Structural Dynamics of the Conflict
Since the onset of the Hamas-Israel conflict on October 7, 2023, and even prior to that date, the dynamics of the conflict have undergone significant changes. These transformations have been shaped both by the internal dynamics of the parties involved and by the evolving regional and international context. The structural dynamics that have emerged within the Hamas-Israel conflict can be categorised as follows: 1) Economic dynamics; 2) Political dynamics; 3) Military dynamics; 4) Social dynamics; 5) Geopolitical dynamics.
Economic Dynamics
Even before the outbreak of the conflict on October 7, 2023, the Levant region as a whole had already been on the agenda of both regional states and international actors, positively and negatively, due to its location along key international logistics and energy transit routes. As recalled from earlier periods, international projects such as the EastMed pipeline, the hydrocarbon reserves discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) have significantly shaped these dynamics. The Gaza Strip, governed by Hamas, is situated atop hydrocarbon reserves, and economic and logistical motivations primarily drove its initial attack targeting the Haifa-Ashkelon line.
Political Dynamics
These dynamics stem from both Israel’s internal political developments and the longstanding rivalry between Hamas and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). In Israel, the process that began with judicial reform gradually shifted the political landscape toward the dominance of right-wing parties. This internal focus led to the marginalisation of external threats and, in turn, created security vulnerabilities. On the Hamas-PLO front, the geographic separation between Gaza and the West Bank, much like in previous periods, manifested as a leadership conflict in contemporary politics. Seeking to fill the void of a charismatic leader who could represent all Palestinians, Hamas initiated the October 7 attacks with external backing, thereby launching a formal political and military campaign. From its power base in Gaza, Hamas has strived to position itself as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian cause, overshadowing the PLO. This ambition nearly culminated in success with the Beijing Declaration; however, shifting international circumstances thwarted this momentum, causing Hamas’s political gains to rapidly dissipate.
Military Dynamics
Although both sides have experienced intermittent tactical gains and losses, these fluctuations have had limited impact on the overall outcome of the conflict. For Hamas, the initial stages of the October offensive led to a temporary doubling of its effective territorial control within Gaza. For the first time in its history, Hamas succeeded in approaching the border zone shared with the PLO from the ground, marking an unprecedented geographical advance. Militarily, the offensive exposed significant vulnerabilities in Israel’s security apparatus, including its renowned military capabilities and elite intelligence agencies such as Mossad and Shin Bet. Hamas’s accurate reading of the geopolitical climate at the time played a crucial role in its early success. This context included a more distanced stance toward Israel by the Democratic administration in the United States, Russia’s regional isolation, and China’s supportive posture.
For Israel, military achievements emerged more clearly over the longer term. Among its notable successes were the execution of effective hostage rescue operations and the full control of strategic corridors such as Netzarim and Rafah. Nonetheless, Israel’s performance in urban warfare operations has revealed certain limitations; despite its military superiority, it has not been able to fully dismantle Hamas’s operational capacity.
Social Dynamics
On the societal level, both parties have been deeply affected by the devastation of war. In Gaza, Hamas repeatedly displaced nearly 2 million residents across a narrow north-south axis within the territory. In Israel, over 100,000 people—primarily from northern regions—were evacuated, many of whom relocated to the capital. This large-scale internal migration intensified public discontent with Prime Minister Netanyahu and accelerated anti-government protests. Initially centred around judicial reform, these protests later evolved into demonstrations focused on the hostage crisis. Although Hamas managed to maintain control over social dynamics for much of the conflict, public sentiment began to shift following the latest ceasefire. Notably, calls from Gaza’s population declaring “we no longer want war” marked a significant rupture in what had previously been a tightly controlled social narrative.
Geopolitical Dynamics
Perhaps the most significant transformations have occurred in the geopolitical sphere. The election of Donald Trump in the United States and renewed diplomatic engagement with Russia had a direct impact on the Middle East. In Syria, the entrenched Assad regime adopted a relatively softer stance toward Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), signalling a shift in the regional balance. This realignment altered the strategic motivations of two of Hamas’s key supporters, Iran and Russia, resulting in Hamas’s growing marginalisation. For Israel, the evolving international environment became increasingly favourable, allowing it to successfully negotiate the return of many hostages. However, despite these gains, Israel has not achieved a comprehensive military or political victory.
