fbpx

Hydrocarbon Riches and Boundary Disputes: The Eastern Mediterranean’s Geopolitical Chessboard

23 Min Read

Disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean: A Struggle Over Boundaries and Wealth

The Mediterranean Sea is a confined and narrow body of water, necessitating coastal nations to establish maritime boundaries to distinguish their respective continental shelves and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). The Eastern Mediterranean, in particular, remains the most disputed area. Throughout recent decades, rich underwater resources of the Eastern Mediterranean region have been one of the most conflicting and controversial unresolved issues between the regional basin states and the external actors trying to attain benefit from the wealth of hydrocarbon deposits. The contentious nature of the problem has necessitated long-lasting discussions and negotiations over the maritime boundary agreements among the coastal nations.

Maritime delimitation becomes particularly challenging when islands are involved, as parties often struggle to reach a consensus on the extent of maritime zones to be allocated to islands. In fact, islands have been central to disagreements in all maritime delimitation disputes. As a result, the states involved are frequently compelled to seek resolution through international courts. In contrast, other geographic factors, such as the location of the coasts and the respective coastal lengths of the states, tend to present fewer complex issues.

The process of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) delimitation ignited the hidden tensions among the coastal countries when the Republic of Cyprus took bold steps in the early 2000s to establish its maritime boundaries and secure exploration rights. Shortly after, neighbouring countries took similar actions, each competing for a portion of the underwater wealth. In a brief period, other neighbouring countries in the region such as Türkiye, Greece, and Israel joined the battle and claimed their own claims about the EEZ. Maritime boundary disputes have revived longstanding tensions and fostered new alliances. Türkiye’s assertive “Blue Homeland” doctrine, along with its conflict with Greece and Cyprus over maritime zones, has led to the deeply entrenched and continuous struggles for regional dominance and security over maritime borders. The discovery of the gas reserves gave rise to the already existing and frozen economic and strategic controversies affecting regional power dynamics and international relations, which added more to the competition in the area for national resources.

Historical Overview

In the 2000s, Mediterranean states signed a series of bilateral EEZ delimitation agreements, driven largely by the potential for hydrocarbon exploration. The Republic of Cyprus (RoC) led this effort, establishing a pioneering legal framework by signing an EEZ agreement with Egypt in 2003. Türkiye promptly lodged a formal objection to the treaty, claiming it encroached on its potential continental shelf areas. Additionally, it argued that the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus (GASC) acted unlawfully by disregarding the Turkish side of the island of Cyprus. The exploration licenses issued under this contested treaty also sparked further objections from Türkiye, leading to preventive actions. This proactive step was further reinforced in 2004 when Nicosia unilaterally legislated the designation of its EEZ.

The RoC maintained this momentum in 2007 by entering an EEZ agreement with Lebanon, though Ankara’s discontent over the matter, influenced by Türkiye, has led to the Lebanese parliament withholding ratification. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) officially objected to these treaties, arguing that the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus (GASC) was not the sole legitimate representative of the entire island, and thus the agreements infringed upon the TRNC’s continental shelf rights. Lebanon also raised objections to the treaty between the GASC and Israel, claiming it violated Lebanon’s maritime area in the adjacent section between the two nations.

Complicating matters further, the RoC unilaterally divided part of its maritime zone into 13 licensing blocks for offshore energy exploration in 2007. To explore hydrocarbons, this controversial move involved licensing major international energy companies, including Exxon Mobil, Total, Eni, Kogas, and Novatek. Ankara responded swiftly, asserting that several of these blocks — particularly Blocks 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7 — infringed upon the Turkish continental shelf.

These actions had profound geopolitical implications beyond mere economic interests. The discovery of significant offshore natural gas reserves by Israel and Cyprus, combined with strained Turkish-Israeli relations, shifted regional strategic balances. This shift was further cemented when Cyprus and Israel formalized their cooperation with an EEZ agreement in December 2010. Greece skillfully navigated these changing dynamics, capitalizing on the rift between Türkiye and Israel by strengthening ties with Israel. This approach culminated in a robust security partnership between Greece and Israel within just a few years.

