Introduction: The New Geopolitical Landscape
The shift from fossil fuels to critical materials for sustaining green transitions and technological development has positioned these materials as the new “oil and gas” of the 21st century. This shift has intensified global competition, as major powers vie for access to these essential resources to minimize dependency on single suppliers. Critical materials are indispensable for the production of solar panels, wind turbines, electric vehicles, and grid-scale batteries.
While African countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zimbabwe, and Latin American countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile, are prominent suppliers of critical materials, Central Asia’s visibility is increasing due to its vast reserves of these resources. Traditionally known for its extensive oil and gas reserves, Central Asia is becoming a new frontier for mineral competition due to rising demand from Western countries, China, and Russia.
Central Asia’s Resource Richness
Central Asia holds significant proportions of the world’s critical material reserves: 38.6% of global manganese ore, 30.07% of chromium, 20% of lead, 12.6% of zinc, 8.7% of titanium, 5.8% of aluminum, 5.3% of copper, 5.3% of cobalt, and 5.2% of molybdenum. Kazakhstan boasts the world’s largest reserves and is the second-largest producer of chromium, essential for wind turbines. Additionally, Uzbekistan has the world’s 11th largest proven copper reserves and substantial deposits of silver, molybdenum, selenium, cadmium, and lithium, suitable for large-scale mining.
Interest in developing these resources extends beyond external powers. Central Asian countries themselves are eager to enhance their reserves to strengthen their positions on the global stage. In 2023, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan underscored the importance of developing rare and rare-earth metals, referring to them as the new oil. Kazakhstan has approved “The Comprehensive Plan for the Development of the Rare and Rare Earth Metals Industry for 2024–2028,” which aims for a 40% increase in investment and production volume.
Similarly, Uzbekistan prioritizes the development of critical raw material reserves. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has emphasized the importance of exploiting reserves of rare and rare-earth metals, including lithium, magnesium, molybdenum, germanium, vanadium, and indium. Uzbekistan plans to invest $500 million in promising projects in the mining of rare earth elements.
The EU and U.S. Strategic Interests
Both regional and global powers are keen on joint exploration and extraction of minerals in Central Asia to solidify their positions in the critical material market. Russia, for instance, is discussing rare-earth material extraction with Kyrgyzstan and plans to send 50 people to Russia annually for training to become specialists in developing rare earth metals and uranium. Russia is also interested in collaborating with Tajikistan on rare-earth metal exploration and mining. Access to regional reserves could help Russia reduce its reliance on overseas imports and secure a sustainable supply for its defense industry. Additionally, controlling these critical materials would bolster Russia’s influence in the region and its leverage against other powers, particularly the EU and the United States.
Regarding European interests, French company Orano plans to invest in uranium mining and processing in Uzbekistan. During German President Steinmeier’s state visit to Kazakhstan, HMS Bergbau acquired two majority stakes with licenses for lithium, tantalum, and rare earths mining and exploration. On a broader scale, the EU and the EBRD will allocate a €400,000 grant for research on lithium extraction from the Aral Sea salt marshes and the development of the Verkhneye Kairakty tungsten deposit. Uzbekistan has also signed a memorandum of understanding with the EU for critical raw material development.
The EU’s main interest in investing in these reserves is to diversify its imports. The EU currently relies on China for 98% of its rare earth supplies. Investing in Central Asia could help reduce this dependence on China and Russia. Promoting EU market share growth in the region could also balance the presence of Russia and China. Furthermore, the EU’s proactive approach can help regional countries develop a regulatory environment conducive to competitive business practices in critical material development.
The United States also seeks to increase its presence in Central Asia’s critical raw material market. During the 2023 C5+1 Summit, the U.S. launched the C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue platform to foster connections between government officials and the private sector, catalyze investment, and collaborate on critical mineral supply chains. The U.S. aims to find alternative suppliers, reduce dependence on China, and renew its presence in the region. Additionally, access to resources could diminish local countries’ reliance on Chinese technology, offsetting China’s influence in the region’s critical materials sector. Increased access to resources would also enable the U.S. to control the flow of materials to EU countries, enhancing its leverage against both China and the EU.
China’s Dominant Role and Strategic Moves
China, the main country looking to expand its presence in Central Asia, is particularly interested in the region’s lithium reserves. For instance, Chinese company Zhicun Lithium Group is interested in developing the lithium industry in Kazakhstan and discussing potential projects in Kyrgyzstan. China dominates nearly 60% of global rare earth mining and over 85% of processing capabilities, positioning it to leverage its quasi-monopolistic stance in critical minerals. China’s involvement in Central Asia’s critical material market could further increase the region’s dependence on Beijing.
China is already a leading player in electric vehicles and renewable energy technologies, supplying both inputs and know-how to local countries in Central Asia. Dominance in critical materials could make local countries more dependent on exports to China, giving Beijing comprehensive control over the region’s green transition and potentially excluding other regional powers.
This influence could extend beyond the region. Increasing imports from Central Asia can help China reduce its dependence on overseas supplies and secure a sustainable supply. Moreover, securing supplies through land routes can mitigate vulnerabilities against U.S. maritime dominance, providing China with greater flexibility in its foreign policy. Conversely, strengthening Beijing’s control over the international critical raw material market would increase the dependence of the EU and the U.S. on Chinese supplies.
Conclusion
To sum up, Central Asia’s importance for both regional and global power is increasing due to its vast reserves of critical materials. This growing interest creates both opportunities and threats for local countries. On the opportunity side, the presence of extensive reserves can attract investment and help diversify their economies. Additionally, it can lead to new employment opportunities and the localization of new technologies for resource extraction. New investments can also enable Central Asian countries to maintain a balanced and multi-vector foreign policy. However, there are also threats. Attracting investment from a limited number of countries, such as China, can increase local countries’ dependence on foreign powers and limit their foreign policy options instead of expanding them.