Iran’s Reformist and Principlists Foreign Policy: What Does Masoud Pezeshkian Promise?

Introduction: Reformist Winds

Following the recent elections in Iran, reformist politician Masoud Pezeshkian was elected president. Pezeshkian, who frequently emphasizes his ethnic Azerbaijani Turkish background, has sparked expectations of significant changes in the country’s domestic and foreign policy with his election. Known for advocating the rights of ethnic minorities, Pezeshkian has stated that recognizing minority rights will weaken separatist tendencies in the country (Radio Farda, April 25, 2018). Frequently speaking on such issues, Pezeshkian has criticized the harsh suppression of recent protests in Iran and has addressed women’s rights (Khabaronline.ir, June 14, 2024). His election as president could potentially lead to changes in domestic policy, especially regarding issues like the centre-periphery relationship and ethnic minorities. But can any changes in foreign policy be expected? Speculations about potential changes and compromises in foreign policy often refer to his reformist stance.  This paper will analyze Pezeshkian’s promises regarding foreign policy, explore whether there will be any changes in Iran’s foreign policy during his presidency, and comparatively discuss whether there are any real differences in foreign policy between reformists and principlists.

Reformists (اصلاح‌طلبان) and Principlists (اصول‌گرایان): Is There a Difference in Foreign Policy?

Although official party activity has been banned in Iran since 1987, two main political factions or groups are still active. These political circles, broadly categorized as reformists and principlists, are less of a unified political group and more of a loose coalition of political circles around ideas with unclear boundaries. Although non-reformist circles have mainly governed Iran since the Islamic Revolution, the period of Mohammad Khatami’s presidency from 1997 to 2005 is noted as the first time reformists held power in government.

Khatami also began his presidency in 1997 with high expectations. He primarily advanced the idea of a “dialogue among civilizations” as a counter to Samuel P. Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis (Iranian Diplomacy, October 2, 2010). Another notable event in foreign policy during Khatami’s tenure was the attempt to establish a “roadmap” in relations with the United States.[1] Although the process was initially conducted secretly by low-ranking diplomats, Khatami and his Foreign Minister agreed on the points of the roadmap. However, the Supreme Leader, Khamenei, reportedly agreed with 85-90% of it. Allegedly, the Leader supported the negotiations but insisted that they remain entirely secret until a tangible result was achieved. It seems that Iran wanted to avoid appearing as the side seeking rapprochement with the U.S. in case the negotiations failed. The roadmap aimed to address issues such as Palestine, Iraq, Turkey’s intervention in northern Iraq, sanctions, financial embargoes, and the nuclear issue. At the same time, the U.S. was expected to abandon efforts to overthrow the internal regime in Iran (Washington Post, May 4, 2003). It is clear that Khatami, in the second phase of his presidency, was in favour of establishing a full plan of action with the U.S., and consequently, reaching an agreement. Interestingly, Khamenei was also reportedly in agreement with 85-90% of these conditions.[2] Nevertheless, the acceptance of such a roadmap was not realized.

Although significant progress was not achieved in relations with the U.S., during Khatami’s second term, Iran held nuclear negotiations with Britain, France, and Germany, leading to the signing of the Saadabad Agreement in October 2003 and the Paris Agreement in November 2004. With these two agreements, Iran opened its nuclear facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and committed to the voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol provisions of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. (Iran suspended this implementation in January 2006.)

In both cases, there are conflicting reports about exactly what was discussed in the negotiations, who proposed the talks, and which party rejected them. What is clear, however, is that during Khatami’s tenure, the reformist government lacked the power or ability to establish a comprehensive modus vivendi with the U.S., and any significant step required the Leader’s approval.

Thus, during the reformist presidency, apart from minor events, there was no successful process, and all other voluntary and non-binding cooperation with the IAEA, including the Additional Protocol formed based on agreements with Britain, France, and Germany, was suspended. Overall, during the eight years of nominal reformist rule in Iran, aside from a few symbolic steps towards a softer foreign policy, no real results were achieved. Interestingly, a real outcome was achieved during the time when principlists were in power in Iran, specifically during the nuclear negotiations in Vienna.

