With a current Algerian diaspora estimated to be 2.6 million people, France is far from having put its colonial history in the past. First established during Napoleon III’s rule, the French authority over Algeria lasted more than a century, accompanied by economic gain on one hand, but mostly and foremost a constant struggle with Algerians to gain power and access over land. The Algerian War for Independence was deadly, resulting in a high number of civilian casualties, as well as the use of torture or other methods alleged to be war crimes. More than the amount of violence, the discord that France caused in Algeria transcended throughout the Algerian population, causing division in groups based on identity. This division, clearly visible during the independence movement, didn’t disappear with the migration of these groups post-war to Metropolitan France, and could be said to some extent to have shaped city landscapes.
Historical Context
French rule over Algeria was first established over the 1830-1847 period, and was to be maintained for the following century in a climate of violence and repression. Typical of French colonisation, the coloniser’s approach effectively resulted in making the population “more barbaric” than prior to French arrival, highlighted by French Politician and historian Alexis de Tocqueville. While Algeria was not yet part of France from a legal perspective, French colonials who had emigrated there, termed as Pieds Noirs, started requesting rights and privileges, which would later become clear settler domination. Following the fall of Napoleon III in 1870, the Third Republic was established in France, marking a transition in Algeria from a military administration to a civilian government system. Surprisingly so, it is generally accepted that military rule was in fact better than civilian rule for native Algerians; being then run by the Arab Bureaus, military officers had a rather good knowledge of the language and local culture while having no economic interest in the colony’s resources.
Once Algeria became part of France juridically and the resistance at the time was crushed, large-scale land confiscation programs were established for agricultural purposes, and migration of settlers continued, attracting Europeans from France, Spain, Malta and Italy. The state’s approach considerably differed by previously Napoleon III’s approach, who had reinstated control of Algerian in Algiers, previously having been transferred to Paris, affirming that Algeria was “not a French province but an Arab country, a European colony, and a French camp.”. An increase in settlers’ presence and land revindication coordinated with France’s defeat in the Franco-German War, leading to the last major Kabylia revolt, which was crushed by French forces, consequently resulting in the loss of more land to settlers. Loopholes in the legal system were also used by settlers to gain access to more lands, effectively confiscating, for instance, a vast amount of tribal lands through the senatus consultum of 1863. Not only did Algerians lose their lands and means of generating economic gains in addition to providing for their families, but it also forced displacement towards forest-covered areas of the country, which is at the source of nowadays environmental issues. As a result of armed struggles, famine and disease, it is estimated that a third of the Algerian population died during early French colonisation.
The French influence was very much present in the following period of Algeria’s colonised history; political, economic and social domination was felt on every level of society. Medical and educational facilities have developed significantly, yet are mostly available in the French language and with better access for Europeans. Higher education was restricted for Algerians, the architecture of settler properties matched Western styles, primary education was only accessible to Algerians and mostly in towns or cities. Unemployment was much more visible in the Muslim population.
World War I could probably be considered a border opener and an inverse migratory flux. With around 200,000 Algerian men having fought for the French Army and a third of Algerian men aged 20-40 living in metropolitan France, the emerging diaspora was not insignificant in France. By the end of the war, approximately 70,000 Algerians remained in France in order to work and send remittances back to their families in Algeria. The WWI period was also characterized by the emergency of Algerian nationalism, led by three groups; the Assimilationists (Algerians who were French educated and French employed), the Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama (inspired by Salafi movements, not political but nationalist), and a more radical proletarian movement (at first organized by Algerian workers in France and then gaining popularity in Algeria).
The Blum-Viollette proposal illustrates well the tensions existing between settlers in Algeria and the revendication of rights by Algerians, particularly in regards to the French nationality which was given to a small number of people only, such as the French educated or veterans of the French military service. This proposal would have offered Algerians full French citizenship and the rights associated with it, while still having the right to be judged under Muslim law for personal matters such as marriage or child custody. The colonists, however, strongly opposed the text, and it was consequently never voted on. Facing repeated failure of peaceful means, the use of organised violence started to appear as the only solution to ignite change, leading to the establishment of the National Liberation Front (FLN), which later absorbed many of the members of the other nationalist movements.
WWII brought a new wave of revendication among the colonised states, particularly in the Arabic peninsula, advocating for emancipation. Inspired by events in Syria and Lebanon, Algerian nationalism requested political autonomy through a manifesto delivered to both the Allies and France. As a response to the request, General De Gaulle extended French citizenship to more Muslim categories. The measure was nonetheless judged insufficient, leading to protests in Setif in May 1945. French authorities fired on the demonstrators, causing a massive escalation of violence. 84 European settlers were killed, to which French authorities retaliated with the massacre of 8000 Algerians, according to French sources, or 45,000 Algerians according to Algerian sources. The Algerian War of Independence had just started.
