Introduction
Against the backdrop of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and the resurgence of protectionist and isolationist policies under the Trump administration, the European Union (EU) is actively seeking to expand its presence in Central Asia. With its vast energy reserves, abundant critical mineral resources, and strategic location, Central Asia presents the EU with an opportunity to diversify its partnerships, reduce its reliance on Russia, and access new export markets.
In this context, the first-ever EU–Central Asia summit, held in Samarkand on April 3–4, 2025, marked a historic milestone in the relationship between the European Union and the five Central Asian republics—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The summit concluded with a joint announcement elevating the relationship to a strategic partnership, ushering in a new era of intensified cooperation across various sectors.
Central Asian countries offer the EU energy resources and critical minerals that can help reduce its dependency on Russia and China, while also providing alternative import routes. In return, the EU is offering investments, training programs, and technological support to facilitate industrialisation and the development of value-added production in the region. The summit highlighted several priority sectors for cooperation, with a strong focus on critical minerals, renewable energy, and transportation infrastructure.
Critical Minerals
The EU’s interest in Central Asia is largely driven by the region’s vast and underexplored reserves of critical minerals. EU member states have already begun forming bilateral agreements with Central Asian countries. For example, in November 2024, France and Kazakhstan signed a strategic roadmap on critical raw materials that will run through 2026. This agreement enables French companies to participate in Kazakhstan’s geological exploration and mining sectors. Similarly, German companies, such as HMS Bergbau AG, are partnering with Kazakhstan on lithium extraction projects.
Another key example is the joint venture between France’s Orano and Uzbekistan’s state-owned Navoiyuran, which has created Nurlikum Mining. This partnership is focused on developing the South Djengeldi uranium deposit in Uzbekistan’s Navoi region. The project aims to sustain uranium production for at least a decade, with peak output expected to reach 700 metric tons annually. The agreement includes commitments to joint exploration, environmentally responsible uranium extraction, job creation, adherence to safety standards, and support for local communities.
The EU has already signed Memoranda of Understanding on critical minerals with both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. This collaboration was further elevated with the signing of a Joint Declaration of Intent on Critical Raw Materials. As part of the new strategic partnership package announced during the summit, the EU committed €2.5 billion specifically for critical raw materials projects in Central Asia.
The EU is not only seeking access to raw materials but also aims to engage in the entire value chain, including mining and processing. There are several reasons for this strategic push. First, the EU wants to reduce its reliance on China, which currently accounts for around 60–69% of global rare earth mining and nearly 90% of the world’s rare earth processing, by far the most technically complex and value-added segment of the supply chain.
Second, by offering Central Asian countries new partnerships, the EU hopes to limit China’s dominant presence in the region’s critical minerals sector. Third, beyond China, the EU is also wary of future U.S. administrations, particularly under Trump, potentially using strategic resources as leverage in foreign policy. In this context, securing access to Central Asian critical minerals also strengthens the EU’s autonomy vis-à-vis the United States.
Renewable Energy
Renewable energy is another promising area for deepening cooperation between the European Union and Central Asia. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has emphasised the region’s potential to become a clean energy hub, highlighting Kazakhstan’s wind capacity, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan’s solar potential, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan’s hydroelectric resources, and the region-wide prospects for geothermal development. The EU aims to support Central Asia in harnessing these renewable sources to stimulate local industries, power mining operations, and potentially export clean energy to neighbouring regions.
A major milestone in this effort is the establishment of a regional office of the European Investment Bank (EIB) in Tashkent. Founded in 1958, the EIB is the EU’s primary financial institution. Its new presence in Central Asia is expected to catalyse investment in green energy, modern infrastructure, and digitalisation. The EIB has pledged renewed support for strategic investments in sustainable and clean energy projects across the region, underscoring the EU’s long-term commitment to Central Asia’s green transition.
As part of the broader strategic partnership, the EU has announced a new funding package worth €6.4 billion dedicated to water, energy, and climate-related projects. The renewable energy component of this package offers mutual benefits. For Central Asian countries, increased renewable electricity production will help reduce carbon emissions, air pollution, and broader environmental degradation, leading to improved public health. It will also enable these countries to conserve more natural gas for export and reduce their reliance on imported fossil fuels, particularly from Russia. In the long term, this transition strengthens their energy security and reduces vulnerability to external shocks.