More comprehensive discussions on Iran’s nuclear issue took place during the presidency of the principlist or hard-liner faction. Negotiations with the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States—plus Germany), which began during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency in 2013, concluded with an agreement in July 2015. The main points of the JCPOA are as follows (U.S. Department of State; BBC News, November 23, 2021):

1. Limiting Uranium Enrichment: Iran agreed to reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium and limit the level of enrichment to 3.67%, well below the weapons-grade level.
2. Reducing Centrifuges: Iran agreed to reduce the number of its centrifuges and use only the older, less efficient models for a period.
3. Reactor Modifications: Iran agreed to redesign and rebuild its heavy-water reactor in Arak so that it could not produce weapons-grade plutonium.
4. Inspections and Monitoring: The agreement provided the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with enhanced access to Iran’s nuclear facilities to monitor compliance with the terms of the deal.
5. Sanctions Relief: In return for Iran’s compliance, the UN, EU, and the US agreed to lift nuclear-related economic sanctions, which significantly impacted Iran’s economy.

This agreement remained fully in effect until 2018, when the U.S. unilaterally withdrew from it. Although discussions about the agreement resumed in 2021, they seemed to have stalled by the end of 2023 (Ravid, B., September 16, 2023).

As is evident from the progress and outcome of the two diplomatic processes mentioned above, whether the president and government in Iran are reformist or principlist does not play a significant role in determining foreign policy. Despite the diplomatic negotiations during Mohammad Khatami’s tenure as a reformist president yielding no results, a crucial agreement like the JCPOA was achieved during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who is considered a staunch principlist. In short, the fact that Pezeshkian is a politician from the reformist faction does not necessarily mean that he will seek, be able to, or even attempt to make changes in foreign policy.

Pezeshkian: What Does He Promise in Foreign Policy?

Masoud Pezeshkian provided relatively detailed insights into his potential foreign policy in an article titled “My Message to the New World,” published in the Tehran Times. The key points can be summarized as follows (Pezeshkian, July 12, 2024):

• Pezeshkian will attempt to revive stalled negotiations with major powers to restore the 2015 nuclear agreement.
• He will pursue “an opportunity-driven policy by creating balance in relations with all countries” and will “welcome sincere efforts to alleviate tensions and will reciprocate good-faith with good faith.”
• He will strive for cooperation to prevail over regional competition.
• The stance towards Israel and support for Palestine will continue, at the very least, as they currently are.
• Russia and China will continue to hold significant positions in Iran’s foreign policy.
• Cooperation with Europe and Iran’s adherence to its commitments under the JCPOA may be discussed if Europe fulfils the obligations it took on after 2018, following the U.S.’s withdrawal from the JCPOA and the imposition of sanctions, but later abandoned.
• The U.S. must recognize that Iran will not surrender to pressure.

Another interesting point in Pezeshkian’s address is his indication that he intends to participate not only in the execution but also in the formulation of foreign policy. He emphasized that the formation and execution of foreign policy fall under the responsibility of the president and government, and stated that he “intends to use all the powers granted to his office” to achieve his goals. His use of such a phrase is noteworthy, as legally, the Supreme Leader and certain institutions under his authority play the primary role in determining Iran’s foreign policy (Divsallar, 2023).

Additionally, it appears from the open letter that the new president is inclined to cooperate with European countries, at least in the economic sphere. The worsening economic hardships since 2018 have likely compelled Pezeshkian, who has promised prosperity to his electorate, to take this approach.

Additionally, it appears from the open letter that the new president is inclined to cooperate with European countries, at least in the economic sphere.[3] The worsening economic hardships since 2018 have likely compelled Pezeshkian, who has promised prosperity to his electorate, to take this approach.

Regarding the United States, there is a particular emphasis on sanctions and the suffering they have caused the Iranian people. At the same time, Pezeshkian asserts that the U.S. must recognize that Iran cannot be subdued through pressure, highlighting the “illegal” nature of the U.S.’s withdrawal from the JCPOA. He also stresses that Iran has fulfilled all its obligations under this agreement and reiterates that the country’s nuclear program is peaceful, accusing the U.S. and its Western allies. Despite the large-scale military intervention in Gaza supported by the U.S., Pezeshkian’s reluctance to entirely rule out the possibility of negotiations with the U.S. suggests that he might be willing to engage in de-escalation, provided Iran’s key conditions are met. Perhaps Pezeshkian is planning to establish relations with the U.S. and European countries similar to those in 2015-2018, to revitalize the increasingly deteriorating economy.