The Algerian War of Independence was marked by violence, opposing the FLN to mobs of Pieds Noirs (European settlers) and the French army, with civilians often being the target of attacks aimed at dissuading or gaining more international attention. Facing the incapacity to overcome the resistance, De Gaulle announced in 1959 the necessity for Algeria to obtain “self-determination”. Clinging to the idea of a French Algeria, several generals even organised a failed coup to overthrow De Gaulle, known as the General’s Putsch, in 1961. The following year, a ceasefire was declared by France, and a truce between the Pieds-Noirs resistance and the FLN was agreed upon. On July 1st 1962, six million Algerians voted in favour of the referendum, validating the Evian Agreements and effectively making Algeria Algerian.
Demographic and urban legacy
Algeria’s colonisation by France had an impact on many levels, a majority of them still clearly visible to this day. The demographic legacy Algerian has had both through the colonisation process and the independence war is of great significance, not only shaping the population in metropolitan France but also influencing urbanisation policies. Three groups immigrated to France post-Algerian independence: the Pieds Noirs, the Harkis, and the Algerian migrant workers. While Pieds Noirs were European-origin settlers in Algeria, the Harkis, on the other hand, were Algerian Muslims who had collaborated with the French. Each group presented its unique characteristics and had to be integrated to some level in the French society.
Pieds Noirs, which had previously established a home in Algeria, attempted in its almost totality to migrate to metropolitan France, representing a movement of about 1.5 million people across the border, thus matching at the time roughly 3% of the French population. Algerian-originated migration concorded with migratory fluxes from neighbouring countries as well, namely Morocco (240,000 migrants), Tunisia (175,000 migrants), Indochina (30,000 migrants) and Sub-Saharan Africa (8,000). While many colonisers chose to remain in post-independent countries, the violence Pied Noirs had suffered from and perpetuated in Algeria left them in a precarious situation and a need to evacuate.
The intensity of the migration, reaching 400,000 Pieds Noirs within 3 years, thus surprised the government and especially the Commissariat of Planning, which had not foreseen that situation. To add to the situation, most of the refugees had decided to settle south of the Loire River, despite the North of France being more economically dynamic. The government consequently mobilised significantly to adapt and provide the first necessity structures. By the end of the first two years of the migratory wave, almost all Pieds Noirs were adequately housed, with a state policy reserving 30% of public housing being built in that timespan specifically for this group. Out of all the Pieds Noirs seeking employment in the private sector and the public sector, 87% and 80% respectively were employed as well within these two years, illustrating the labour-short French economy. It’s also important to note the regional concentrations, with Pieds Noirs populations accounting for up to 10% of some cities, such as Marseille or Montpellier, for instance. A political and social tension remained, however, despite their integration, namely the issue of reparations, which were not being provided for lost property in Algeria, as well as the frightened feeling they created by association with the OAS (Secret Army Organisation) terror tactics. This extreme far-right rebel faction perpetuated terror attacks with the aim of disrupting peace agreement talks between France and Algeria.
The second significant group of migrants from Algeria was the Harkis, a term used to describe Muslim Algerians who had collaborated with the police and gendarmerie, including their families. They accounted for roughly 200,000 individuals, plus their dependents/ family. Of that number, 52,000 Harkis with their families (accounting in total for 130,000) migrated to France in 1962 alone. Once again, the French government was strongly surprised by the number, expecting no more than 10,000 of them at first. Unlike the Pieds Noirs, however, the French government was rather hostile to their coming and did as little as possible to assist evacuation from Algeria. The state took this approach despite having knowledge of the precarious situation Harkis found themselves in, judged as collaborators and traitors by locals, and the reason that 30,000 to 150,000 of them were killed. Many of the Harkis who managed to be evacuated owed it to the sympathising French army despite a clear governmental stance.
Unlike Pieds Noirs, Harkis struggled greatly upon their arrival in France; lacking skills or a cultural understanding of France, accommodation was difficult. The government placed a large share of them in camps designed for refugees during the Spanish Civil War, and the remaining migrating Harkis were placed in isolated rural communities in the South. Furthermore, Harkis had to apply for French citizenship, unlike the Pieds Noirs, who had it granted. Governmental grants were also significantly lower than the ones perceived by the Pieds Noirs, respectively 70,000 francs instead of 170,000. Despite having defended French interests in Algeria, Harkis were effectively forgotten. As illustrated by Le Monde, to this day, Harkis are “victims [of] a double racism, that of the French who assimilate them to the Algerian emigrant workers, that of the Algerians in France who do not forgive them for their “treason”.The living conditions in camps were such that Harkis had to stage protests in 1974 to hopefully gain more consideration from the government.