On November 27, 2019, following negotiations between the Turkish President and the Chairman of the Libyan Presidential Council, Türkiye signed the “Memorandum of Understanding on the Delimitation of Maritime Jurisdictions in the Mediterranean Sea” with the Libyan Government of National Accord. This agreement established the maritime boundary for the continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) between the two countries.

In the latest development regarding disputed maritime delimitation treaties, Greece and Egypt signed an EEZ Delimitation Agreement on August 6, 2020, which also covers the area previously delimited by Türkiye and Libya. Türkiye subsequently declared this agreement null and void, stating that it “violated the continental shelf/EEZ areas of both Türkiye and Libya.”

Türkiye’s Perspective

From Türkiye’s viewpoint, the current de-facto maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean unjustly and illegally deny it its rightful maritime territory. As a result, Türkiye regards the regional agreements for offshore natural gas development—based on these de facto boundaries—as illegitimate. This dispute can be traced back to the “Seville map,” a cartographic study commissioned by the European Union and produced by the University of Seville in the early 2000s.

Figure 1: Countries’ Territorial Waters According to the Seville Map

The map established maximum boundaries for Greece and Cyprus, extending from the coasts of every inhabited Greek island, irrespective of their size or proximity to Türkiye’s shores, thereby encroaching on Türkiye’s interests. Türkiye’s claims regarding the unfair demarcation hold some merit, as its Mediterranean coastline is longer than the U.S.-Mexico border. Regarding the area between Türkiye and Egypt, Türkiye has proposed that the boundary “follow the median line between the Turkish and Egyptian coastlines,” with the western terminal point determined based on the outcome of future agreements in the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean involving all relevant states.

Figure 2: The Boundaries Claimed by Turkey in the Whole Eastern Mediterranean Sea

Türkiye advocates that conventional and customary laws do not provide different rules for maritime delimitation and claims that the agreement between Cyprus and Egypt did not include Türkiye’s involvement thus ignoring the principle of equity mentioned in Articles 74 (1) and 83 (1) of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Regarding the area between Türkiye and Egypt, Türkiye has proposed that the boundary “follow the median line between the Turkish and Egyptian coastlines,” with the western terminal point determined based on the outcome of future agreements in the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean involving all relevant states, while considering all pertinent and special circumstances. Consequently, Türkiye asserts that the boundary between its coast and Egypt should be established as a median line, leaving the determination of the western section to be resolved through agreement among all involved parties.

In contrast to Greece’s application of the principle of equidistance in the maritime delimitation, Türkiye emphasizes that equidistance is not a principle of general applicability but instead one of the methods of maritime delimitation and it does not lead to the equitable result in accordance with the international law principles. Türkiye emphasizes certain specific principles: ‘land should dominate the sea’; ‘there should be no ‘cut-off effect’ on the maritime areas of a coastal state’; and ‘there should be a reasonable degree of proportionality between the respective coasts and the maritime areas to be accorded.’

Citing the examples of UK-France, Romania-Ukraine, and others, one of the most important arguments of the Turkish government related to the application of delimitation rule in the case of islands is that islands do not generate full maritime jurisdictional zones when they are against continental lands. The wording is also important in Türkiye’s rhetoric: One of its primary arguments is that equity necessitates a reasonable degree of proportionality between the lengths of the relevant mainland coasts of both parties and the maritime areas allocated to them. In this context, the term “coasts” specifically refers to the mainland coasts, rather than those of islands. Consequently, the Greek islands—specifically Crete, Kasos, Karpathos, Rhodes, and Kastellorizo—should be disregarded entirely, as allocating maritime areas beyond their territorial waters would sever the projection of the Turkish mainland, leading to an inequitable outcome. This is particularly evident in the case of Kastellorizo, which is located just 2 kilometres from the Turkish mainland and has a land area of only 10 square kilometres. The same argument applies to the islands of Rhodes and Karpathos, which are smaller and located closer to the Turkish mainland.

