area, implying that it is about to resume nuclear development at full speed.
It is by no means guaranteed that these strikes will result in regime change in Iran, as was the case with the loss of Hezbollah in Lebanon. While Hezbollah has seen its legitimacy and influence diminish as a result of the war’s defeat and the internal political upheaval in Lebanon, Iran’s government has a much more deeply entrenched institutional base, a wider diversity of repressive tools, and a much stronger hold on national identity. However, if these strikes fuel the current economic distress, provoke domestic dissent, and diplomatically isolate the regime, there could be a rise in internal pressure.
Conclusion
The Middle East is in a state of realignment, demonstrated through the diminishing effects of Iranian proxies, the change of authority within the region, and capricious US policies. The erosion of Hezbollah’s power, the demise of Bashar Assad’s regime, and the setback of nuclear deliberations are all indicators of a flux in Iran’s geopolitical calculus. Israel’s efforts against Iranian atomic installations have escalated tensions and demonstrated Iran’s precariousness. In this tumultuous situation, Lebanon is teetering on the brink; a chance exists to consolidate sovereignty and refuse foreign intervention, but success will require transformations in institutions over the long haul, and a shift of international policies back to consistency and accountability.