Not only guilty of having underestimated the risks of death by reprisals towards Harkis in Algeria, the French State also neglected the hosting of those who had managed to flee the fighting in Algeria. Transit camps are built for Harkis and their families; first in Puy-de-Dome and Aveyron regions, these camps quickly became saturated, hosting roughly 11 0000 people in July 1962. Facing a constant inflow of Harki migrants in light of the level of violence back in Algeria, more transit camps open in France, in regions of Pyrenees-Orientales, Gard, and Lot-et-Garonne, in which 42,000 people will stay, and another 40,000 escape from them. Considered more as refugees than repatriated subjects, Harkis are unable to request French citizenship. Managed administratively by the Ministry of Repatriation, but controlled militarily in camps made of tents at first and cabins later on in precarious conditions, families stayed in these conditions from a few days to years.
Considered by the state authorities as incapable of adaptation, “irrecoverable” even as said at the time, Harkis are purposely marginalised in “host cities” with disciplinary aims. Such host cities are built across the south, essentially, built from scratch from forest hamlets. In addition to the 69 host towns, specific districts in bigger cities are allocated for Harkis, such as La Cité des Tilleuls in Marseilles, or La Cité des Oliviers in Narbonne, where Harkis struggle alongside other migrant families in less than desirable social conditions. Some programs were built to assure housing, such as the Sonacotra or SNCF’s “harki programme”, but also came with several measures to facilitate integration, which in turn reinforced societal marginalisation.
By 1970, anger spread across camps and host cities, and by 1975, strong protests were organised in Bias and Saint-Maurice-l’Ardoise to contest the treatment and conditions endured by Harki families. It’s following these demonstrations that the French public discovered, to some extent, the treatment and State policies reserved for Harkis. Facing hunger strikes and the abduction of camp managers as means of protesting, and fearing an escalation of violence, the State adopted short-term emergency measures to appease the general climate, thus dismantling the two camps in question. Only after further protests in 1991, marked by highway closures and manifestations, did the State take into consideration the reparation requests for Harkis and their families.
The last dominant group to arrive in France after Algerian Independence was the Algerian workers. Already established in France, particularly after WWI, the attraction and need for foreign labour was even greater post WWII, at a time when France was demographically poor and where poverty and hunger were prevalent in Algeria. The war for independence heightened emigration to France; on one hand, the violence and instability in Algeria portrayed France as a more peaceful and secure place to live, and on the other hand, labour was even more needed to fill the gap of all the French soldiers mobilised to fight the insurgency. The importance of Algerian workers was furthermore highlighted by the Evian agreement, which provided free movement between Algeria and France; Paris needed that cheap labour, and Algiers needed those remittances. These policies led to a massive migration flux; over half a million Algerians were in France by 1964, with 90,000 continually arriving yearly for the following 5 years. Policies were then adjusted by the governments to limit the flow and favour other countries.
Tabling in immigration when it comes to employment and housing planning is one thing, but the Algerian migration also had significance in terms of demographics for France, particularly when it comes to its religious impact. Combining the migration of Harkis, Algerian workers and North African migrants, Islam became the second most predominant religion in France, making it the most Muslim country in Western Europe. The government then had to address needs such as building Muslim cemeteries and mosques, as well as learning centres for the Islamic faith. The French State also use this situation to its economic benefit, developing ties with oil-rich Gulf states and organising Mecca pilgrimages. Naturally, French society was not all inclusive either, and racism prevailed. 1966 polls underlined two items, namely that 62% of the French estimated that there were too many North Africans, and that 65% of Parisians admitted “having a racist attitude toward Arabs”. Aware of this problem, intellectuals and government officials tried to remedy it, unsuccessfully at first, until a first bill outlawing racial discrimination was passed in 1972.
The Algerian War for Independence coincided with the French cities’ renewal, marked by renovations, slum clearance, and the establishment of large housing units. The significance of Algerian migration brought new challenges for the state to tackle; more than finding means of housing, public authorities were also concerned by the risk of spreading Algerian nationalism through the FLN, for instance, and thus required being able to exert control over the place of living. Three main goals became clear for the French administration: to dismantle FLN bases, to control them, and to educate and integrate them into French life. Materially, these aims became apparent by the clearance of shanty towns, the renovation of slum neighbourhoods, the creation of temporary settlement suburbs, and the establishment of work hotels.
Macron, Harkis, and the Algerian Legacy
The Algerian War for Independence was particularly violent for Algerians; massacres, deaths by torture. Yet, decades later, representatives of the State of France are only now starting to acknowledge this dark part of history.