However, in contrast to the aforementioned Greek islands in the region, Cyprus is not part of another coastal state but rather a political entity distinct from any mainland country. In this context, Türkiye highlights the significant difference in the respective coastal lengths. Considering this factor, Türkiye argues that it is equitable to allocate a smaller maritime area to the island of Cyprus compared to its own maritime area.

According to the Turkish narrative, the starting point of the conflict in the area was the agreement between Egypt and Cyprus without involving other interested parties in the region, especially Türkiye. This led to the subsequent counter-moves by the Turkish government to protect the country’s security and its maritime zone. Furthermore, Türkiye contends that “there is no single authority, legally or in practice, that is competent to jointly represent both the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots, and thus the island of Cyprus as a whole. The Greek Cypriots cannot assert authority, jurisdiction, or sovereignty over the Turkish Cypriots, who possess equal status, or over the entire island of Cyprus.”

Greek Approach

The Greeks’ main argument is that the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the basis for the maritime boundaries in the region. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a sovereign state holds exclusive rights for the exploration and exploitation of marine resources, such as energy production from water and wind, within 200 nautical miles of its coastline.

By establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), Greece will protect the economic integrity of its continental and archipelagic areas. The primary reason most coastal states have unilaterally adopted a 200-mile EEZ is to prevent the over-exploitation of their coastal fisheries. Historically, a significant portion of Greece’s fishing fleet operated beyond its coastal waters, particularly in the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. However, with many countries now establishing their own EEZs, Greek fishermen have lost access to these traditional fishing areas. A Greek EEZ would, therefore, greatly benefit the country’s fishing industry, which, although contributing only around 1% to the Gross Domestic Product, plays a vital role in providing the population with affordable, high-protein food.

Moreover, in late 1986, Turkey unilaterally declared a 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Black Sea, despite the irony that Türkiye has consistently opposed it. At the same time, Türkiye reached an agreement with the former Soviet Union on the EEZ’s delimitation, confirming that the continental shelf boundary established by the 1978 Soviet-Turkish Delimitation Agreement would also apply to their EEZ. This agreement, based on the equidistance method, did not consider special circumstances or refer to the enclosed or semi-enclosed nature of the seas. Therefore, Türkiye has inadvertently weakened its stance in its maritime dispute with Greece. The Black Sea, being a semi-enclosed sea like the Aegean, leaves Türkiye vulnerable when Greece applies the same delimitation mechanism.

In partial response to the Greek Cypriot actions, Ankara signed an agreement with Libya’s Government of National Unity (GNU) in November 2019 to establish an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) between Türkiye’s southern coast and Libya’s northeastern coast. The announcement of this agreement was widely rejected by regional actors; Egypt deemed it illegal, while Greece dismissed it as absurd pointing at the UNCLOS provisions, pointing out that it disregards the Greek island of Crete, which lies between the two countries.

Blue: areas claimed by Greece and Cyprus; Red: areas claimed by Turkey. Section A-B: claimed delimitation between Turkey and Libya according to the 2019 agreement

Hindrance of Better Deals?

Following the agreement between Ankara and Libya’s UN-recognized government that claimed southern Aegean water that Greece also claims, Athens formed a trilateral partnership with Israel and the Republic of Cyprus (RoC). Athens also is one of the most supporting countries for Israel in the Gaza War while Ankara has been a vocal critic. Türkiye condemned Israel’s response to the October 7 attacks by Hamas as disproportionate. Unlike Greece and most Western countries, Türkiye does not classify Hamas as a terrorist organization.

Despite Türkiye’s energy ambitions, the recent discoveries of gas in the Eastern Mediterranean have heightened its concerns about being excluded from the region’s developing energy and security landscape. This apprehension stems mainly from two interconnected factors: 1) the proposed route for the Eastern Mediterranean gas pipeline project and 2) the establishment of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum. The planned €6.2 billion pipeline to Europe relies on increased cooperation among Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, effectively excluding Türkiye from the initiative. In this context, the maritime boundaries agreement was more focused on the Eastern Mediterranean than on Libya itself. This is because the agreement indicated that the proposed Israel-Greece-Cyprus gas pipeline would need to traverse maritime areas claimed by Türkiye, as outlined in the Turkish-Government of National Accord (GNA) maritime deal. This underscores Türkiye’s intention to disrupt any projects that seek to bypass its claims.

