Azerbaijanis in Iran

There is a striking discrepancy in estimates regarding the number of Azerbaijani Turks [1]in Iran, with figures ranging from as high as 50 per cent to as low as 7 per cent of the population. The primary reason for this uncertainty is the absence of official ethnic demographic data in Iran. Additionally, such estimates are often shaped by various political agendas, leading to inflation or deflation of the numbers to serve different narratives. Ultimately, this issue is not unique to the Iranian context but rather reflects broader challenges in nationalism studies, particularly debates over the definition and measurement of ethnic identity.

Given these obstacles, while we are far from a perfect result, presenting various calculations by historians, political scientists, and politicians from the past 150 years will help us reach the closest possible estimates.

Statistical Figures for the last 150 years

While historical records provide population estimates for Iran dating as far back as the Achaemenid-Greek wars, one of the earliest known demographic accounts distinguishing ethnic groups comes from Akim Mikhailovich Zolotarev’s Military-Statistical Essay on Iran, written in 1888. In this work, Zolotarev estimated Iran’s total population at 6 million, of which half were Persians and approximately 1 million—or 16.7 per cent—were classified as Turko-Tatars (Zolotarev, 1888, 38). This category included various Turkic tribes such as the Bayat, Shahsevan, Afshar, Qajar, Karagozlu, among others.

Four years later, in his influential book The Persian Question and Iran, Lord George Curzon criticised Zolotarev’s population estimate as too low, asserting that Iran’s actual population at the time was closer to 9 million (Curzon, 1892, Vol. 2, 494). Although Curzon did not provide a detailed breakdown of Turkic or Azerbaijani populations across Iran, he claimed that 75 per cent of the 2 million residents of the Azerbaijan region—approximately 1.5 million people—were Turks. This would mean that, even within the Azerbaijan region alone, Turks made up around 16 per cent of the total Iranian population. Given the wider dispersion of Turkic populations beyond Azerbaijan, the actual figure was likely even higher (Curzon, 1892, Vol. 1, 517).

Ervand Abrahamian, a leading 20th-century historian of Iran, offers further statistical insight across several periods. In Iran: Between Two Revolutions, Abrahamian estimates that ‘Azeris’ constituted 21.1 per cent of Iran’s population in 1850 (Abrahamian, 1982, 12). This retrospective calculation was based on the 1956 Iranian census, adjusted backwards to account for variables such as war, famine, plague, and assimilation. In A Modern History of Iran, he estimates that Azerbaijani Turks made up 20.8 per cent of the population in 1900—2.5 million out of 12 million people (Abrahamian, 2008, 18). However, this figure excludes Turkic groups such as the Afshar, Shahsevan, Karapapakh, and Qashqai. When these groups are included, the share rises to approximately 26 per cent in 1900 and 29 per cent in 1850.

In an earlier article published in 1970, Abrahamian presents slightly different figures. He estimated that Persians made up 45 per cent of the population, Azerbaijani Turks 19 per cent, and other Turkic groups—including Turkmens, Qashqai, Shahsevan, and Afshars—collectively comprised an additional 7 per cent (Abrahamian, 1970, 292)

Another early 20th-century source provides demographic data from Colonel Medvedev of the Russian General Staff during the Constitutional Revolution, as well as from the Iranian Consulate General in St. Petersburg, estimating the Azerbaijani population at approximately 25 per cent. However, Jamil Hasanli criticises these figures, noting that they were not based on an official population census, overlooked various Turkic tribes, and were likely minimised due to Russian political objectives (Hasanli, 1998, 41). Hasanli’s book also cites multiple other estimates from later periods: in 1932, Kayhani, who prepared a geographical study of Iran, estimated the Azerbaijani population at 2 million, while shortly thereafter, Ahmad Khan’s Military Geography of Iran estimated it at 3 million. The total population of Iran during this time was around 13.5 million. Furthermore, an extensive 1939 report by Mir Jafar Bagirov for the Soviet centre recorded Iran’s total population as 16.85 million, with 4.2 million residing in Azerbaijan, of whom 3.2 million were Azerbaijani Turks. Bagirov also noted that approximately one million Turks lived in other Iranian provinces (Hasanli, 1998, 41). Much of the research on Azerbaijani Turkish demographics originates from the World War II era, especially following the establishment of the Azerbaijani National Government led by Jafar Pishevari. Hasanli highlights that population clarifications occurred after Southern or Iranian Azerbaijan was included in Soviet planning, with estimates indicating a population of 5.5 million in the region. Of these, over 80% were Turks, 10% Kurds, 5% Persians, and the remainder comprised groups such as Talysh, Kilak, Aysor, and Armenians (Hasanli, 1998, p. 41). During this period, the phrase “5 million Azerbaijani people” became widely used in political discourse and the press. In particular, between 1945 and 1946, the Azerbaijan Newspaper, the official publication of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party’s Central Committee, employed this figure to justify claims for cultural and territorial autonomy and even independence. From this time forward, ethnic demographic statistics increasingly became a significant element in Iran’s political discourse (Azərbaycan Demokrat Firqəsi Mərkəzi Komitəsinin orqanı, 2022).