The case of Maurice Audin serves as a bitter reminder of it. Member of the Algerian Communist Party, then supporter of the FLN, Maurice Audin was a young French university student studying mathematics in Algiers. During the Battle of Algiers, the French military locked down the city, conducting house searches and mass arrests, questioning hundreds of suspects with the use of torture. Maurice Audin was never seen again. French authorities denied the use of torture for a long time, suggesting he had fled to a neighbouring country and to never reappear. French institutions took 60 years to admit his murder, with President Hollande presiding over the renaming of a main square in Algiers in his memory. He, however, never admitted or apologised. It took another 6 years for President Macron to officially take responsibility for his death, effectively admitting for the first time in history the responsibility of France for Audin’s death by torture.
The presence of Harkis in France has been characterized by a constant fight for the recognition of their service to France, and the provision of fundamental rights, with revendications centering around social discrimination and lack of access to employment and housing, as well as the difficulty to return to Algeria, or the political failure to recognize their history. Aware of the stakes at hand, French Presidents have attempted in more recent history to address and recognise France’s role. As such, tributes were led by President Chirac in 2001, President Sarkozy in 2012, President Hollande in 2016, and President Macron in 2018.
In September 2021, President Macron held a solemn conference alongside Harkis survivors and their descendants to officially apologise on behalf of the state. While President Holland had, in 2016, admitted “the responsibilities of French governments in the abandonment of the Harkis”, President Macron went beyond, promising the drafting of a law recognising the state’s responsibility and establishing reparations for the horrendous camp conditions in which entire families grew up. Harkis associations welcomed the gesture, but “hope that [President Macron] will be the one to end 60 years of a certain hypocrisy by which the abandoning of the Harkis is recognised in speeches, but not in the law”.
The question of reparation to Harkis descendants and their families is one which has been addressed in court, at both a national and European level. The first pillar of this recognition occurred in 2005 with the recognition allowance, followed up closely with the life annuity allowance ten years later. The third significant pillar was the legal right to compensation, which was passed by law 2022-229 on February 23rd 2022. Combined, these three pillars of recognition represent 123 million euros worth of retributions, as per the 2025 financial plan of the State, thus clearly taking responsibility, as stated by the law itself: “on the Nation’s recognition of the harkis and other persons repatriated from Algeria who formerly had civil status under local law, and reparation for the prejudice suffered by them and their families as a result of the indignity of their reception and living conditions in certain structures on French territory”.
Reparations owed to Harkis and their families became a European matter with the Tamazount case. Initially tried in France as a court case over reparations, it was pursued in the European Court of Human Rights, which delivered its verdict on April 4th 2025 – requiring the French government to review allocated amounts for reparations to increased levels. The court thus granted applicants the living conditions in Bias camp was in fact qualifiable to “inhuman and degrading treatment”, thus violating their right to “the respect of their private and family life” in light to the precarity of the camp in which they were enclosed, the lack of common school systems, and to the control of their letters by the administration. The official responses of the Government to such allegations were not one of denial, but rather acknowledging the conditions in which Harkis and their families were housed. It did, however, nuance the context to a certain extent, arguing that it wasn’t a matter of penal restriction of liberties but one in the context of a massive migratory wave. The Court concluded that conditions in which Harkis were housed by the State harmed human dignity and individual liberties.
While President Macron is adamant in taking responsibility over significant events, he has gone further by tasking historian Benjamin Stora with writing a report assessing how France should address its colonial legacy in the case of Algeria, having already addressed the ones of nuclear testing in Polynesia and the French role in the Rwandan genocide. Aside from the Harkis recognition work, President Macron was to appear at a commemoration for the Paris Massacre (1961), where the French police violently repressed an FLN protest, killing and drowning several tens of Algerian protestors, and kept the story away from mediatization. He was also to appear at an event commemorating the ratification of the Evian Accords in 1962.
The French colonising rule over Algeria eventually led to a determined fight of its people for independence, for a French Algeria to become an Algerian Algeria. Thousands lost their life in the fight, permanently staining this period of time in history. Yet, to this day, ties between France and Algeria are unique by their intertwining history, complex in admitting state responsibility, complicated to navigate with the colonial heritage, and yet still incredibly tied by migration. The class or group by origin divide, which was already observable during the war for independence, was yet again seen during the migratory flux, with such drastically different treatments between Harkis, Pieds Noirs and Algerian workers. Not only was the treatment different, and in some cases state-sponsored inhuman conditions, but it also shaped French cities, culture, policy and territory. Sixty years ago, France was fighting against racial discrimination, integrating a newly significant Islam in its culture, and building urban settlements in the suburbs to house migrating communities. Sixty years later, France is still dealing with related issues; fighting islamophobia, trying to legalise the place of Islam in its culture, and addressing numerous issues characteristic of those suburban urban settlements, while starting to finally recognise officially on a state level the role it has played back then.