The Evolution and Typology of Modern Warfare: Clausewitz’s Theory in Contemporary Conflicts
According to Clausewitz, war is the continuation of politics by other means. Today, when diplomacy reaches an impasse or when conflicts of interest cannot be resolved peacefully, wars emerge. These wars have diversified in terms of parties involved, types, means, and objectives.
Wars can be divided into two categories based on the parties involved, inter-state wars and wars involving non-state actors. In terms of types, wars can be classified as interstate wars, civil wars, hegemonic wars, total wars, limited wars, and asymmetric wars. For example, interstate wars involve two or more states, while civil wars occur within a single country. Hegemonic wars reflect the struggle for superpower status, whereas in total wars, geographical and civilian-military distinctions almost disappear. Limited wars remain confined in terms of casualties and geographical scope, while in asymmetric wars, the parties differ in capacity and goals, with counterterrorism being a prime example.
Militarily, wars can be divided into conventional and unconventional categories. Conventional wars involve traditional armies, while unconventional wars, such as those involving weapons of mass destruction or biological warfare, fall under a different category. Based on objectives, wars can also be classified as just wars, humanitarian interventions, and counter-terrorism efforts. In this context, regional wars have also gained significance, as illustrated by World War I, the Arab – Israeli wars, and the Gulf Wars. The likelihood of a new regional war in the Middle East is increasing, with a shift from rhetoric to action seen as a possible outcome.
Geopolitical Fractures Triggered by the Events of October 7, 2023
Until October 7, 2023, the geopolitical boundaries in the Middle East had been shaped by the Syrian Civil War. According to these de facto boundaries, states such as Türkiye, Iran, Syria, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, the U.S., and Russia, along with non-state actors like Hezbollah, Hamas, ISIS, the Syrian National Army, the YPG, and smaller affiliated groups, were positioned within their newly established areas in the region. However, this de facto situation underwent a change with the October 7 attacks.
Although the events of October 7, 2023, initially began as an internal conflict between a state and a non-state actor, they quickly evolved into a conflict with geopolitical implications. At the outset, the war directly involved Israel and Hamas. However, over time, the conflict expanded, drawing in groups like Hezbollah and the Houthis. As Iranian-backed groups in Iraq became involved, the war indirectly transformed into a broader conflict between Israel and the Iranian-backed resistance axis. By April 13, 2024, the conflict had reached a new phase, involving Iran, its proxy groups, and Israel in a more direct confrontation.
From a geopolitical perspective, the period following April can be classified as the initial covert phase leading to a regional war. What started as a limited conflict gradually expanded, becoming regional in scope. Additionally, the conflict intensified as one of the parties entered a race to acquire unconventional weapons, further escalating the situation.
In this context, it is more reasonable to describe the war between October 7, 2023, and April 13, 2024, as an internal or limited war. However, the period between April 13, 2024, and July 20, 2024, can be considered a transitional phase. The events that occurred during this timeframe indicate that the war was evolving and shifting towards a new stage.
During this period, as Israel entered Rafah and began to take control of key corridors, Hamas effectively found itself sidelined in the conflict. In response, Iranian-backed groups like Hezbollah and, occasionally, the Houthis attempted to fill this power vacuum.
The geography of the conflict effectively began to encompass the southern regions of Lebanon. For Israel, engaging in ground warfare with Hezbollah would evoke memories of the 2006 trauma, so this situation allowed for a focus solely on air forces and intelligence operations.
The Rise of Regional War Discourse on July 20, 2024
Although Hezbollah had joined the war, it was still not possible to speak of an overt regional war in the Middle East. However, when the date turned to July 20, 2024, the spark was ignited for events that would change all the balances in the region. Perhaps on that day, neither regional nor world leaders, nor independent researchers, paid special attention to this date.
To understand the significance of this date, we must take a brief look at the events leading up to it. On July 19, 2024, the Houthis launched an attack on Tel Aviv using Samad-3 drones, resulting in the death of one person. The fact that the drones were of Iranian manufacture and that the conflict had escalated to major cities like Tel Aviv—especially with the Houthis being able to conduct such an attack from a considerable distance—highlighted the weaknesses in Israel’s defence systems.
The day after this incident, on July 20, 2024, Israel retaliated by heavily bombing the port of Hudaydah in Yemen. However, this bombing alone was not significant enough to impact the events dramatically. Following this, Israeli Defense Minister Gallant stated, “The fire burning in Yemen is visible throughout the Middle East, and we will take necessary action against any threats.” In the truest sense of the word, from that day forward, the likelihood of a regional war increased across the entire Middle East, as the ramifications of the escalating conflict became increasingly apparent.
Eleven days after the incident, the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh by Israel served as a stark reminder to other regional states that the rhetoric was not without consequence. Following Haniyeh’s killing, Türkiye’s Foreign Ministry was the first among regional governments to state, “This attack also aims to escalate the war in Gaza to a regional level. If the international community does not take action to stop Israel, our region will face much larger conflicts.”
Thus, the discourse of a ‘regional war’ began to be repeated frequently after July 31. However, these statements gained even more momentum following the death of Nasrallah. With Nasrallah’s assassination on September 27, 2024, the most powerful proxy against Israel suddenly found itself without coordination. No one who would replace Nasrallah, who had led the organization since 1982, could make it as strong as he had.
Following the assassination of Nasrallah, on September 28, Türkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated in an interview with TRT Haber, “Israel will cause a regional war.” The distinction between this statement and the one made regarding Haniyeh’s assassination lies in its more definitive nature.