The Resurgence of Trump’s Proposals for Conflict Resolution
Donald Trump, who came to power on the promise of ending wars around the world during his U.S. presidential campaign, has also proposed a series of unconventional solutions to the Gaza war—proposals that he has continued to revise and update over time.
In fact, during his first term in office, Trump introduced a peace plan aimed at ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to this plan, the Gaza Strip was to remain under the control of the PLO. However, shifting geopolitical conditions prompted Hamas to act, ultimately disrupting the proposed framework. Trump’s subsequent recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel effectively nullified the plan altogether.
In the revised plan, many elements have changed. Most notably, the plan now aims to end the war between Hamas and Israel and facilitate a hostage exchange. The proposal was first introduced during Netanyahu’s official visit to the United States on February 4, 2025, and was publicly announced on February 5. In its initial form, Trump suggested placing Gaza under U.S. control, effectively removing it from local governance structures.
Meanwhile, a new vision dubbed the “Riviera of the Middle East” was introduced, promising improved living conditions for Gazans. Since its announcement, Trump and his administration have sent mixed signals regarding the plan. On February 5, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt assured reporters that any displacement of Palestinians would be “temporary,” and that no U.S. troops or taxpayer dollars would be involved in Gaza. However, in a February 10 interview with Fox News, Trump contradicted this by stating that Palestinians would not return to Gaza, as they would have “much better housing… a permanent place for them” elsewhere.
On February 26, Trump shared a video on his social media platform, TRUTH, depicting a Gaza Riviera that did not include Palestinians, created using artificial intelligence. Following this post, the Arab world reacted by attempting to allocate funds for a Gaza that would include the Gazan population. Egypt’s proposed $53 billion investment was rejected by both the United States and Israel. In response to this stance, Trump stated on February 27 that Gazans should be relocated to Egypt and Jordan. Although Egypt and Jordan were initially reluctant to embrace this proposal, over time, they have exhibited a more conciliatory approach. For instance, Egypt announced that it would temporarily accept nearly 500,000 people. Jordan, on the other hand, provided assistance to 2,000 children. However, following public backlash in Egypt, this announcement was officially denied.
The primary reason for Egypt and Jordan’s reversal is their dependence on U.S. foreign aid and the resurgence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. These two pressures are driving both countries toward reaching an agreement with the United States and Israel.
Trump, leaving nothing to chance, is also considering Sudan, Somalia, and Syria as potential countries for resettling displaced populations. These countries have officially declared that they will not accept the proposal. However, despite updating his plan, Trump remains steadfast in his position.
The Significance of the Third-Stage Ceasefire Negotiations between Hamas and Israel
Since there were no clear winners or losers between Israel and Hamas, and issues such as hostages and humanitarian aid reached an impasse, both sides were pushed toward a ceasefire agreement. The ceasefire was first announced on January 15, 2025, and, following extensive negotiations with the support of the United States, Egypt, and Qatar, it officially took effect on January 19. This proposal had originally been put forward by Joe Biden in May 2024. The ceasefire was structured into three phases:
The first phase lasted for 42 days. During this phase, Hamas released a total of 33 hostages, including 25 alive and 8 deceased. In return, Israel freed 1,900 Gaza prisoners. The Israeli army withdrew from Gaza, and displaced Gazans returned to their homes. Humanitarian aid vehicles were allowed to enter Gaza daily. Israel agreed to vacate only the Netzarim corridor, out of the two previously mentioned corridors (Philadelphi and Netzarim).
The process for the start of the second phase was supposed to begin 16 days after the first phase, but this did not occur. This phase was also intended to last for 42 days. During this phase, all hostages and prisoners were to be exchanged. A permanent ceasefire would be established, and Israeli forces would completely withdraw from the region.
