China and Serbia’s bilateral relations are described with various expressions of commitment such as “Friendship made of steel,” “Serbian- Chinese brotherhood,” and “Iron-clad friendship.” Last May, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Serbia during his European tour clearly demonstrated the momentum and deepening of these relations. Prior to this visit, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian described Serbia as the first comprehensive strategic partner in Central and Eastern Europe, emphasizing the reciprocity in the development of bilateral relations and highlighting that these deepening ties promise long-term benefits for both countries and their peoples.
Indeed, on January 2, 2025, on the 70th anniversary of this friendship, referred to as ‘iron brotherhood’, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić spoke highly of the Chinese people in a broadcast. Stating that the Chinese have an ‘eye of the tiger’ that the Europeans no longer have, Vučić emphasized that he would continue to take some of China’s energy, enthusiasm and ambition and offer it to his people, noting that working with China was beneficial for Serbia.
1. China-Serbia Relations: A Historical Perspective.
The relations between the two countries date back to 1955 when China established diplomatic ties with Serbia’s predecessor, Yugoslavia. Although China maintained active diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia throughout the 1980s and 1990s and strongly opposed NATO’s bombing of Serbia and Montenegro in the late 1990s, its economic expansion into the former Yugoslav countries, particularly with Serbia, only began in the second decade of the 21st century. Officially, the relationship is described as a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” Notably, there are close inter-party contacts between the Chinese Communist Party and the ruling Serbian Progressive Party, led by President Aleksandar Vučić. The core political focus of China-Serbia relations revolves around the issue of Kosovo’s independence. China holds the power to support Serbia by exercising its veto against the recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign state in the United Nations (UN). During the 2024 tensions between Kosovo and Serbia, China expressed support for Serbia by stating that “China respects Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” and called for constructive dialogue. China’s support for Serbia’s territorial integrity is driven by Taiwan’s de facto independent status and Beijing’s aspirations for reunification. In this regard, China views Serbia as a partner facing similar challenges.
Geographically, Serbia is a key point for China’s activities. Unlike other countries in the Western Balkans, the cooperation in infrastructure development between Beijing and Serbia predates the Belt and Road Initiative. Vuk Vuksanović from the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy notes that Belgrade’s pivot towards China began after 2008. This shift is attributed to Kosovo’s declaration of independence and the impact of the global financial crisis. In 2008, China provided a loan and assisted in the construction of the Most na Adi (Ada Bridge).
2. China’s Strategy in the Western Balkans: Economic Cooperation and Serbia’s Pivotal Role
China’s growing power and influence are reshaping global dynamics, particularly in the global economy, Asian security, and global governance structures, with significant and lasting effects. Although China lacks a specific foreign policy framework for the Balkan region and adopts a relatively indifferent stance, it has particularly focused on bilateral relations with Western Balkan countries since the 2010s, sustaining these relations through investments in strategically important sectors. For example, the 17+1 initiative contributes to the formation of a broad regional cooperation network, while the Belt and Road Initiative provides alternative and complementary routes to China’s foreign trade.
China views the Balkans as a diplomatic tool and began implementing its Eastern European policies after the global financial crisis. In 2011, China and 16 countries from Eastern and Central Europe held a trade and investment summit in Budapest. The countries participating in the summit were China, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, (North) Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia. By 2019, the summit was renamed the 17+1 initiative with the participation of Greece. Within the framework of the 17+1 initiative, 17 countries from Central and Eastern Europe and China regularly meet through a series of institutionalized high-level meetings, numerous sectoral cooperation mechanisms, and other dialogue and exchange activities.
Under this initiative, several joint projects have been carried out, particularly in infrastructure development, including the construction of highways and energy plants. China’s increasing role and influence in Central and Eastern Europe through the 17+1 format is part of Beijing’s global ‘go out’ strategy. From the perspective of Balkan countries, China is seen as a source of financing, providing the capital needed for regional and national development. China’s economic initiatives are welcomed by the governments of these countries.
The Western Balkan countries rely on Chinese financing to overcome the dilemma: without EU membership, these countries (even if they are candidate countries) do not have access to large EU structural funds. To progress toward EU membership, countries must improve infrastructure and transportation connections both within their own borders and with their neighbours. In light of the relatively slow project approval processes, preparation stages, and other institutional barriers in the West, China often offers an attractive alternative through simplified approval processes, state-backed financing, and quick implementation.
After 2013, the Beijing government focused on a more comprehensive regional initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), within the 17+1 format, which includes Central European and Balkan EU members. With this initiative, China began pursuing a broader strategy to improve physical connectivity in Afro-Eurasia to enhance access for its products to target markets. By the end of 2022, China ranks fourth in total investment in the Western Balkans with €4.369 billion. However, nearly €4 billion—or almost all of these investments — are concentrated in Serbia. In other Western Balkan countries, China does not rank among the top ten investors.