Following this, for the first time on October 1, Türkiye’s leader Erdoğan addressed the Parliament, stating, “Israel’s next target is Türkiye; we are facing not a state, but a pack of killers.” With this statement, Türkiye’s leader emphasized that Israel’s target was not just regional warfare but also the potential occupation of Turkish territory, highlighting the magnitude of the threat. This statement can be interpreted not only as related to a regional war but also as a move to strengthen the AKP’s position domestically. By shifting the focus from the “Kurdish issue” to the issue with Israel, it may be seen as an appeal for a renewed alliance with the Kurds to pass constitutional reforms in parliament.
On October 1, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova made a similar statement. Speaking to Anadolu Agency, Zakharova said, “The Arab-Israeli war is moving toward a large regional conflict. The UN still has the potential to halt this war.” With this, the discourse on regional war effectively disturbed another state in the region as well.
Following the death of Hezbollah’s leader, Iran attempted to navigate a path between rhetoric and action after October 7. The Iranian parliament considered a proposal to establish a pact between Iran and the “resistance axis.” Since alliances are generally the most cost-effective means of avoiding war, Iran, by raising this discourse, essentially baited Israel, signalling its intention to consolidate regional influence without direct confrontation.
Subsequently, on October 8, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) held a closed session regarding Israel. The discussions in this session are classified as state secrets and will remain confidential for a period of ten years.
Thus, the threat of a regional war, which began with rhetoric, was brought to the Turkish Parliament, effectively making Türkiye a “party” in the conflict. The primary reason for discussing this decision is the possibility that, following Hezbollah, the direct target could be Iran, which has the potential to disrupt all existing balances in the region.
How the Crossing of Red Lines on October 18, 2024, Affected the Entire Equation
Ten days after Türkiye’s closed parliamentary session (on October 18), the threat of regional war and the regional balances began to change in a tangible way. What happened on this date? Israel crossed the Syrian border with two tanks on October 14 and positioned itself near the town of Kwdana. Four days later, Israel took control of four villages located 50 kilometres from Damascus.
Following these events, Israel, which encountered Russian forces stationed along the Syrian border, did not advance further. Subsequently, the Russian observation points in Dera and Kuneytra were vacated and quietly relocated further north. Afterwards, as Assad’s forces did not resist, Israeli troops positioned themselves on Tel Hara, the highest peak in the region. However, after some time, they withdrew from there based on a verbal agreement between Russia and Israel. After the incident, Russia withdrew its forces from southern Syria to the northwest and bombed areas held by the opposition.
In northern Syria, Türkiye had been preparing for a year to complete its “safe zone” by eliminating the YPG entirely. However, Russia’s withdrawal to northern Syria, despite the ongoing Ukraine war, created a surprise for Türkiye in this region.
Aiming to avoid a regional war, Türkiye sought to take new steps to eliminate terrorism. This initiative is known as the “second opening process.” Through this process, Türkiye aimed to feel more secure and unified in the face of a potential regional conflict. However, on October 23, a terrorist attack linked to the PKK occurred at an institution like TUSAŞ, undermining this process. In the aftermath, Türkiye was compelled to carry out military operations in northern Syria and Iraq. Türkiye considers both the YPG, based in Syria, and the PKK, based in Iraq, as interconnected terrorist organizations.
Therefore, the process initiated on October 18 can be likened to Hitler’s occupation of the Sudetenland. At that time, regional powers tolerated Germany up to Sudetenland, but it eventually escalated into a multi-actor war. Similarly, the Syrian border is pressuring Turkey, Russia, and Iran to act together. The clearest example of this is the October 21 statement by Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Ismail Bekayi: “We agree with Türkiye on the need to help restore stability and security in Syria to combat terrorism on shared borders and in the region.”
Conclusion
Shortly after the attacks on October 7, 2023, it was anticipated that the conflict would remain limited and conclude quickly. However, a year later, we can observe that the parties involved, the goals, the means, and the geography of the war have all changed significantly.
What began as the Israel-Hamas conflict is evolving into a regional war due to assassination attempts and the expansion of the geographical area involved. This regional conflict is affecting each of the regional states both in terms of domestic and foreign policy.
The actors and geographical boundaries created by the Syrian civil war are being gradually altered by Israel. In the region, states such as Türkiye, Iran, Syria, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, the USA, and Russia, along with groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, ISIS, the Syrian National Army, the YPG, and smaller affiliated factions, are struggling to establish complete control within their borders. Among these actors, Hamas is nearly finished, while Hezbollah has suffered significant damage.
The weakening of these two non-state actors has led Türkiye to intensify its efforts to eliminate the YPG. This scenario indicates that the region will be reshaped once again through Syria. The extent of potential Israeli attacks on Iran will also signal how quickly the region may change. While Israel may initiate this process, it only possesses the power to alter the southern part of the region on its own. However, a potential Israel-Iran war in the north could naturally create new risks and opportunities for Türkiye as well.
Iran’s proposal for a joint pact to prevent a regional war remains only a proposal. The next step could be the approval of this law. However, historically, while pacts have sometimes managed to prevent large-scale wars, they often become a catalyst for conflict. Thus, if Iran formalizes this pact, it may lose all avenues to avoid a regional war.
This process, which emerges as a limited war, could lead to the disappearance of old actors and the active involvement of new parties in the conflict. Another influencing factor in this situation is the impact of the U.S. elections. If Israel responds to Iran before the election, it could affect both the U.S. elections and the possibility of an all-out war in the region. However, if the response is delayed until after the elections, the likelihood of a regional war will be postponed, at least for a time.