After World War II and the collapse of the Azerbaijani National Government, one of the most reliable demographic sources is the Geographical Cultures of Iran, published by the Military Headquarters of Geographical Research of Iran between 1949 and 1952. Led by Hossein Ali Razmara, this research is considered a valuable resource for the period as it provides detailed data on the ethnic and religious composition of nearly every village and city in Iran. According to Razmara’s findings, out of a population of just over 17 million, approximately 4,452,666 individuals were Turks (excluding Turkmens), accounting for 26% of the total population. The number of Persians was estimated to be less than 50% (Razmara, 1949–1952).

The first official census of Iran, conducted in 1956, did not explicitly provide detailed ethnic demographic data, but useful conclusions were drawn from available information. According to Abrahamian’s analysis of this census and other contemporary studies, Azerbaijani Turks comprised approximately 21% of Iran’s population of around 19 million, even when excluding tribes such as the Qajar, Bayat, Shahsevan, and Afshar (1982, 12).

Additional statistics on Iran’s ethnic composition are available from foreign intelligence sources, especially those from the United States. The CIA World Factbook, the most frequently cited resource, estimated that Azerbaijanis constituted 24% of the population in 2006. A 1980 report by the U.S. Defence Intelligence Agency estimated that Iran’s Azerbaijani population ranged between 3 and 14 million out of a total population of approximately 38 million. The report attributed this wide range to the Iranian government’s political efforts to downplay both the size and distinct identity of its national minorities. Similar to other studies, this report treated Turkic tribes such as Qashqai, Shahsevan, Afshar, and Karapapakhs—whose populations range from 800,000 to 1.2 million—as separate ethnic groups (Defence Intelligence Agency, 1980). Another well-known estimate comes from the Atlas of the Peoples of the World, published in the USSR in 1966, which placed Azerbaijani Turks at 3.3 million people, about 16% of the population (GGUK, 1966). This 16% figure is echoed in reports from the Minority Rights Group International for modern Iran (Minority Rights Group, 2017). The Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset relies on the CIA’s 24% estimate but, unlike many other sources, argues that Turkic tribes should not be counted separately from the Azerbaijani population (Girardin et al., 2015).

Although many later studies estimate the Azerbaijani Turkish population in Iran to be between 16 and 24 per cent, some sources report significantly higher figures, claiming that Azerbaijani Turks constitute up to one-third of the Iranian population, while others present much lower estimates. Viktoriya Arakelova, a former professor at Yerevan State University, estimated the number of Azerbaijani Turks in Iran at just 6 to 6.5 million out of a total population of 82 million (Arakelova, 2015, 281). Her calculation was limited to only five provinces—East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, Ardabil, Zanjan, and Qazvin—ignoring major Azerbaijani-populated areas like Tehran. She claimed that 70% of West Azerbaijan are Kurds, over 1 million of Qazvin’s 1.2 million residents speak Persian or Tati, and that around 500,000 Talish, Tat, Aysor, Kurdish, and Armenian people live in the remaining provinces. These sweeping assumptions lack solid demographic backing and appear designed to shrink the Azerbaijani count. Moreover, her use of the term “Turkic-speaking ethnic Iranians” instead of more neutral names reflects a political or ideological attempt to downplay their distinct identity. She cited Amanollahi’s 2005 article as a more reliable source, where Amanollahi estimated 9 million Turks in Iran (including Turkmens) out of 70 million total population in 2005 (Amanollahi, 2005, 37). Given this, according to his estimations, the actual number of Azerbaijani Turks would likely be lower than this figure since the figures referred to numbers of whole Turkic groups living in Iran.