In this sense, while Serbia is undoubtedly the largest and most attractive economy in the region, China has adopted a strategic approach, preferring investments in key acquisitions that yield economic and geopolitical advantages over purely commercial ventures. These acquisitions will be explored in greater detail in the next section.
It is clear that among the Western Balkan countries, Serbia has benefited the most from Chinese investments and will continue to do so, based on the strategic partnership and the sentiment of “iron brotherhood.” Indeed, the agreements signed during Xi Jinping’s visit to Serbia on May 7, 2024, underscore this strong relationship. Approximately 30 bilateral agreements were signed between the two countries, opening the way to a “shared future.” Serbia became the first country in Europe to endorse Chinese concepts such as the Global Development, Security, and Civilization Initiatives as part of the process of redefining the current world order.
The strategic partnership between Serbia and China dates back to August 2009, when the two nations signed an agreement consisting of ten points covering mutual respect for territorial integrity, trade development plans, and cultural, technological, and scientific exchanges. In this context, the economic relationship between Serbia and China is not only comprehensive but also resilient and diverse. As Western companies gradually withdrew from energy and natural sectors, China emerged as a significant investor in Serbia and the broader region. Where many sectors were previously under Russian control, China has now effectively replaced Russia in Serbia.
For example, after the Serbian government’s efforts to privatize RTB Bor (Mining and Smelting Complex Bor), China’s Zijin Mining Group acquired 63% of the company’s assets in 2018. Similarly, the acquisition of Železara Smederevo (a steel producer) and RTB Bor by Chinese investors holds structural significance for Serbia’s national economy.
China is running numerous projects in the region, and in terms of project implementation, Serbia is Beijing’s key partner. China has already invested over $1 billion, primarily in the form of loans, to finance transportation infrastructure and energy projects in Serbia. For example, the China-Serbia Friendship Bridge (Zemun-Borča Bridge) on the Danube River in Belgrade is a highly symbolic project, completed in 2014 with a loan of €170 million (85% of the total cost). In 2016, the Chinese Hebei Iron and Steel Company (now Hesteel Group) acquired Serbia’s only steel plant, Železara Smederevo, for €46 million. This was the largest foreign investment in Serbia that year. Another project, supported by the China Exim Bank with an investment of €600 million, involves the construction of sections of Corridor XI (Timisoara Belgrade-Bar).
As part of the Belt and Road Initiative, the Serbian government and China signed a $1 billion loan agreement for the development of the local extension of the Belgrade-Budapest railway connection. Additionally, Serbia has signed an industrial park project with China Road and Bridge Corporation. The park will consist of three sections: manufacturing and processing, trade and logistics, and high-tech industries. The project is expected to create between 2,000 and 5,000 jobs, contribute around 5% Serbia’s GDP, and provide an annual contribution of approximately €2 billion.
In some cases, state-owned companies receiving Chinese loans are contractually obligated to work with Chinese subcontractors. For example, during the construction of a new block at the Kostolac coal-fired power plant, Elektroprivreda Srbije worked with Chinese subcontractors. Similarly, around 7,000 Chinese workers from the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) were involved in completing the China-Serbia Friendship Bridge.
The comprehensive document titled “Country Guide for Foreign Investment and Cooperation,” published by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce in 2022, identifies China’s investments in Serbia as primarily targeting the mining, metal manufacturing, and automotive industries. Investments in these sectors demonstrate significant diversity. The Smederevo Steel Plant and Bor mines represent key examples of brownfield acquisitions by Chinese investors, while the Čukaru Peki project stands out as a notable greenfield investment.
The rise of China’s investment in Serbia has been closely intertwined with the overall growth of the China-Serbia partnership. In particular, Chinese investments have expanded significantly over the past five years. On October 17, 2023, Xi Jinping and Aleksandar Vučić met in Beijing for the “Third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation.” During this meeting, they signed several bilateral agreements, including a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which came into effect on July 1, 2024. With this agreement, Serbia became China’s first FTA partner among Central and Eastern European countries and its 29th overall FTA partner.
3. Military, Security, and Diplomatic Cooperation: International Arena and the Kosovo Issue
China-Serbia military cooperation remains one of the most prominent components of the growing security partnership between the two nations. This partnership has not onlygarnered attention bit also raised concers among regional and foreign powers.