For the EU, cooperation on renewable energy opens access to a vast and underdeveloped market that is eager for investment and technological partnerships. Central Asia offers EU-based renewable energy companies opportunities to expand their presence as input suppliers, project developers, and investors. More importantly, the growth of renewable energy in Central Asia aligns with EU climate objectives and enhances its energy diversification strategy.
One significant development in this area is the green energy corridor agreement signed in November 2024 during the COP29 climate conference. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan entered into a strategic partnership to jointly develop and transmit renewable energy, particularly wind and solar, across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan. From there, the electricity is intended to be transmitted to Europe, potentially via the planned Black Sea undersea cable.
This corridor could enable the EU to directly import clean electricity from Central Asia, reinforcing its long-term energy security. Additionally, it deepens economic interdependence between the EU and Central Asia, paving the way for broader and more integrated cooperation in the future.
Middle Corridor
Another critical development in EU–Central Asia cooperation is the focus on the Middle Corridor. As part of its new strategic package, the EU has allocated €3 billion specifically for the development of this corridor. The funding will be used to modernise and expand transport infrastructure, improve logistics networks, and strengthen value chains along this key route, which connects Central Asia to Europe via the Caspian Sea.
Since the onset of the Russia–Ukraine war, the strategic relevance of the Middle Corridor has significantly increased for the EU. First, the corridor bypasses both Iran and Russia, two of the most heavily sanctioned countries in the world, and instead passes through relatively stable states in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Second, the recent peace negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the de-escalation of tensions between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and growing regional cooperation across Central Asia and the South Caucasus have lowered the risk of disruptions along the route. Third, China’s involvement in building the corridor’s hard infrastructure provides an opportunity for the EU to complement this with investments in soft infrastructure, such as regulatory harmonization, digital systems, and customs modernisation, thus helping regional countries unlock the corridor’s full potential.
Fully realising the Middle Corridor’s potential will bring multiple strategic benefits. It will reduce the EU’s transit dependency on Russia, establish new export-import routes between Europe and Central Asia, and foster the creation of resilient supply chains among partner countries. Furthermore, growing security risks to maritime shipping routes—such as Houthi attacks in the Red Sea—underscore the urgency for the EU to diversify trade routes and invest in secure overland corridors through Central Asia and the South Caucasus.
The Middle Corridor not only enhances connectivity but also strengthens political and economic interdependence between Europe and Central Asia, laying the groundwork for long-term strategic alignment in trade, transport, and regional development.
Conclusion
In summary, Central Asia’s strategic importance for the European Union is steadily increasing, driven by its vast reserves of energy and critical raw materials, geographic location, and growing potential as a renewable energy and transit hub. The EU’s newly announced financial and political commitments—covering areas from critical minerals to renewable energy and infrastructure development—signal a promising shift toward deeper engagement. However, the success of these initiatives will ultimately depend on the EU’s ability to adopt a long-term, coordinated, and strategic approach toward the region.
A key concern is how effectively EU investments will be channelled. Without a clear, transparent, and inclusive implementation mechanism, there is a risk that EU-backed projects may fail to deliver the expected outcomes or lose local legitimacy. The creation of a cohesive framework for collaboration, ensuring coordination among EU member states, institutions, and local stakeholders, will be essential to avoid fragmentation and duplicative efforts.
Furthermore, while critical minerals are a top priority for both sides, this sector poses significant challenges. Environmental degradation linked to extraction activities could generate local resistance and undermine sustainability goals. Additionally, although the EU aims to support processing and value addition within Central Asia, China remains the global leader in mineral processing technologies, raising questions about the EU’s comparative advantage and what it can realistically offer the region in this domain. Overcoming this will require not just capital investment, but also technology transfer, skills development, and meaningful joint ventures that build local capacity.
Long-term success will also hinge on the EU’s ability to present itself not merely as a resource-seeker, but as a true development partner. This means shifting the focus away from extractive sectors alone and toward projects that generate inclusive growth, support human capital development, and align with the economic visions of Central Asian governments. Initiatives in education, digital transformation, SMEs, and green infrastructure can contribute to a more sustainable and diversified regional economy.
Finally, for this cooperation to endure, the EU must demonstrate consistent political commitment. Ad hoc or reactive engagement will not suffice in a region where other powers—particularly China, Russia, and increasingly Turkey—are already entrenched. A united and proactive EU strategy, grounded in mutual benefit, long-term development, and respect for regional sovereignty, will be key to building a robust and resilient partnership with Central Asia.