Moreover, the maritime dispute between Greece and Türkiye is likely to intensify as the Eastern Mediterranean is set to become a crucial transit area for electricity. One of the European Union’s flagship initiatives in the region is the EuroAsia Interconnector, a 2,000 MW electricity highway that will connect the national electricity grids of Israel, Cyprus, and Greece via a 1,208 km subsea cable. Another significant project is the EuroAfrica Interconnector, which aims to link the electricity grids of Egypt, Cyprus, and Greece through a 1,396 km subsea cable. These two interconnectors are designed to supply the EU with electricity generated from the gas reserves of Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel, as well as from renewable energy sources. The project’s visual documentation reveals that the proposed cable route from Cyprus to Crete passes through an area that Türkiye considers part of its continental shelf. The lowest point of the subsea cable will reach 3,000 meters below sea level. According to several reports, Ankara has already issued diplomatic notes to the Greek and Israeli embassies and the EU delegation, asserting that they must obtain Türkiye’s permission before undertaking any work in its continental shelf area.

Additionally, Israel’s partnership with the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and Greece poses a challenge to the normalization of relations between Israel and Türkiye. Ankara has presented alternative claims based on its “Blue Homeland” doctrine, which allows it to assert larger Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea (EMS). Notably, Türkiye’s “Blue Homeland” doctrine does not conflict with Israel’s interests, suggesting potential avenues for cooperation between the two nations regarding EEZ delineation in the EMS. Should Israel enter into an EEZ agreement with Türkiye, it could substantially expand its own EEZ. Currently, Israel’s maritime territory in the EMS may face limitations due to its existing EEZ agreement with the RoC, which could lead to potential losses. Furthermore, it is important to note that both Egypt and Lebanon would also gain additional EEZ if they entered into agreements with Türkiye. Following the restoration of full diplomatic relations between Israel and Türkiye in 2022, albeit hindered after the Hamas attack, Türkiye highlighted the potential for gas cooperation with Israel. In February 2023, Israel and Lebanon finalized an agreement, brokered by the United States, to establish a permanent maritime boundary, thereby eliminating a significant obstacle to tapping into the region’s hydrocarbon potential. The following month, Türkiye and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) reportedly agreed to initiate formal negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Therefore, the dynamics in the region are intricate, and the decisions surrounding EEZ agreements carry significant implications for each country’s maritime boundaries and resources in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Conclusion

The maritime delimitation disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean illustrate the complex interplay among international law, geographic realities, and political interests. The discovery of significant hydrocarbon resources has intensified long-standing tensions, particularly between Türkiye, Greece, and Cyprus, while also involving external actors like Israel, Egypt, and the European Union. These disputes are further complicated by the involvement of islands and the overlapping claims of continental shelves and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). Türkiye’s objections, rooted in its “Blue Homeland” doctrine, reflect its determination to secure a larger share of maritime territory and resources, countering agreements made by Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt without its participation.

The growing alliances between Greece, Israel, and Cyprus, coupled with energy projects such as the Eastern Mediterranean pipeline and subsea electricity interconnectors, demonstrate the strategic importance of the region. However, these alliances effectively exclude Türkiye, exacerbating existing tensions. Meanwhile, Türkiye’s pursuit of agreements with Libya and potential cooperation with Israel indicate its efforts to prevent marginalization in the regional energy landscape.

Despite ongoing diplomatic efforts and negotiations, the deeply entrenched positions of the involved parties suggest that maritime boundary disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean will remain a persistent source of regional friction. The region’s future stability and economic development depend on the ability of these nations to reach equitable agreements that consider both geographic realities and the principles of international law.

Share This Article