In the third phase, the bodies of all the deceased would be returned, and the issues related to the reconstruction of Gaza would be addressed.
The ceasefire process was crucial for the region’s stability, as both global power transitions and regional power shifts in Syria were occurring while the parties were engaged in conflict. For the implementation of an active political and military strategy that aligned with these developments, a ceasefire was necessary for both sides. However, the parties had no consensus on whether the ceasefire would be permanent or temporary.
Structural and Political Impediments to Transitioning to the Second Stage
Although the transition to the second phase was expected on March 1, the Israeli side believed that after this phase, a return to the previous status would not be possible. Achieving a permanent ceasefire was undesirable for Israel, as Netanyahu had stated when the war began that Hamas would be completely eradicated. For this reason, a permanent ceasefire did not align with Israel’s interests. For Netanyahu, making this ceasefire permanent would also mean the revival of the judicial case against him. Additionally, the “Qatar-gate” scandal has once again undermined the prestige of Netanyahu and his Likud party. Two of Netanyahu’s closest aides, Yonatan Urich and Yisrael Einhorn, are accused of accepting bribes from the Qatari government and acting as agents to protect Qatar’s interests in Israel. This incident, in itself, caused the Israeli public to turn significantly away from Likud, and Netanyahu could not pursue a permanent peace under such circumstances.
The situation is different for Hamas. Despite everything, Hamas has managed to maintain its existence and now views the Israeli hostages as guarantors of that existence. Hamas currently holds a total of 59 hostages, 24 of whom are believed to be alive.
For Hamas, the situation is different. By giving up its only leverage, Hamas could not trust the guarantees of the United States and Israel. This is because the U.S. administration has changed and is now pursuing a more hardline, pro-Israel policy than the Democrats did. Furthermore, Hamas’s supporter, Iran, has been expelled from Syria. Hamas is facing an increasing supply shortage. Another balancing element in the region, Russia, also appears to be pursuing a policy of engaging with the U.S. in the Middle East. This overall atmosphere of distrust compels Hamas to view the continuation of the war as an existential necessity. The main reason for this is the growing divergence of opinions between Hamas and the people of Gaza, as well as differences in the U.S. approach not only to Middle East policy but also to global politics. Specifically, if Hamas does not wage war, it will be completely destroyed due to the loss of all its support. At the same time, the U.S.’s systemic policy centred on Iran differs from that of Israel. While Iran acquiring nuclear weapons is absolutely unacceptable for Israel under any circumstances, for the U.S., the priority is simply that Iran does not acquire such weapons at present. This could make it contextually acceptable for the U.S. in the future for Iran to become a nuclear power.
Although there are both structural and political obstacles for Israel, the structural and contextual barriers for Hamas are more pressing. For all these reasons, Israel continues its attacks by breaking the ceasefire agreement in Gaza.
Prospects for the Future
The fact that both sides are either compelled to fight or consciously choose to do so indicates that the state of war will continue in the near future. In general, the complete encirclement of Iran in the Middle East and the escalation towards nuclear weapons will also affect Hamas. For now, the priority for the United States and Israel is to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and to ensure that Turkey does not fill the resulting power vacuum in Syria. If these interests are pursued and achieved, the next phase will be the complete eradication of Hamas.
The Trump administration has clearly stated that if the complete migration of Gaza’s population is not feasible, its goal will be to expel Hamas from Gaza. Additionally, there was a reconstruction plan, supported by the Arabs themselves, that aimed to avoid exile. However, it became invalid due to the lack of international support. Following French President Macron’s visit to Egypt, his discussions with both the Egyptian president and the Jordanian king led to his support for the Arab plan, highlighting the existence of a second alternative in the region.
The only fundamental difference of this plan is the inclusion of Hamas in the governance. For this reason, the course of US-EU relations, marked by either positive or negative events, will also influence these plans. For example, in a scenario where the EU and Turkey, like Macron, support the Arab plan, the security dilemma surrounding the Hamas-Israel ceasefire may be avoided, and negotiations could resume. Otherwise, the prospects for peace or a ceasefire seem unlikely.