It is clear that the dissatisfaction of certain segments of the population with the current domestic situation played a decisive role in his election as president. Although it might be possible to slightly ease the domestic political environment through actions that could be taken with the Supreme Leader’s approval or tacit consent, it is evident that Pezeshkian’s promises regarding the economy will be unfeasible in a situation where sanctions are not significantly relaxed as a result of reduced tensions with the West.

Additionally, it should be noted that Pezeshkian’s campaign and his post-election statements did not include any indication of reducing cooperation with groups in the region that are associated with Iran to some degree (broadly known as the Axis of Resistance). On the contrary, he emphasized that support for Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, would remain central to their policies (Isna.ir, July 9, 2024), that Iran would continue to support Palestinians until the liberation of all of Quds (Tehran Times, July 12, 2024), and thanked the Houthis for their support on the Palestinian issue (Iranwire, July 15, 2024).

Given the ongoing Israeli military operations in Gaza and the fact that these operations are supported by the United States, it is almost certain that Pezeshkian will not take steps towards any form of dual compromise or reduction of tensions [nor is it likely that such a proposal will come from the other side]. Moreover, the recent assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran has made this possibility almost completely unlikely. However, under the political conditions where the Israel-Gaza war ends and the status quo before the military operations is restored, the scenarios mentioned above might become possible.

Conclusion: The Limits of Reform in Iran

Therefore, it is unfounded to claim that Pezeshkian’s reformist stance will lead to changes in Iran’s foreign policy. The primary reason for this is that the de jure and de facto authority to make decisions on foreign policy rests with the Supreme Leader. The shifts in foreign policy are more dependent on the internal and external conditions of the time and the Supreme Leader’s decisions on how to respond to these changes based on consultations with his advisors, rather than on a change in the presidency. Although Pezeshkian made some assertive statements about his role in shaping foreign policy after being elected president, he had previously indicated during a debate with his opponent, Jalili, that the final decision would be with Khamenei (Independent Persian, July 4, 2024).

Considering the country’s economic situation and the significant role that poor relations with Western countries have played, there is a high likelihood of some easing of tensions (naturally, this refers to the period after the cessation of the Israeli occupation of Gaza). However, any such changes will stem from Khamenei’s response to the internal and external conditions rather than from any foreign policy course that Pezeshkian might wish to implement. At best, the president and some cabinet members might influence certain aspects of the foreign policy decision-making process through the Supreme National Security Council. Nevertheless, as demonstrated by past events, the final word on foreign policy, as with all other matters, belongs to Khamenei. Pezeshkian’s reformist identity and his messages about wanting to establish good relations with the world might facilitate Iran’s process of easing tensions. It is possible that this very “advantage” contributed to his candidacy and eventual victory in the elections. However, these qualities will not grant him the authority, capability, or power to dictate the direction and priorities of Iran’s foreign policy.

In any case, the possibility of Iran easing its foreign policy through Pezeshkian’s desire or influence can only occur after the ongoing active conflict in Gaza comes to an end.

Notes

[1] This was only a proposed framework/roadmap for starting negotiations, not the negotiations themselves or their outcome.

[2] It should be noted that it is not entirely clear whether such a Grand Bargain ever existed. While some, like Nicholas Kristof of The New York Times, have used this claim to criticize the hardline policies of the Bush administration in subsequent conflicts (Kristof, April 28, 2007), others, such as Michael Rubin, have argued that the claim is entirely false (Rubin, February 18, 2010; October 22, 2007). John Kerry also mentioned in a 2013 interview that such a proposal existed but was rejected by the Bush administration. However, Kerry’s claim may have been more about justifying the nuclear negotiations with Iran at that time rather than revealing any factual evidence (Kessler, December 9, 2013).

[3] Abbas Araghchi, who was nominated by Pezeshkian as a candidate for the position of foreign minister, made similar statements about Europe (Tehran Times, 13 August 2023).

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