On the other hand, sources from both North and South Azerbaijan often cite much higher numbers. Abulfaz Elchibey, the second president of the Republic of Azerbaijan, claimed that Turks made up half of Iran’s population, approximately 30 million people, and criticised Iran for denying their cultural rights (Elchibey, 2004, 87). Azerbaijani student organisations in Iran during the late 1990s also mentioned population figures as 27 to 30 million (1997, as cited in Shaffer, 2002). Mahmudali Chohraganli, leader of the South Azerbaijan National Awakening Movement, frequently used the figure of 40 million in his speeches (Reaksiya TV, 2021), and Ahmad Obali, head of South Azerbaijan Television, similarly claimed the Azerbaijani population to be around 30 million (Azertac, 2022). Ilham Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan, has indirectly referred to a total Azerbaijani population abroad of 30 to 35 million in his speeches (Aliyev, 2022). These inflated figures are often used in political rhetoric, accusing Iran of violating the rights of national minorities.

Interestingly, similar high percentages have been mentioned by several Iranian officials. Ali Akbar Salehi, then Foreign Minister of Iran, stated during a 2012 visit to Turkey that 40 per cent of Iranians speak Turkish, highlighting cultural commonalities between the two countries (Umudaraz, 2012). This figure was reiterated in a 2023 article published by the official Iranian news agency IRNA (IRNA, 2023). Furthermore, in 2009, Hamid Reza Haji Babayi, then Minister of Education, noted that 70 percent of students in Iran are bilingual, which implies that the ethnically Persian dominant group may constitute as little as 30 percent of the population (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2012).

Modern studies often repeat earlier figures and CIA reports. For instance, a joint report by the Iranian Statistical Committee and the “Monde iranien” research group of the University of Paris in 2002 showed that 23.3 per cent of the population spoke Azerbaijani Turkish (as cited in Riaux, 2008). This survey, which addressed the socio-economic conditions of Iranians, included 30,715 participants and focused more on language use to estimate ethnic identity. Similarly, a study conducted across all provinces from 2008 to 2010 under the leadership of Mansur Vaezini, secretary of the Iranian Public Culture Council, found that Turks made up 23 per cent of the population and Persians 47 per cent (2010, as cited in Shaffer, 2023).

Conclusion

The reported figures typically range between one-fifth, one-fourth, and one-third of the population. Among these, the most reliable data—those based on surveys rather than estimates—indicate a range between 23 and 26 per cent. Some scholars argue that Iran’s repressive language policies, political efforts to encourage migration to central cities, economic incentives favouring Persian language use, and social factors such as mixed marriages have contributed to reducing the number of national minorities over time. Moreover, Ahmad Kasravi and his followers’ concept of “Azeri” has diminished the Azerbaijani Turks’ resistance to Persianization. Additionally, the phenotypical similarity among most national groups in Iran has likely eased the government’s assimilation policies. Conversely, Brenda Shaffer contends that because the birth rates of national minorities—especially those in rural areas—are higher than those of Persians, it is unlikely their population numbers are declining statistically (Shaffer, 2002, 228). Although recent studies show a trend among Azerbaijani parents toward raising their children in Persian (Shoraka, 2009; Mirvahedi, 2017; Elling, 2013; Jafari, 2018), this has not yet significantly altered the population figures over the years, and the resistance to assimilation is getting stronger by the year (Mammadov, 2023; Rezaei, Latifi & Nematzadeh, 2017; Souleymanov et al., 2013).

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[1] The group studied in this research is known by different names, such as Azerbaijani Turks, Azeris, Azerbaijanis, or just Turks. While different sources use different terms, peer-reviewed literature most commonly refers to them as Azerbaijanis (or Iranian Azerbaijanis) and Azerbaijani Turks. This study adopts the same terminology for consistency. However, it is important to note that the accuracy of these labels can be debated depending on the context.