In 2018, a bilateral cooperation plan was signed, including cooperation in education and the defence industry. As a result, Serbia announced its decision to purchase nine unmanned aerial vehicles (Wing Loong drones) from China. Serbia became the first European country to purchase Chinese UAVs. Serbia opted for these drones due to their compatibility with its domestic Serbian drone development program. This arrangement illustrates that China is not merely supplying Serbia with new weapons but is also transferring key knowledge and technology.
In 2019, Chinese and Serbian special police forces conducted a joint counter-terrorism exercise at a Chinese-owned steel plant in the Serbian city of Smederevo. This was the first joint exercise of its kind in Europe. The FTA signed in 2023 provided tariff reductions in defence-related areas over a 15-year period. However, Serbia’s acquisitions began before the signing of the FTA. In 2019, Belgrade purchased China’s FK-3 surface-to-air defence system, which was delivered by China in 2022 and has since been used by the Serbian military. Additionally, in 2020, China supplied Belgrade with 18 FT-8C laser-guided missiles and six CH-92A combat drones, which feature a flight altitude of up to 16,400 feet, a range of 250 kilometers, and a maximum speed of 124 miles per hour. Following President Vučić’s indication of future purchases, Serbia also acquired the advanced Chinese CH-95 drones.
The Serbian Air Force became the first in Europe to independently operate and maintain the Chinese-made FK-3 air defence missile system. The country’s Ministry of Defence stated that all necessary training was completed in China. The FK-3 is the export version of China’s latest HQ-22 medium-range air defence missile system. According to the Serbian Ministry of Defence, the system includes a command centre, launchers, radars, and logistics vehicles. The delivery—considered the largest air shipment of Chinese weapons to Europe so far, was conducted by a dozen Y-20 transport aircraft from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force in April 2022.
The Sino-Serbian partnership reached a pivotal moment with the signing of the Strategic Agreement in 2009, which established a foundation for future bilateral cooperation. This period was crucial for Serbia as it determined its foreign policy priorities and partners. China emerged as a suitable ally during the global economic crisis, which significantly impacted Serbia’s economy. Serbian officials were also compelled to seek partners outside the Western political sphere, following the 2008 declaration of Kosovo’s independence.
An underlying factor for this alignment was the mutual stance on Kosovo’s independence. Countries such as Russia, Iran, and China did not recognize Kosovo’s independence, providing Serbia with alternative allies who opposed Western recognition of the territory. Simultaneously, China became increasingly interested in expanding its economic and political ties with European countries. Serbia, as a gateway to the EU market, became an integral part of China’s broader, proactive foreign policy ambitions.
4. Cultural and Educational Cooperation
Based on an agreement signed in 2017, the two countries enjoy visa-free travel, which has led to increased tourism and strengthened people-to-people interactions. While Beijing has gradually been increasing its media-related activities, these efforts have had limited influence on Serbian media, with no notable growth in China-related coverage in Serbia.
China also aims to establish cultural influence in Serbia. An educational cooperation agreement signed in 2005 led to the establishment of the first Confucius Institute in Belgrade in 2006, followed by a second in 2014. These institutes have played a pivotal role in fostering bilateral cultural relations, particularly after 2014. In September 2024, Serbia’s third Confucius Institute was inaugurated by Nis University in collaboration with Jiangsu University.
On November 22, 2024, a roundtable meeting on China-Serbia cultural cooperation was held in Belgrade, focusing on enhancing bilateral relations through cultural exchanges.
5. Future Prospects: Opportunities and Challenges
Serbia, due to its Slavic roots, has had long-standing political and cultural ties with Russia. As a result, it continued to use Soviet-era technology in many areas. Especially after the declaration of Kosovo’s independence, Serbia was drawn closer to China, an economic powerhouse facing similar geopolitical issues. The Russia-Ukraine War and the COVID-19 pandemic further advanced the China-Serbia rapprochement that had been growing since the early 2000s. The China-Serbia Free Trade Agreement and military agreements have positioned Serbia as a regional representative of Chinese interests.
Serbia views its tie with China as an advantage, both for securing economic investment and modernizing its outdated military technologies. As the only European country using Chinese weapons, Serbia has reinforced its position against potential threats, particularly regarding Kosovo. While both China and Serbia emphasize the defensive nature of arms exports and their commitment to regional stability, uncertainty remains, particularly in light of potential geopolitical threats. The European Union and the United States have voiced concerns about this military partnership, arguing that it could destabilize the region and hinder Serbia’s EU accession.
It is evident that Serbia is leveraging the geopolitical competition between major powers to modernize its infrastructure and military.
China’s “iron-clad friendship” with Serbia is driven by two key motivations. First, it seeks to penetrate the European market and test its role as a new security actor in Europe. Second, it aims to secure investments for its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects in the Western Balkans.